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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This is an appeal from a final Decree of Divorce 
dated May 19, 1993. The Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1986). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court err or abuse its 
discretion by ordering Devon Smuin to pay $313.00 per 
month in child support for Dee Jay Smuin in spite of 
Bonnie Jo Smuin1s earning capacity? The lower court's 
decision need not be upheld if it is so manifestly 
unjust or inequitable that it indicates a clear abuse 
of discretion. Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 
(Utah App. 1987). Supporting authorities cited by 
Defendant/Appellee on this issue are as follows: Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (1989); Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 
489 (Utah 1991). 
2. Did the lower court err or abuse its 
discretion by awarding Bonnie Jo Smuin $1,000 per month 
as alimony in spite of Bonnie Jo Smuin's earning 
capacity, available liquid assets, and the distribution 
of marital debt? In reviewing such issue, the lower 
1 
court's decision should not be upheld if it constitutes 
abuse of discretion. Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 
841, 843 (Utah App. 1992). Supporting authorities 
cited by Defendant/Appellee on this issue are as 
follows: Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985); 
Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991); 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988); 
Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991); 
Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1992); 
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989). 
3. Did the lower court err or abuse its 
discretion by ordering DeVon K. Smuin to pay all 
marital debts of the parties except the "Tole House" 
debt? The standard of review for assignment of marital 
debts is abuse of discretion. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 
P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah App. 1988). Supporting 
authorities cited by Defendant/Appellee are as follows: 
Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055 (Utah App. 1987). 
4. Did the lower court err or abuse its 
discretion by considering the part-time employment of 
DeVon K. Smuin in its award of $1,000 per month alimony 
to Bonnie Jo Smuin? The standard of review for awards 
of alimony is stated in paragraph 2. Supporting 
2 
authorities cited by Defendant/Appellee are as follows: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (1989), Rasband v. Rasband, 
752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988). 
5. Did the lower court err or abuse its 
discretion by ordering DeVon K. Smuin to pay one-half 
of his retirement to Bonnie Jo Smuin, while not 
considering said funds as monies available to Bonnie Jo 
Smuin in determining Bonnie Jo Smuinfs financial need 
for alimony? The lower court's decision should not be 
upheld if "there was a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated 
against the findings, or such serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." 
Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App. 
1988). The standard of review for awards of alimony is 
stated in paragraph 2. Supporting authorities cited by 
Defendant/Appellee are as follows: Rasband v. Rasband, 
752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988); Jones v. Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072 (Utah App. 1985). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1986) and 
3 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (1989). Copies of the 
statutes are attached to the Addendum as Exhibits L and 
M. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The parties were married on April 19, 1968. 
During the next twenty years, they had three children 
together. Plaintiff/Appellee ("Bonnie Jo") worked at 
numerous jobs, became a licensed beautician, and 
operated her own business. Defendant/Appellant 
("Devon") often worked more than one job at a time to 
support the family. Both parties purchased The Tole 
House, a craft and paint store which Bonnie Jo managed 
and operated. 
Bonnie Jo is currently working only 12 to 15 hours 
a week as a beautician. She is studying nursing at 
Utah State University. She lives, rent-free, in a home 
provided for her by her mother, receives a Pell grant 
which covers nearly all educational expenses, and has 
no utility expenses or car payments. 
DeVon works more than 40 hours a week at two 
different jobs. He provides health insurance coverage 
for the only minor child of the parties, Dee Jay Smuin. 
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His other monthly expenses include rent, utilities, 
child support, automobile expenses, medical costs not 
covered by insurance, and more than $500 a month for 
installment payments on outstanding debts. 
The lower court awarded Bonnie Jo $312.00 a month 
child support, $1,000.00 a month alimony, one vehicle, 
half the proceeds of the sale of the marital home, and 
one-half of Devon's retirement fund. The court ordered 
DeVon to pay all of the marital debts except for the 
balance remaining on the Tole House, which appears to 
have been written off by the obligor. The debts, added 
to the child support and alimony DeVon must pay, exceed 
DeVonfs monthly net income. DeVon appeals the child 
support, alimony, allocation of debt, and division of 
property ordered by the lower court as an abuse of 
discretion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The parties were married on April 19, 1968 
(R. 5). 
2. Three children born have been born of the 
marriage, one of whom is still a minor. The minor 
child is Dee Jay Smuin, ("Dee Jay") born October 10, 
5 
1976 (R. 5), 
3. During the course of the marriage, the 
parties have resided in Vernal, Utah (R. 18). 
4. During the course of the marriage, Bonnie Jo 
has been periodically employed at numerous jobs. 
(Smuin Dep. pp. 5-13, R. 69-77). 
5. During the course of the marriage, Bonnie Jo 
has worked at the following establishments in the 
following positions: 
(a) Avon, salesperson (R. 69); 
(b) Sara Coventry, salesperson (R. 69); 
(c) Joyces House of Beauty, shampoo girl (R. 
69-70); 
(d) Jean's Beauty Boutique, 
apprentice/licensed beautician (R. 71); 
(e) The Hair Affair, licensed beautician (R. 
72); 
(f) The Tole House, owner, manager, teacher 
(R. 75-76). 
6. During the period of time that Bonnie Jo 
owned the Tole House (1988) she also worked at the Hair 
Affair (R. 75). 
7. During the aforementioned period, Bonnie Jo 
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worked at the Tole House six days per week and at The 
Hair Affair approximately two to three days per week. 
At this time, Bonnie Jo worked from eight to fifteen 
hours per day. (R. 75-76). 
8. Bonnie Jo and DeVon purchased The Tole House 
in 1988 and the original purchase price was $15,000.00 
(R. 75-77). 
9. The Tole House was a craft and paint store 
where things were made of wood with tole paintings on 
them. The Tole House was also a retail store which 
sold the paint supplies. (R. 14). 
10. DeVon made the original down payment of 
$2,200.00 on the Tole House (R. 14). 
11. Even without deducting alimony, Devon's 
monthly expenses exceed his monthly income by 
approximately $72.00 a month. (R. 10). 
12. DeVon has borrowed money to meet his monthly 
financial obligations. (R. 10-11). 
13. DeVon now holds more than one job, working 
more than 40 hours a week. 
14. Bonnie Jo is taking one class at Utah State 
University. (R. 82). 
15. Bonnie Jo works 3 days a weeks, from 2 to 8 
7 
hours a day. (R. 73). 
16. Bonnie Jo's classes are taught in the evening 
and do not prevent her from working at a minimum wage 
job during the day. (R. 120). 
17. DeVon has paid more than $10,000 in house 
payments on the marital property since the separation, 
although he has not had access to the home during this 
time. (R. 19-20). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: The lower court erred in ordering DeVon 
to pay $312.00 per month in child support for Dee Jay 
Smuin. In making this award of child support, the 
court considered Bonnie Jo's income of only $250.00 per 
month although Bonnie Jo is capable of earning at least 
$760 a month if she works full time like she did during 
the marriage and as DeVon continues to do. 
POINT II: The lower court erred in awarding 
Bonnie Jo Jo $1,000.00 per month as alimony. Failure 
to consider the Jones factors is abuse of discretion. 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1988). 
The lower court failed to consider any of the Jones 
factors. 
POINT III: The lower court erred in ordering 
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Devon to pay all marital debts except the "Tole House" 
debt without considering his ability to pay the debts. 
The assignment of all debts to DeVon, after ordering 
him to pay amounts of child support and alimony 
exceeding his financial ability to pay, was unjust, 
unequitable, and an abuse of discretion. 
POINT IV: The lower court erred in considering 
Devon's part-time employment in awarding $1,000.00 per 
month alimony to Bonnie Jo. The income attributed to 
DeVon in considering his ability to pay alimony should 
have been limited to his earnings during one full-time 
job because no one should be required to work more than 
one full-time job so that another person can work only 
part-time. 
POINT V: The lower court erred by ordering DeVon 
to pay one-half of his retirement to Bonnie Jo while 
not considering said funds in determining Bonnie Jo's 
financial need for alimony. This property settlement 
was unjust, unequitable, and an abuse of discretion 
because it deprives DeVon of an asset needed to pay 
debts assigned to him. Moreover, the retirement funds 
awarded to Bonnie Jo should have been counted as a 
resource decreasing her financial need for alimony. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEVON TO PAY 
$312.00 PER MONTH IN CHILD SUPPORT FOR DEE JAY 
WITHOUT CONSIDERING BONNIE JO'S EARNING CAPACITY. 
In awarding $312.00 a month child support, the 
court considered Bonnie Jo's income of only $250.00 per 
month although Bonnie Jo is capable of earning at least 
$760 a month if she works full time like she did during 
her marriage and as DeVon continues to do. Bonnie Jo 
is a healthy, fit adult with business management skills 
and experience which enable her to earn at least 
minimum wage. She has voluntarily reduced her work 
hours to less than 20 hours a week. The Utah 
legislature recognized the gross unfairness in such a 
situation by authorizing the court to impute income to 
any parent who is voluntarily underemployed or 
unemployed. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (1989). 
The lower court should have imputed income to 
Bonnie Jo in an amount based upon her "employment 
potential and probable earnings as derived from work 
history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing 
earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the 
community." Id. None of the exceptions to the rule 
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that income should be imputed apply to Bonnie Jo; she 
has no minor children at home with unusual emotional or 
physical needs, she is not disabled in any way, and she 
is not engaged in training to establish basic job 
skills. Id. 
Bonnie Jo does not need additional education or 
training to prepare her to enter the job market. She 
already has more than ample job skills. She has 
experience in sales, teaching, and retail management. 
She has owned and operated her own business. She has 
taken classes in word perfect, lotus, English, and 
business math. She has not sacrificed a career for 
marriage, but has pursued her career and outside 
interests freely during the duration of the marriage. 
Bonnie Jo's continued education is not 
rehabilitative in nature. Unlike the wife in Bell v. 
Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991), Bonnie Jo did not 
help her husband to acquire an education while 
postponing her own educational plans. Bell at 492. 
Instead, Bonnie Jo is attending college only because 
she has decided to change careers. Although the 
decision to better oneself is always commendable, it is 
unjust and unfair to require DeVon to bear nearly all 
11 
of the financial responsibility for Dee Jay merely 
because Bonnie Jo chooses to make a career change. 
Even if Bonnie Jo's educational pursuits are 
considered necessary, she is taking only one evening 
class. This class does not prevent her from working 
during the daytime. Bonnie Jo worked full-time during 
the marriage and should not be permitted to 
substantially reduce her efforts after the termination 
of the marriage to Devon's detriment. 
By counting only $250 a month in earnings for 
Bonnie Jo, the lower court lifted much of the financial 
responsibility for Dee Jay from Bonnie Jo's shoulders 
and placed it upon DeVon. This decision was not based 
upon a difference in earning capacity, but only upon a 
difference in the willingness of each parent to work to 
support their child. DeVon was, in effect, penalized 
because he chose to work full-time instead of going 
back to school to learn a new trade. He remains bound 
to a full-time job as a laborer, while Bonnie Jo works 
very little. This is so manifestly unjust and 
inequitable that it constitutes abuse of discretion. 
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II. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING BONNIE JO 
$1,000.00 PER MONTH AS ALIMONY WITHOUT CONSIDERING 
ANY OF THE JONES FACTORS. 
Three factors must be considered in determining a 
reasonable alimony award: (1) the financial conditions 
and needs of the reguesting spouse, (2) the ability of 
the reguesting spouse to produce a sufficient income 
for himself or herself, and (3) the ability of the 
other spouse to provide support. Jones v. Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072, 1975 (Utah 1985). See also, Schindler v. 
Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989). Failure to 
consider the Jones factors "constitutes an abuse of 
discretion." Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 
(Utah App. 1988). The lower court failed to consider 
any of the Jones factors. 
A. THE COURT DID NOT CONSIDER BONNIE JO'S FINANCIAL 
NEEDS 
Since the purpose of alimony is to maintain the 
standard of living enjoyed during marriage, "trial 
courts should first determine the financial needs and 
resources for both parties." Howell v. Howell, 806 
P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah App. 1991)(emphasis added). The 
lower court's consideration of Bonnie Jo's needs was 
limited to finding that she "does not possess work 
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skills which will allow her to receive much more than 
minimum wage" and may receive an inheritance. Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 4. 
An individual's financial need depends upon more 
than the individual's income. As demonstrated in 
Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, 435 (Utah App. 
1991), financial need is determined by comparing income 
to expenses. In Thronson, the court compared Ms. 
Thronson's imputed monthly income to her monthly living 
expenses to determine that she had a financial need for 
$800 a month alimony. Id. The lower court in the case 
at hand made no similar comparison and utterly failed 
to consider Bonnie Jo's expenses. The court gave no 
weight to the fact that Bonnie Jo, unlike DeVon, had no 
housing expenses. The court properly stated that the 
rental value of Bonnie Jo's home was not very 
important, but did not explain why the rental value of 
Bonnie Jo's home is of any consequence, since she does 
not receive rental income from the home and pays no 
rent to live in it. The court overlooked the 
significance of the market rental value of the home. 
Clearly, the value of the home to Bonnie Jo is a type 
of income in-kind, equal to what she would otherwise 
14 
have to pay for shelter. 
The lower court erred in not considering the home 
and free utilities as factors in determining Bonnie 
Jofs need for alimony. The court never compared Bonnie 
Jo's expenses to the amount of money available to her 
through her own earnings and educational assistance. 
Such a comparison is a crucial part of any 
determination of Bonnie Jo's financial need. 
B. THE COURT DID NOT FULLY CONSIDER DEVONfS ABILITY 
TO PAY ALIMONY 
Ability to pay any debt, including alimony, 
depends upon an individual's expenses as well as 
income. The court erred by not considering Devon's 
expenses in comparison to his income. The court merely 
stated that the gross income from all of Devon's jobs 
would be counted to determine the amount of alimony he 
must pay to Bonnie Jo. Findings of Fact, 3. Although 
the court never articulated the relationship between 
Devon's gross income and the alimony award, the 
implication is that DeVon should be able to pay $1,000 
because of his gross income. "The court must do more 
than simply state that the defendant has the ability to 
pay." Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
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Devon's net income is the real indicator of his 
ability to pay alimony. Without knowing the monthly 
liabilities imposed upon DeVon by the order that he pay 
child support and all of the marital debts, and without 
considering Devon's other living expenses, it is 
impossible to know if DeVon is financially able to pay 
$1,000.00 per month alimony. The court abused its 
discretion by failing to note that DeVon had no net 
income with which to pay alimony. Lacking a comparison 
of Devon's income and expenses, the lower court failed 
to make an "adequate factual finding'1 as required by 
Chambers. Id. 
C. THE COURT DID NOT FULLY CONSIDER BONNIE JO'S 
ABILITY TO PROVIDE FOR HERSELF 
The lower court found that "the defendant does not 
possess work skills which will allow her to receive 
much more than minimum wage" and that she currently 
earns about $250.00 a month. Thus it appears that the 
alimony award was based upon Bonnie Jo's current 
earnings, but the court did not explain why it relied 
upon this reflection of Bonnie Jo's willingness to 
support herself instead of her ability to provide for 
herself. At a minimum, the court should have 
considered the amount that Bonnie Jo could earn if she 
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accepted a full-time minimum wage job. The lower 
court's statement that Bonnie Jo is currently a full-
time student may indicate that the alimony award was 
meant to be rehabilitative, but the lower court neither 
characterized the alimony as rehabilitative nor 
explained why rehabilitative alimony is appropriate. 
Bonnie Jo is a healthy adult with an educational 
background at least equal to Devon's. She has a good 
work history and work skills. She is clearly able to 
earn at least $760 a month, the equivalent of the 
federal minimum wage for 40 hours a week. The same 
equitable considerations which led the Utah State 
legislature to impute earnings when awarding child 
support to a spouse who voluntarily reduces employment 
also apply to determinations of alimony. Bonnie Jo 
worked full-time during the marriage and should not be 
permitted to voluntarily reduce her employment in order 
to increase her alimony award. 
III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEVON TO PAY ALL 
MARITAL DEBTS EXCEPT THE "TOLE HOUSE" DEBT. 
Without explanation or rationale, the lower court 
ordered DeVon to pay all marital debts except the "Tole 
House" debt. In Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1057 
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(Utah App. 1987), the appellate court upheld the trial 
court's allocation of debt because the trial court had 
considered the nature of the debts and the parties1 
relative abilities to repay them. No such 
consideration was made before DeVon was ordered to pay 
all the debts. DeVon has zero net income after payment 
of child support, alimony, and living expenses. Bonnie 
Jo is relatively more financially capable of paying 
these debts, because her monthly expenses are much less 
than the amount that she could earn if she worked 40 
hours a week like DeVon. Assigning all debts to DeVon 
without comparing his ability to pay those debts to 
Bonnie Jo's ability to pay is so arbitrary and unjust 
as to constitute abuse of discretion. 
IV. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING DEVON'S PART-
TIME EMPLOYMENT IN AWARDING $1,000.00 PER MONTH 
ALIMONY TO BONNIE JO. 
The lower court based the alimony award upon 
Devon's total earnings, counting his part-time 
employment as well as his full-time employment. This 
is unfair, unreasonable, and contrary to the overall 
goal of alimony to "equalize the parties' respective 
post-divorce living standards" because the income 
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results from Devon working more than 40 hours a week. 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App. 
1980). The Utah state legislature has recognized the 
unfairness and unreasonableness of basing child support 
awards upon a parent's income from working more than 40 
hours a week. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(2) (1989). 
It is just as unfair and unreasonable to base alimony 
awards upon a spouse's income from working more than 40 
hours a week. Our modern society has accepted 40 hours 
a week as the norm and the maximum that a reasonable 
employer may expect from laborers. Forty hours a week 
is called "full-time" because 40 hours of work occupies 
the full amount of work time reasonably allocated to an 
individual. Since DeVon should not be expected to keep 
working more than 40 hours a week, the alimony award 
should not be based upon the income from more than 40 
hours a week. 
A standard of living is more than income; it is 
the way of life followed by an individual. If DeVon 
must work more than full-time, while Bonnie Jo works 
much less than full-time, their standards of living are 
grossly unequal. 
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V. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY ORDERING DEVON TO PAY 
ONE-HALF OF HIS RETIREMENT TO BONNIE JO WHILE NOT 
CONSIDERING SAID FUNDS AS MONIES AVAILABLE TO 
BONNIE JO IN DETERMINING BONNIE JO'S FINANCIAL 
NEED FOR ALIMONY. 
The court erred in two respects concerning the 
order requiring Devon to pay one-half of his retirement 
to Bonnie Jo. First, the division of Devon's 
retirement is a substantial and prejudicial error and a 
serious inequity because it deprived DeVon of assets he 
needs to enable him to pay the debts allocated to him 
by the court. Second, the court failed to consider the 
retirement funds as a resource affecting Bonnie Jo's 
financial need for alimony. 
A. DIVISION OF DEVON'S RETIREMENT IS A SERIOUS 
INEQUITY BECAUSE DEVON WAS ORDERED TO PAY ALL OF 
THE MARITAL DEBTS EXCEPT THE TOLL HOUSE DEBT. 
DeVon was ordered to pay Bonnie Jo one-half of his 
retirement, even though he was assigned all of the 
debts. Debt, however, is merely the inverse of an 
asset. As a type of property, the negative value of 
the debts should have been added the value of the 
Devon's retirement and all other assets, such as the 
equity in the marital home, so that the total value of 
all marital property could be equitably divided. 
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Before adding in the equity of the marital home, DeVon 
should have been reimbursed for the $10,000 he paid in 
mortgage payments on this home after the separation. 
The lower court, however, never calculated the total 
value of all of the assets or considered using the 
marital assets to offset the marital debts. In giving 
half of Devon's retirement to Bonnie Jo, the court 
deprived DeVon of assets which should be available for 
him to pay the debts which the court ordered him to 
pay. 
B. IF DEVON MUST GIVE ONE-HALF OF HIS RETIREMENT TO 
BONNIE JO, THE RETIREMENT MONIES SHOULD BE COUNTED 
AS A RESOURCE DECREASING BONNIE JO'S FINANCIAL 
NEED FOR ALIMONY. 
In determining the amount of an alimony award, a 
court must consider the financial need of the party 
requesting alimony. Jones at 1075. Failure to 
consider this Jones factor is an abuse of discretion. 
Rasband at 1333. As demonstrated in Jones, the assets 
available to the party requesting alimony should be 
considered in determining financial need for alimony. 
Jones at 1075. The Jones court considered the cash, 
securities, and equity in the home awarded to Ms. Jones 
compared to her monthly expenses as part of the 
determination that she needed $1,000 a month alimony. 
21 
Such a comparison has never been made upon which to 
base the alimony awarded to Bonnie Jo. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the facts and circumstances of this 
case, and the authorities cited herein, the orders and 
judgments entered by the lower court should be 
reversed. 
DATED this^7^ day of December, 1993. 
MCDONALD, WEST & BENSON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a 
true and accurate copy of the foregoing Brief this 
^L\ ' day of December, 1993 to the following: 
Alan M. Williams 
365 W. 50 N., #W10 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
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EXHIBIT C: Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah 1991) 
EXHIBIT D: Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 (Utah 
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EXHIBIT E: Hansen v. Hansen. 736 P.2d 1055 (Utah 
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EXHIBIT F: Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah 
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EXHIBIT G: Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 
1985) 
EXHIBIT H: Naranio v. Naranio. 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah 
App. 1988) 
EXHIBIT I: Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah 
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EXHIBIT J: Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 
(Utah App. 1989) 
EXHIBIT K: Thronson v. Thronson. 810 P.2d 428 (Utah 
1991) 
EXHIBIT L: Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(i) 
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EXHIBIT M: Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (1989) 
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Alan M. Williams (3478) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
365 W. 50 N., #W10 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
801-789-2713 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEVON K. SMUIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BONNIE JO SMUIN, 
Defendant, ! 
! DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. 9108000247 
This matter came before the Court on the 29th day of January, 
1993. The Honorable A. Lynn Payne presided. The plaintiff 
appeared in person and was represented by his attorney, Suzanne 
Bensen. The defendant was present and represented by her attorney, 
Alan M. Williams. The Court heard evidence from the parties. 
Having done so and now being fully advised in the premises, and 
having previously entered its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, and for good cause appearing, the Court makes the following: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The parties are hereby granted a Decree of Divorce from 
each other dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing 
between the parties. Said decree shall become final upon entry 
ShanaiWitbeck, C 
By Mt ' 
lerk 
Deputy 
2 
thereof. 
2. It is ordered that the parties property should be divided 
as follows: 
a. The parties are ordered to sell the marital residence 
with the proceeds to be divided equally between the parties. In 
the event that there is a deficiency upon sell, it is ordered that 
it shall be divided equally between the parties; 
b. The parties are ordered to sell the Kit camp trailer. 
The proceeds are to divided equally between the parties; 
c. It is ordered that the inventory from the business 
known as the Toll House be sold with the proceeds being retained 
for the purposes of paying off the $8,000.00 debt owed on the 
business. In the event that the creditor cannot be located, it is 
ordered that the parties retain the proceeds until such time as the 
statute of limitations has expired for collection of the debt. In 
the event that there is a residual debt on the business, it is 
ordered that the parties divide equally and be equally responsible 
for that debt. In the event that the proceeds become available, 
it is ordered that those proceeds shall divided equally between the 
parties. 
d. It is ordered that the plaintiff be awarded all 
property on Exhibit Four received by the Court and referred to in 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with the exception of 
the dishes, glasses, and kitchen appliances; 
e. The defendant is awarded the dishes, glasses, and 
kitchen appliances and the items listed on Exhibit Five with the 
3 
exception of the inventory of the Toll House; 
f. The defendant is awarded the 1988 Pontiac automobile; 
g. The plaintiff is hereby awarded the 1985 Bronco; 
h. The parties are hereby awarded all other personal 
property which is currently in the possession of each of them. 
3. It is ordered that the plaintiff shall assume and pay all 
remaining marital debts. 
4. It is ordered that the plaintiff pay to the defendant one 
half of the value of his retirement plan currently held with his 
employer, P.J.E. 
5. The defendant is hereby awarded custody oi the parties 
minor child, D.J. 
6. The plaintiff is ordered to pay child support in the 
amount of $312.00 per month until the month of May following D.J.'s 
eighteenth birthday. 
7. The plaintiff is ordered to pay alimony in the sum of One 
Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) per month. The Court retains 
jurisdiction to alter or amend this award in the event that 
defendants income substantially increases. 
8. The plaintiff is ordered to maintain medical insurance on 
behalf of D.J. through his employment through the month of May 
following his eighteenth birthday. 
9. Each party is ordered to execute and complete all necessary 
**" : 
documents in order to effectuate the above transfer of property. 
Dated this (f day of / ^ L 1993. 
A. Lynn Pa 
Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Suzanne Bensen 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and DECREE OF DIVORCE were 
sent postage prepaid to Suzanne Benson, Attorney at Law at 455 East 
500 South, Suite #200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the 5th day 
of March, 1993. 
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Alan M. Williams (3478) 
Attorney for Defendant 
365 W. 50 N., #W10 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
801-789-2713 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEVON K. SMUIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BONNIE J. SMUIN, 
Defendant, j 
| FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 9108000247 
This matter came before the Court on the 29th day of January, 
1993. The Honorable A. Lynn Payne presided. The plaintiff 
appeared in person and was represented by his attorney, Suzanne 
Bensen. The defendant was present and represented by her attorney, 
Alan M. Williams. The Court heard evidence from the parties. 
Having done so and based on the evidence, the Court makes the 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
1. The parties were married on April 19, 1968. 
2. That during the course of the marriage, irreconcilable 
differences have developed in making a continuation of the marriage 
impossible. 
3. The parties have resided in Uintah County, State of Utah 
for a period of at least several years prior to the filing of the 
ShanatfM 
By CJ^ 
 j titbeck. Clerk 
_ Deputy 
2 
action in this matter. 
4. The parties have two children. One of the children, D.J. 
is under the age of eighteen. Based on the parties stipulation of 
record, it is reasonable and appropriate that child support 
continue until through the month of May following D.J.'s eighteenth 
birthday in order that he may finish high school. 
5. The plaintiff works at P.J.E. Resources as a pumper. For 
the purposes of accessing child support, his income is $2,885.92 
per month. 
6. The defendant is currently enrolled as a full-time student 
and works part-time a week as a beautician. Her income from 
employment is $250.00 per month. 
7. The parties have stipulated that the defendant be given 
custody of D.J. The Court finds that this is a reasonable 
arrangement. It is reasonable and appropriate that the plaintiff 
have the right to reasonable and liberal visitation. 
8. It is reasonable and appropriate that based on the parties 
income, child support should be assessed at $312.00 per month 
payable by the plaintiff to the defendant. 
9. It reasonable and appropriate that plaintiff be ordered 
to provide insurance for D.J. through his employment. He may 
deduct the costs of D.J.'s portion of such medical insurance from 
the child support payments. It is reasonable that each party pay 
one-half of the medical expenses not covered by insurance. 
10. It is reasonable and appropriate that the plaintiff may 
claim DeeJay as his dependant for income tax purposes. 
3 
11. It is reasonable and appropriate that the plaintiff assume 
all debts incurred during the marriage except as specifically 
excepted in these findings. 
12. The plaintiff has other employment besides his work as a 
pumper. For the purposes of considering alimony, the Court will 
consider all of his income. His total income for the purposes of 
considerating alimony is $3,176.66 per month. 
13. During the course of this marriage the parties purchased 
a business known as the Tole House. It is reasonable and proper 
that the inventory of this business be sold with the proceeds being 
used to pay off an existing debt in connection with this business 
in the amount of approximately $8,000.00. In the event the parties 
cannot locate the creditor, the funds should be retained by the 
parties until a statute of limitations has expired with respect to 
the collection of the debt. In the event that there is residual 
debt after the payment of any creditors in this matter, it is 
reasonable and appropriate that the debt be divided equally between 
the parties. 
14. The parties are owners of real property with a home on it. 
It is reasonable and appropriate that the home should be sold and 
the proceeds should be equally divided between the parties after 
expenses are paid. 
15. The parties are the owner of a Kit camp trailer. It is 
reasonable and appropriate that it should be sold and the proceeds 
divided equally between the parties. 
16. It is reasonable and appropriate that the parties personal 
4 
property be divided as follows: 
a. Plaintiff should awarded the dishes, silverware and 
utensils in the trailer. 
b. Defendant should be awarded the items listed on 
Exhibit Five with the exception of the inventory. 
c. Plaintiff should be awarded the property on Exhibit 
Four with the exception of the dishes, glasses, and kitchen 
appliances which are awarded to the defendant. 
d. Except as otherwise specified, each party should be 
awarded the personal property of his or her own possession. 
17. The plaintiff has available to him retirement funds. It 
is reasonable and appropriate that the retirement funds should be 
divided equally between the parties. 
18. It is reasonable and appropriate that the plaintiff should 
be awarded the 1985 Bronco and that the defendant should be awarded 
the 1988 Pontiac automobile. 
19. The Court finds that the defendant does not possess work 
skills which will allow her to receive much more than minimum wage. 
It is therefore reasonable and appropriate that the plaintiff be 
ordered to pay alimony. In consideration of the amount of alimony, 
the Court finds that it is inappropriate at this time to consider 
any expectation of inheritance. The court also finds that it is 
unable to give the fact that the defendant will live in a new home 
at a rental rate at less than market value a great deal of weight 
in determining the amount of that alimony. Based on the parties 
present financial condition, it is reasonable and appropriate that 
5 
the defendant be awarded the sum of $1,000.00 per month as alimony. 
20. The defendant currently is in school to up-grade her job 
skills, and it is anticipated that her ability to provide for 
herself willincrease in the future. It is appropriate that the 
Court retain jurisdiction to alter alimony if defendants income 
substantially increases. 
21. It is reasonable and appropriate that each party be 
required to bear his or her own attorney's fees in this matter. 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the court now makes 
the following conclusions of law: 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties hereto. 
2. The parties are entitled to a decree of divorce from each 
other on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to 
become final upon entry. 
3. The parties debt should be divided in accordance with the 
above findings of fact. 
4. The parties personal property should be divided in 
accordance with the above findings of fact. 
5. The defendant is awarded custody of the parties minor 
child. 
6. The plaintiff should be required to pay child support in 
the amount of with the amount of $312.00 per month until the month 
of May following Deejay's eighteenth birthday. 
7. The plaintiff should be required to pay alimony to the 
Defendant in the amount of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) per 
month. 
6 
8. The Court should retain jurisdiction to alter alimony if 
the defendants income substantially increases. 
9. The plaintiff should be required to pay and assume medical 
insurance for the parties minor child in accordance with the terms 
set forth above. 
10. The plaintiff should be required to assume and pay all 
marital debts in accordance with the terms set forth above. 
Dated this ff day of /^*H 1993. 
A. Lynj/TPayne, Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Suzanne Bensen 
TabC 
BELL v. BELL 
Cite as 810 PJJd 489 (Utah App. 1991) 
dmmistrative search, which, as applied, made on appeal 
1
 not violate the fourth amendment. 
Utah 489 
thout exceeding the scope of the admin-
n v e search, an officer discovered a bin-
£»e containing cocaine in plain view at the 
'
 0f the purse's contents. A more ex-
haustive search of Cornwall's baggage en-
ued as an incident to her arrest and re-
led marijuana. Since the controlled 
substances seized were either in plain view 
discovered in a lawful search incident to 
arrest, the district court erred in suppress-
mg the controlled substances as evidence 
against Cornwall. 
The order of suppression is therefore 
reversed and this case is remanded for 
trial. 
JACKSON, J., concurs. 
ORME, Judge (concurring): 
I concur in the court's opinion but write 
separately to highlight an aspect of our 
decision that is only implicit in the main 
opinion. 
Just as in the context of automobile in-
ventory searches, routinized adherence to 
an articulated search protocol is critical to 
sustaining an administrative search as rea-
sonable. As this court recently stated in 
the inventory search context, 
[s]uch a procedure precludes the possibil-
ity that officers conducting inventory 
searches will act arbitrarily and only se-
lectively open containers. Further, such 
a procedure insulates police from the 
claim that, in a particular case, their 
opening closed containers was nothing 
more than a "fishing expedition." It also 
promotes a certain equality of treatment. 
With a standardized, mandatory proce-
dure, the minister's picnic basket and 
grandma's knitting bag are opened and 
inventoried right along with the biker's 
tool box and the gypsy's satchel. 
State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 428 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
In the instant case, uncontroverted testi-
mony establishes that the bailiff conducted 
the magnetometer and x-ray screening and 
the ensuing search strictly in accordance 
with the established protocol. No claim is 
that the bailiff deviated 
from the routine that is followed in all 
situations where the x-ray reveals "a dark, 
indistinct mass." 
Thus, I infer that the protocol routinely 
followed when a container enclosing such a 
mass also contains other closed containers 
is that the other containers—or, more accu-
rately, those large enough to contain the 
mass which has aroused curiousity—are 
immediately opened and individually in-
spected rather than to first individually x-
ray the smaller containers. 
As the main opinion observes, the bailiff 
"discovered that [the large bag] contained 
two purses, and she could not see from 
examining the outside of the purses wheth-
er either purse contained a weapon or dan-
gerous object." Of course, further insight 
might have been gained with less intrusion 
had each purse been individually x-rayed as 
the next step. But on the record before us, 
that is not what the search protocol re-
quires. Neither does the Fourth Amend-
ment. Use of an x-ray is essentially gratui-
tous, an accommodation to the privacy con-
cerns of the public and/or a convenience to 
those conducting the searches. So long as 
proper notice is posted, the Fourth Amend-
ment is not violated at other court locations 
where the practice is to simply physically 
inspect the briefcases, bags, and purses of 
all persons seeking to enter the courthouse. 
( O | «Y NUMBtR SYSTEM^ 
Michele Mclver BELL, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Harold Freeman BELL, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 900183-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 23, 1991. 
Divorce judgment was entered by the 
First District Court, Cache County, F.L. 
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Gunnell, J , and wife appealed The Court 
of Appeals, Billings, J , held that: (1) the 
trial court's findings on the issue of alimo-
ny were inadequate, and (2) trial court was 
required to explain its reduction of attor-
ney fees incurred by wife 
Affirmed in part, and reversed and re-
manded in part 
1. Divorce «=>286(3) 
Court of Appeals will not disturb trial 
court's ruling on alimony as long as court 
exercises its discretion within bounds and 
under standards Court of Appeals has set 
and has supported its decision with ade-
quate findings and conclusions. 
2. Divorce <S=»239. 240(2), 285 
Failure to consider Jones factors in 
fashioning alimony award constitutes 
abuse of discretion; thus, trial court must 
make sufficiently detailed findings of fact 
on each factor to enable reviewing court to 
ensure that trial court's discretionary de-
termination was rationally based upon 
those three factors, and if sufficient find-
ings are not made, Court of Appeals must 
reverse unless record is clear and uncontro-
verted such as to allow court to apply 
Jones factors as matter of law on appeal. 
3. Divorce e=>239 
Alimony award was not supported by 
adequate findings; court failed to make 
adequate findings on needs of either hus-
band or wife, as both parties claimed that 
other's expenses were unreasonable, but 
court made no findings as to reasonable-
ness of those expenses, and findings were 
inadequate as to wife's ability to support 
herself, as wife's claimed expenses far ex-
ceeded her monthly income even at level 
imputed by trial court 
4. Divorce *»252.1, 252.2 
Wife failed to show that property dis-
tribution was inequitable, as wife did not 
explain what property she believed should 
have been awarded to her or how court 
abused its discretion 
5. Divorce «=»22l. 227(1) 
Award of attorney fees in divorce pro-
ceeding must be based on evidence of fi-
nancial need of receiving spouse, ability of 
other spouse to pay, and reasonableness of 
requested fees; court may consider, among 
other factors, difficulty of litigation, effi-
ciency of attorneys, reasonableness of 
number of hours spent on case, fee custom-
arily charged in locality, amount involved 
in case and result attained, and expertise 
and experience of attorneys involved. U.C 
A. 1953, 30-3-3. 
6. Divorce «=»287 
Where court gave no explanation for 
its reduction of attorney fees incurred by 
wife in divorce proceeding and reasonable* 
ness of fees was uncontroverted, and court 
failed to address wife's need or husband's 
ability to pay her attorney fees, remand 
was required for redetermination of award* 
able attorney fees. U C.A.1953, 30-3-3. 
7. Divorce «=>226, 227(1) 
It is abuse of discretion for trial court 
without any reasonable justification to 
award less than claimed amount of attor-
ney fees in divorce proceeding; court must 
explain its sua sponte reduction in order to 
permit meaningful review on appeal. U.CL 
A. 1953, 30-3-3. 
Lyle W. Hillyard (argued), Hillyiri 
Anderson & Olsen, Logan, for plaintiff and 
appellant. 
Craig S. Cook (argued), Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, GARFF, and 
ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Appellant Michele Mclver Bell (WifeX 
and Appellee Harold Freeman Bell (Hua» 
band), were married in 1979 at Logan, 
Utah. One child, age six at the time of the 
divorce, was born during the marriage. * 
Husband serves as a Major in the Air 
Force and is stationed in New Mexico. Hit 
monthly salary at the time of the divoroi 
was $3,660, or approximately $40,000 per 
year. During the marriage, Husband 
HELL v. HELL 
C l l e u S I O P2d 4S9 (Utah App 1991) 
tamed a master's degree which assisted child support, 
aim in the advancement of his military 
career. Wife claims the degree was a re-
mit of joint efforts of Husband ami Wife. 
Wife claims the parties agreed she would 
twist Husband in pursuing his degree, and 
•hen she decided to return for her gradu-
ate degree, Husband would support her. 
Husband admits Wife assisted him in ob-
ttihing his degree and does not explicitly 
deny that he agreed to support Wife when 
•be returned to school to obtain her gradu-
ate degree. 
Utah 491 
At the time of trial, Wife was pursuing a 
•uter 's degree in education at Utah Stite 
University and was making $863 per month 
as a teaching assistant. Prior to attending 
Utah State, Wife taught school in North 
Carolina making about $1,500 per month, 
«T approximately $18,000 a year. 
The parties purchased a home in North 
Carolina and resided there between 1983 
and 1987. Both parties incurred substan-
tial debt in their individual names during 
the marriage. 
In April 1987, Husband was ordered to 
Korea for a one year tour of duty. Wife 
dtd not accompany him, but remained in 
North Carolina.1 
Wife began working on her master's de-
fine at Utah State in 1988. Although Hus-
band had sent Wife between $1,600 and 
•1,800 per month while he was stationed in 
Korea, once Wife began attending Utah 
Slate, he refused to provide Wife with fi-
nancial support other than $450 per month 
to support their child, apparently because 
be disapproved of her relocation and edu-
cational advancement. 
Wife filed for divorce in March 1989, and 
k March 1990, the parties were granted a 
divorce based on irreconcilable differences. 
Under the divorce decree, Wife was award-
ed custody of the parties' child subject to 
reasonable visitation by Husband. Hus-
band was ordered to pay $450 per month 
i Huvband claims thai during this one ycai pen 
ad. Wife dissipated their maiilnl assets Wife, 
•A the other hand, claims there were two 
•lonths of unpaid bills that she paid soon after 
Muihand left for Korea, and that the remainder 
•( the money was spent on joint family expenses 
HOP 2d-13 
Wife was awarded an inter-
est in Husband's military retirement, sub-
ject to a reduction of $3,800, one-half of 
Wife's retirement, which she cashed in Feb-
ruary 1989. Each party was ordered to 
pay the debts incurred in his or her own 
name. Neither party challenges these rul-
ings on appeal. 
The court awarded Wife alimony of $250 
a month for two years and then satisfied 
the award by giving Wife the personal 
property in her possession which the court 
valued at $6,000. The court found no equi-
ty in the family's North Carolina home and 
awarded it to Husband. The court also 
awarded Husband the personal property in 
his possession. Finally the court ordered 
Husband to pay a portion of Wife's attor-
ney fees 
Wife appeals from the divorce decree, 
claiming- (1) her award of alimony was 
insufficient; (2) the trial court failed to 
adequately value and divide the marital 
property; (3) her award of attorney fees 
was inadequate; and (4) she is entitled to 
attorney fees on appeal We affirm in part 
and reverse and remand in part. 
ALIMONY 
111 We will not disturb a trial court's 
ruling on alimony as long as the court 
"exercises its discretion within the bounds 
and under the standards we have set and 
has supported its decision with adequate 
findings and conclusions." Naranjo v. 
Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) (quoting Davis v. Davis, 749 
P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988)). 
The well-settled standard for setting tra-
ditional alimony has been articulated by the 
Utah Supreme Court as follows: 
"The most important function of alimony 
is to provide support for the wife as 
nearly as possible at the standard of 
living she enjoyed during the marriage, 
and to prevent the wife from becoming a 
and that she and hci daughter weie living at the 
same standaid ol living as they had lived before 
Husband went to Korea The only exception 
appears to have been a loan Wile made to her 
sister, which rcptesents only a small part of the 
total amount of assets. 
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public charge." English v. English, 565 
P.2d [409] at 411 (Utah 1977). . . . 
[TJhree factors must 1 1 be considered in 
fixing a reasonable alimony award: 
11] the financial conditions and needs 
of the wife; 
[21 the ability of the wife to produce 
a sufficient income for herself; and 
[3] the ability of the husband to pro-
vide support. 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 
1985). 
12 J Failure to consider the Jones 
factors in fashioning an alimony award 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. See 
Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988) (citing Paffel v. Paffel, 732 
P.2d 96. 101 (Utah 1986)). Accordingly, the 
trial court must make sufficiently detailed 
findings of fact on each factor to enable a 
reviewing court to ensure that the trial 
court's discretionary determination was ra-
tionally based upon these three factors. 
See Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 
1988); Stevens, 754 P.2d at 958-59; see 
also Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 
(Utah 1987). If sufficient findings are not 
made, we must reverse unless the record is 
clear and uncontroverted such as to allow 
us to apply the Jones factors as a matter of 
law on appeal. See Asper v. Asper, 753 
P.2d 978, 981 (Utah CtApp.1988). 
131 The trial court awarded alimony to 
Wife in the amount of $250 a month for 
two years. The court satisfied this award 
by awarding Wife the personal property in 
her possession which the court valued at 
$6,000. This, in effect, eliminated the per-
sonal property award to Wife and resulted 
in no monetary award of alimony. The 
trial court found: 
2. It was undisputed that, at the time of trial, 
Wife's income was J863 per month. None-
theless, the court imputed to hci income at a 
level she previously had earned in North Car-
olina as a school teacher No explanation was 
offcted for this unusual adjustment. 
3. A rehabilitative award could well be appropri-
ate in this case as Wife is college educated, in 
good health, and worked throughout the mar-
riage. She is independently minded, as evi-
denced b) hci decision to stay in North Car-
That regarding alimony, because the 
standard of living is based on debt and 
wasted assets and not established by the 
lifestyle and in lieu of any alimony, Plain-
tiff is awarded all the personal property 
now in her possession which the Court 
places a value of $6,000.00 based on the 
husband's Exhibit No. 14. 
In discussing the alimony award, the tri-
al judge stated from the bench, "I don't 
give it as much weight as to what the 
needs and abilities of the parties might be 
because they dissipated and lived on cred-
it." Nevertheless, the court specifically in-
dicated that the level of its alimony award 
was not based on the fact that Wife dissi-
pated assets. 
The court did find Husband's income was 
$3,660 per month and Wife's was $1,500.' 
The only other arguable reference to the 
Jones factors is included in another state-
ment by the court from the bench: 
So what I will do is, as far as alimony, is 
in lieu of alimony, and I set down and 
computed what the defendant could pay, 
which is essentially nothing, what the 
plaintiff needed, which is a great deal 
and asked how it could be paid. 
The trial court seems to justify ignoring 
the three-prong Jones test because "each 
[of the parties] have had and pursued sepa-
rate careers and there has been a history 
of marital problems." At least the latter 
part of this statement can be made about a 
majority of divorces and certainly is not 
grounds to deviate from the Jones analysis. 
Furthermore, nothing in the record indi-
cates the trial judge approached the alimo-
ny issue from the standpoint of a rehabili-
tative or reimbursement approach rather 
than a traditional alimony award. If this 
was the intent, then different findings and 
analysis would be appropriate.' See Peter-
olina when Husband went to Korea and to stay 
in Utah when he was assigned to New Mexico. 
She is comparatively young and the marriage 
was comparatively short. On the other hand, 
Wife helped Husband get his master's degree, 
but the marriage ended before she had the 
chance to get hers, as had been contemplated. 
There is no question that receiving an advanced 
degree would better equip her to compete in the 
job market for a position at a better salary. An 
award of alimony geared towards reimbursing 
sen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 242 n. 4 
(Utah Ct.App.1987). 
The trial court's findings on the issue of 
alimony are so inadequate that we cannot 
determine the legal basis of the award or 
whether the trial court abused its discre-
tion in the amount of the award. First, the 
court failed to make adequate findings on 
the needs of either Husband or Wife. Wife 
claimed expenses of $2,493 per month. 
Husband claimed expenses of $5,090.74 per 
month. No findings were made as to the 
reasonableness of these expenses, yet both 
parties argued below and on appeal the 
other's expenses are unreasonable. The 
only finding by the court on this point is 
that each party had "roughly equivalent" 
debts in their own names, which the court 
required them to pay. Without a finding 
on reasonable expenses, we are unable to 
determine the true needs of Wife, or to 
determine Husband's actual ability to pay 
and, therefore, to balance Wife's needs 
against Husband's ability to pay as re-
quired in Jones. The mere conclusory 
statement of the trial court that Husband 
can "afford nothing" when he is making 
$40,000 per year is simply not supported by 
the record, absent some finding as to the 
reasonableness of his claimed expenses. 
Furthermore, there is no explanation why, 
if Wife needed "a great deal," the court 
awarded no monetary award of alimony. 
Second, the findings are inadequate as to 
Wife's ability to support herself. Wife's 
claimed expenses of $2,493 per month far 
exceed her monthly income even at the 
level imputed by the trial court. 
The court's alimony award is not sup-
ported by adequate findings, and thus we 
reverse and remand the alimony award for 
additional findings on each of the Jones 
factors in light of our opinion, and a reas-
sessment of the alimony award based upon 
her for the help she extended Husband in get-
ting his degree, or towards assisting her in ac-
quiring her degree which would better enable 
her to suppoit her daughter may well be closer 
to the mark than the traditional alimony analy-
sis. However, if this approach is taken, it 
would be inappiopriale to impute income to 
Wife at the level of her previous teaching salary 
as the trial judge did. The purpose of rehabili-
tative alimony is in the short run to close the 
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those findings. In the alternative, if the 
relevant Jones findings or other analysis 
lead to a conclusion that an award of reha-
bilitative or reimbursement alimony is the 
more appropriate vehicle to equitably treat 
the parties in this case, then findings sup-
porting such an award should be entered. 
PROPERTY DIVISION 
14 J Wife also claims the trial court 
failed to accurately account for and value 
the marital property and that therefore the 
court's property distribution was ineq-
uitable. Wife does not articulate the basis 
of her claim that the court's property distri-
bution was inequitable. She does not ex-
plain what property she believes should 
have been awarded to her or how the court 
abused its discretion. Therefore, we af-
firm the property distribution. 
ATTORNEY FEES AT TRIAL 
151 A trial court has the power to 
award attorney fees in divorce proceedings, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 
(1989). The award must be based on evi-
dence of the financial need of the receiving 
spouse, the ability of the other spouse to 
pay, and the reasonableness of the request-
ed fees. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 
1331, 1337 (Utah Ct.App.1988). The deci-
sion to make such an award and the 
amount thereof rest primarily in the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Kerr v. Kerr, 
610 P.2d 13H0, 1384 (Utah 19H0) A court 
may consider, among other factors, the dif-
ficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of 
the attorneys, the reasonableness of the 
number of hours spent on the case, the fee 
customarily charged in the locality, the 
amount involved in the case and the result 
attained, and the expertise and experience 
gap between actual expenses and actual income 
to enable the receiving spouse to then be better 
able to suppoit hci self when the alimony and 
schooling end Under this analvsis. Wife's in 
come must be considered to be $863, the 
amount she was actually earning as a teaching 
assistant Furthermore, a non monctaiy award 
of alimony would not establish a rehabilitative 
result if there is a dcmonstiatcd difference be-
tween wife's income and expenses. 
of the attorneys involved. Rasband, 752 
P.2d at 1336. 
[6] At trial, Wife's counsel testified his 
reasonable attorney fees expended m pur-
suing this divorce action were $2,350. 
Husband did not challenge the reasonable-
ness of these claimed fees. Nevertheless, 
the trial court awarded Wife only $800 in 
attorney fees. The court made no findings 
on Wife's need for the payment of her fees, 
Husband's ability to pay the fees, or the 
reasonableness of the attorney fees. In 
short, the court gave no explanation for 
awarding only one-third of the requested 
fees. 
[7] To permit meaningful review of the 
trial court's discretionary ruling, "[w]e 
have consistently encouraged trial courts 
to make findings to explain the factors 
which they considered relevant in arriving 
at an attorney fee award." Regional Sales 
Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 
1215 (Utah Ct.App.1989); see also Martin-
dale v. Adams, 111 P.2d 514, 518 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989) (for meaningful appellate re-
view trial court must explain factors and 
basis for sua sponte reduction of attorney 
fees); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 
688 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (award of attorney 
fees in divorce case remanded for more 
adequate findings). In Haumont v. Hau-
mont, 793 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah CtApp. 
1990), we held it was an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court to award less than the 
claimed amount of attorney fees without 
any reasonable justification, and that a tri-
al court must explain its sua sponte reduc-
tion in order to permit meaningful review 
on appeal. See also Regional Sales Agen-
cy, Inc., 784 P.2d at 1215 (findings particu-
larly important when the trial court has 
reduced the attorney fees from the amount 
requested, and amount requested was sup-
ported by undisputed evidence); Martin-
dale, 111 P.2d at 518. 
The trial court in this case gave no expla-
nation for its reduction of attorney fees 
incurred by Wife where their reasonable-
ness was uncontroverted. Again, the 
court's failure to address Wife's need or 
Husband's ability to pay her attorney fees 
leaves us with no adequate explanation for 
the court's award. We therefore remand 
for the trial court to make a redetermhiu 
tion of awardable attorney fees in light of 
our opinion and to make findings to SUTV 
port the award. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Wife seeks an award of attorney fe^ 
incurred on appeal. "Ordinarily, when feet 
in a divorce were awarded below to the 
party who then prevails on appeal, fees wfll 
also be awarded to that party on appeal." 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utatf 
CtApp. 1990). Because Wife was awarded 
attorney fees below, a result that is not 
likely to change on remand although the1 
amount may differ, and because she hat 
prevailed on the main issue on appeal, we" 
award her attorney fees in an amount to be 
determined by the trial court on remand. 
In summary, we reverse and remand on 
the issues of alimony and attorney fees, 
but affirm the trial court's property distri-
bution. 
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur. 
In re J.D.M., A person under 
eighteen years of age. 
CACHE COUNTY, Appellant, 
v. 
A.W. LAURITZEN, Appellee. 
No. 900033-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 25, 1991. 
Attorney who was appointed to repre-
sent indigent parent in proceeding to termi-
nate parent/child relationship was awarded 
fees by the First District Juvenile Court, 
Cache County, L. Kent Bachman, J., and 
TabD 
CHAMBERS v. 
Cite as 840 ?2d 841 
Under the clearly erroneous standard, 
he majority must show how the trial court 
precluded from finding a reasonable 
suspicion by reviewing the facts relied 
non by the officer and explaining why, as 
matter of law, it was improper to consid-
them. See, e.g., Mendoza, 748 P.2d at 
183-84- Since the majority has failed to 
foreclose the possibility of a finding that 
•he officer had a reasonable articulable 
suspicion as a matter of law, it errs in 
substituting its judgment for that of the 
tnal court. In essence, my colleagues 
would require that the officer have subjec-
tive proof of drug dealing at the house 
before they would find the officer's suspi-
cion to be objectively reasonable. Not only 
does such reasoning ignore the trial court's 
proper role, it ignores the well-established 
rule that "[t]he process does not deal with 
hard certainties, but with probabilities." 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 
101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). 
Inasmuch as the trial court did not vio-
late any legal principle in finding that the 
officer had a reasonable articulable suspi-
cion, I would defer to the trial court's find-
mg I therefore respectfully dissent. 
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Erin Jo CHAMBERS, Plaintiff, 
Appellant, and Cross-
Appellee, 
v. 
Thomas D. CHAMBERS, Defendant, 
Appellee, and Cross-Appellant. 
No. 900631-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct. 21, 1992. 
In dissolution action, the Second Dis-
trict, Weber County, Stanton M. Taylor, J., 
divided property, including husband's fu-
ture contract payments and retirement ben-
(JHAMlSbltd utaii 5 4 1 
(UuhApp. 1992) 
efits, and awarded wife alimony and attor-
ney fees. Both parties appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Russon, J., held that: (1) 
findings on issue of alimony were insuffi-
cient; (2) findings on issue of attorney fees 
were insufficient; (3) husband's future con-
tract payments were postmarital income 
and not marital property rights subject to 
division; and (4) trial court should have 
considered cashing out wife's share of re-
tirement benefits. 
Reversed and remanded in part and 
affirmed in part. 
1. Divorce <S=>235, 286(3) 
Trial court is given considerable discre-
tion to provide for spousal support and 
such award will not be overturned on ap-
peal unless there has been clear and preju-
ducial abuse of discretion. 
2. Divorce <s=>237, 239 
When determining alimony, trial court 
should consider, among other things, wife's 
level of education, health, and other mat-
ters concerning her immediate or eventual 
employability; court must do more than 
simply state that husband has ability to 
pay alimony. 
3. Divorce <3=»239 
Trial court's findings on alimony were 
insufficient because findings did not ad-
dress wife's level of education, health and 
other matters concerning her immediate or 
eventual employability, findings' reference 
to "substantial income from assets that 
have been awarded to her" was inadequate 
to justify reduction of alimony and findings 
did not do more than state that husband 
had ability to pay alimony. 
4. Divorce <s=>240(2), 296 
If child support that party stipulated 
to is insufficient to cover children's ex-
penses, court must award sufficient child 
support, not increase alimony to include 
children's expenses. 
5. Divorce <3=223, 227(1) 
Both decision to award attorney fees 
and amount of such fees are within sound 
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discretion of trial court in divorce case. 
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3. 
6. Divorce <$=>224 
Award of attorney fees must be based 
on evidence of reasonableness of requested 
fees, as well as financial need of receiving 
spouse, and ability of other spouse to pay. 
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3. 
7. Divorce <&=>226 
In awarding partial reimbursement of 
attorney fees to wife in divorce case, trial 
court should have addressed reasonable-
ness of attorney fees and made findings as 
to means of each party to pay fees. 
8. Divorce <3=>252.3(1) 
Husband's future contract payments 
for playing professional basketball were 
postmarital income and not marital proper-
ty rights subject to division because future 
income would be derived from husband's 
playing basketball during term of his con-
tract, rather than from past effort or prod-
uct produced during marriage, husband's 
right to benefit of salary would accrue at 
that time and not during course of mar-
riage and contract payments would be 
made only if husband did not suffer injury, 
illness, disability or death as result of cer-
tain off-court activities. 
9. Divorce <s=>252.3(4) 
When dividing retirement benefits, tri-
al court should have considered option of 
ordering valuation of nonemployee 
spouse's share and immediate cash-out 
from other assets. 
FACTS 
Erin Jo Chambers and Thomas D. 
bers were married on February 12, 
While married, Mr. Chambers signe 
first professional basketball contract 
the San Diego Clippers, for whom] 
played for two seasons. He was su 
quently traded to the Seattle Superson 
for whom he played for five seasonal 
then signed a five year contract wiiM 
Phoenix Suns, two seasons of whicnf 
been completed at the time of divoe 
Mrs. Chambers had virtually no emp 
ment during the parties' marriage, pu 
ant to an agreement between the pa 
that she would stay at home with 
three children. ^ 
Mrs. Chambers filed a complaint for 
vorce on April 7, 1989, which was gran! 
on November 30, 1990. During the con 
of the proceedings, the parties stipulated^, 
custody and visitation of the three 
children, and valuation and distribution^ 
most of the marital assets. Thereafter, 1 
trial court entered its order with respect t^ 
the remaining property, alimony, and at 
ney fees. 
Both parties appeal the trial con 
award of alimony and attorney fees to [ 
Chambers. Mrs. Chambers further 
peals the trial court's determination 
future contract payments for Mr. Ch 
bers to play basketball for the Phoen 
Suns were not property rights subject^ 
division. Mr. Chambers challenges the : 
al court's division of his retirement 
fits. 
Brian R. Florence, Ogden, for appellant. 
Pete N. Vlahos, Ogden, and Mark J. Ro-
bens, Phoenix, Ariz., for appellee. 
Before GARFF, ORME and RUSSON, 
JJ. 
RUSSON, Judge: 
Erin Jo Chambers and Thomas D. Cham-
bers appeal the trial court's order granting 
divorce and specifying numerous property 
and support provisions. We affirm in part, 
and reverse and remand in part. 
ALIMONY 
Both parties challenge Mrs. Chambers'*, 
alimony award. The trial court awarded 
Mrs. Chambers $10,000 per month alimonjt 
to be reduced to $5,000 per month after 
three years, and to terminate after six. 
years. Mrs. Chambers argues that the tri-
al court erred in the amount of alimony 
awarded to her, its automatic reduction af* 
ter three years, and its termination after 
six years. Mr. Chambers, on the other, 
hand, contends that the trial court awarded 
nV to Mrs. Chambers which exceeds 
ber needs. 
rii The trial court is given considerable 
A- cretion to provide for spousal support, 
A such an award will not be overturned 
appeal unless there has been a clear and 
judicial abuse of discretion. Paffel v. 
Wffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986); ac-
Jrd Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 
1333 (Utah App.1988). 
[2] In Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 
g4 (Utah App.1989), we outlined the factors 
be considered by a trial court in deter-
mining alimony: "(1) the financial condi-
tions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) 
the ability of the receiving spouse to pro-
duce a sufficient income for him or herself; 
and (3) the ability of the responding spouse 
to provide support." Id. at 90 (citations 
omitted). "If these three factors have been 
considered, we will not disturb the trial 
court's alimony award unless such a seri-
ous inequity has resulted as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion/' Id. (citations 
omitted). Moreover, "in considering these 
factors, the trial court is required to make 
adequate factual findings on all material 
issues, unless the facts in the record are 
'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of sup-
porting only a finding in favor of the judg-
ment.' " Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 
421, 424 (Utah App.1990) (quoting Throck-
morton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 
124 (Utah App.1988), quoting Acton v. De-
liran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)). 
As to the issue of alimony in the case at 
bar, the trial court stated in Finding of 
Fact number seven: 
The plaintiff [Mrs. Chambers] present-
ed to the court in her ''Exhibit 11," a 
request and demonstrated need for ali-
mony in the sum of $10,000.00 per month 
with an additional $4,000.00 per month 
being requested by plaintiff as necessary 
to pay the income taxes on the $10,000.00 
per month. Plaintiff testified that many 
of the base expenses were also expenses 
that would apply to the children as well 
as herself. Defendant [Mr. Chambers] 
contends that plaintiff is not entitled to 
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any award of alimony based upon the 
substantial assets she is receiving. Con-
sidering defendant's "Exhibit 25," the 
court finds that the plaintiff has a need 
to maintain a standard of living some-
what close to what the parties main-
tained in the past. The court further 
determines that the defendant has the 
ability to pay and plaintiff should be 
awarded alimony in the sum of $10,-
000.00 per month, which should continue 
for three (3) years. Thereafter, plaintiff 
should be paid alimony in the sum of 
$5,000.00 per month for an additional 
three (3) years after which alimony will 
terminate. The reason that the alimony 
should decline after three (3) years and 
terminate after six (6) years, is based, 
upon the finding by the court that the 
plaintiff will earn substantial income 
from assets that have been awarded to 
her and which will, by the time three (3) 
years have passed, be substantially in 
her possession or under her control and 
she will be able to invest these assets in 
such a way as to produce income for her 
own support. 
[3,4] This finding is insufficient. See 
Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 689 
(Utah App.1990); Johnson v. Johnson, 111 
P.2d 696, 699 (Utah App.1989); Marchant 
v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 207 (Utah App. 
1987). Contrary to the second prong of 
Schindler, the trial court's findings do not 
address Mrs. Chambers's level of edu-
cation, health, and other matters concern-
ing her immediate or eventual employabili-
ty. Moreover, without further explanation, 
the court's blanket reference to "substan-
tial income from assets that have been 
awarded to her" is inadequate to justify 
the court's reduction of alimony. Without 
more, we cannot determine whether such 
reduction constituted an abuse of discre-
tion. Lastly, as to the third prong of 
Schindler, the court must do more than 
simply state that "the defendant has the 
ability to pay." Given the amount of con-
flicting evidence on these facts, the trial 
court's award of alimony must be reversed 
and remanded for further findings.1 
1. Additionally, upon remand, the district court must reconsider its apparent inclusion of the 
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ATTORNEY FEES 
Both parties appeal the trial court's 
award of partial reimbursement of attor-
ney fees to Mrs. Chambers. Mrs. Cham-
bers argues that she should receive full 
reimbursement of attorney fees, while Mr. 
Chambers argues that attorney fees should 
not be awarded due to Mrs. Chambers's 
failure to prove the reasonableness of the 
fees. 
[5,6] Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989) 
grants trial courts the power to award at-
torney fees in divorce cases. Both the 
decision to award attorney fees and the 
amount of such fees are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Bell v. Bell, 
810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App.1991) (citing 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 
1980)). However, such award must be 
based on evidence of the reasonableness of 
the requested fees, as well as the financial 
need of the receiving spouse, and the abili-
ty of the other spouse to pay. Id. (citing 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 
(Utah App.1988)). 
[7] As to the award of attorney fees in 
the case at bar, the trial court found: 
The plaintiff incurred attorney's fees 
in the sum of $58,050.00 in prosecuting 
this action, including estimated wrap-up 
and completion time. The defendant had 
previously paid, pursuant to Stipulation 
between the parties, the sum of $12,-
500.00 toward the plaintiffs attorney's 
fees. While it is true that there is proba-
bly adequate money being distributed to 
both parties to pay their own attorney's 
fees, in view of the sums of money that 
Mr. Chambers is going to be making over 
the next few years, the court determines 
it is appropriate that he assist the plain-
tiff by payment in the sum of $10,000.00 
[in addition to the sums already paid] for 
her attorney's fees. 
children's expenses in Mrs. Chambers's alimony 
award In its findings, the court acknowledges 
that many of the expenses listed in Mrs. Cham-
bers's request for $10,000 per month alimony 
were expenses that apply to the children. In 
view of the district court's award of $4500 per 
month in child support, it is plainly inequitable 
that Mr. Chambers's alimony payment includes 
Since the trial court, in awarding at 
fees, did not address the reasonable 
the fees, and stopped short of find 
each party would have the means'' 
their own fees out of "the money 
distributed to both," such award 
ney fees constituted an abuse of < 
Accordingly, we reverse the 
award of partial reimbursement^ 
ney fees, and remand this i ssued 
eration under the standards 
Bell 
FUTURE CONTRACT PAY1 
Mrs. Chambers appeals the trial 
conclusion that future contract pay 
for Mr. Chambers to play baske 
the Phoenix Suns were not proper 
subject to division. 
In Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314'(!__ 
App.1990), we held that "the right t^jj 
ture income is a marital asset where; 
right is derived from efforts or pfodiu0 
produced during the marriage.'* M-SE 
1318 (emphasis added) (citations omitted)^ 
Moreover, in Woodward v. Woodward, 
P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), the Utah Sup* 
Court noted that "[t]he essential 
is whether a right to the benefit 
has accrued in whole or in part du 
marriage. To the extent that the : 
so accrued it is subject to equitable 
bution." Id. at 432-33. 
[8] In the case at bar, Mr. Chamfc 
future income will be derived from his j 
ing basketball during the term of his j 
tract, rather than from some past ei 
a product produced during the marriag^ 
Furthermore, his right to the benefit JW 
that salary will accrue at that time, and did 
not accrue during the course of the mii^ 
riage. This is especially true in light of the 
fact that the contract payments will onlj^fe; 
made provided that Mr. Chambers does'$ot, 
suffer injury, illness, disability or death «s 
the children's expenses. If the child support 
that the parties stipulated to is insufficient to 
cover the children's expenses, then the court 
must award sufficient child support, ndtHft^ 
crease alimony to include the children's ex-
penses. See generally Asper v. Asper, 753 P*2d 
978, 981 (Utah App.1988) (increased child sup-
port is an unacceptable substitute for alimony)* 
result of participation or involvement in 
ny one of a number of off-court activities. 
Thus, the trial court correctly determined 
^at Mr. Chambers's future contract pay-
ments were post-marital income and not 
marital property rights subject to division. 
Additionally, other jurisdictions that have 
considered this question have held that fu-
ture contract earnings for services to be 
performed, not as payment for past perfor-
mance, are not a property right subject to 
division. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 
550, 555-56 (Alaska 1990); In re Marriage 
of Sewell, 817 P.2d 594, 596 (Colo.App. 
1991); In re Marriage of Anderson, 811 
p.2d 419, 420 (Colo.App.1990). According-
ly we affirm the trial court's decision not 
to include Mr. Chambers's future contract 
payments in the property division. 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
Lastly, Mr. Chambers argues that the 
tnal court erred in the division of his retire-
ment benefits, under Woodward v. Wood-
ward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). 
In Woodward, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
Long-term and deferred sharing of finan-
cial interests are obviously too suscepti-
ble to continued strife and hostility, cir-
cumstances which our courts traditional-
ly strive to avoid to the greatest extent 
possible. This goal may best be accom-
plished, if a present value of the pension 
plan is ascertainable, by fixing the other 
spouse's share thereof, as adjusted for 
all the appropriate considerations, includ-
ing the length of time the pensioner must 
survive to enjoy its benefits, to be satis-
fied out of other assets leaving all pen-
sion benefits to the employee himself. 
Id. at 433 (quoting Kikkert v. Kikkert, 111 
NJ.Super. 471, 478, 427 A.2d 76, 79-80 
(1981)). 
As to the issue of retirement benefits in 
the case at bar, the trial court ordered: 
The retirement accumulated by the de-
fendant with the NBA should be divided 
between the parties by operation of a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
(QDRO). If that can be effected by an 
Order that will secure an immediate divi-
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sion of the retirement accounts of the 
two parties, that shall be effected. If 
that cannot be done at the present time, 
division shall be effected by a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) which 
includes division of the interests of the 
parties as set forth by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah in the decision 
of Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 
431 (Utah 1982) in which plaintiff would 
be entitled to one-half (lk) of the pension 
proceeds for the number of years they 
were married during the time the pension 
was being accumulated. 
[9] While "[t]he best method for distrib-
uting or allocating retirement benefits or 
their value depends on the particular cir-
cumstances," Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232, 
234 (Utah App.1989) (citing Gardner* v. 
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988)), 
cert denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990), it 
is preferable to "end [the] marriage and 
allow the parties to make as much of a 
clean break from each other as is reason-
ably possible.,, Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1079. 
Pursuant to Woodward, the preferred 
method for doing so is to fix the other 
spouse's share of the pension plan, as ad-
justed for all the appropriate consider-
ations, and satisfy the other spouse's share 
out of other assets, thereby leaving all 
pension benefits to the employee. See 
Woodward, 656 P.2d at 433. This is espe-
cially true when there are sufficient other 
assets for equitable distribution and a pres-
ent value of the retirement benefits can be 
established. See id However, in the case 
at bar, it would appear that the trial court 
did not even consider such possibility here. 
Accordingly, the trial court's order with 
regard to Mr. Chambers's retirement bene-
fits is reversed and remanded with di-
rections to reconsider its division of Mr. 
Chambers's retirement benefits under the 
analysis set forth in Woodward, including 
particularly the preference for valuation of 
the non-employee spouse's share and its 
immediate cash-out from other assets. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above 
and remand the 
reasons, we (1) reverse 
trial court's awards of 
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alimony and attorney fees to Mrs. Cham-
bers, based on the insufficiency of the 
court's findings; (2) affirm the trial court's 
conclusion that Mr. Chambers's future con-
tract payments are not marital property 
rights subject to division; and (3) reverse 
and remand the trial court's division of Mr. 
Chambers's retirement benefits. 
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur. 
= KEY NUMMR SYSTEM $ 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Nena R. CHAVEZ, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 910723-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct. 22, 1992. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Anne M. 
Stirba, J., of distributing cocaine. Defen-
dant appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Bench, P.J., held that: (1) statements of 
coconspirators prior to defendant's involve-
ment were admissible against defendant, 
and (2) conspiracy was not complete until 
undercover officer distributed share of co-
caine to coconspirators who insisted on it 
for their participation in the conspiracy. 
Affirmed. 
Billings, J., concurred in result 
1. Criminal Law <&=>422(1) 
With defendant's entry into conspira-
cy, statements of coconspirators prior to 
defendant's involvement became admissible 
against defendant under hearsay rule. 
Rules of Evid., Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 
2. Conspiracy «=»24.15 
Criminal Law «=>423(9) 
Conspiracy was not complete until ai*? 
dercover officer distributed share of o#£j 
caine to coconspirators who insisted on & 
for their participation in the conspiracy^ 
and, thus, coconspirators' statements we~~ 
made during conspiracy and were adn 
ble under hearsay rule. Rules of 
Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 
3. Criminal Law <s=>l 169.7 
Admission of coconspirator's stated 
ments allegedly made after completion of. 
conspiracy was harmless in prosecution for! 
distributing cocaine; conviction was sup* 
ported by undercover officer's observaf 
of defendant's involvement in 
Rules of Evid., Rule 801(dX2KE). 
I 
Ronald S. Fujino and L. Clark Donaldson^ 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appejh 
lant 
«« R. Paul Van Dam and Kenneth A. Bron-; 
stoti, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and ap$eV 
lee. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and 
GREENWOOD, JJ. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Defendant appeals her conviction for un-
lawfully distributing a controlled sujk-j 
stance, a second degree felony, in violatray 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1X^0^ 
(1990). Defendant also appeals the trial 
court's restitution order. We affirm. 
FACTS V 
On June 20, 1990,' Patricia Jones called 
Edward Lucas, an undercover Murray (S^0 
Police Officer, to inform him that she coiflc^ 
obtain for Kim a quarter ounce of cocaiae^ 
for $360. Patricia informed officer Lucas, 
that in order to obtain this cocaine he 
would have to discuss the details with ht&" 
daughter, Niciey At 8:30 p.m., officer Lu-" 
cas arrived at the Jones residence. Nici§|L, 
told officer Lucas that the cocaine was:*** 
TabE 
HANSEN 
Cite M 736 P J d l 
Personal service within the state shall be 
as follows: (1) Upon a natural person of 
the age of 14 years or over, by delivering 
a copy thereof to him personally, or by 
leaving such copy at his usual place of 
abode with some person of suitable age 
and discretion there residing; or by deliv-
ering a copy to an agent authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive service 
of process. 
[2,3] The trial court heard extensive 
evidence that this is exactly what the depu-
ty did. He left the summons and complaint 
on the Weenig doorstep after a fruitless 
conversation with a faceless individual in-
side the residence. That person identified 
herself as being of suitable age and stated 
that she was Erma's daughter.1 Even 
though both of Erma's daughters denied 
having spoken with the deputy constable, 
the trial judge gave more credence to the 
testimony of the official making the ser-
vice. The trial judge stated he was "not 
impressed with the candor or testimony of 
Mrs. Weenig. It has not been convincing." 
He further stated that the Musselman ele-
ments had not been met. This was not an 
abuse of his discretion. We strongly be-
lieve that personal service should not be-
come a "degrading game of wiles and 
tricks" nor should a defendant be able to 
defeat service simply by refusing to accept 
the papers or instructing others, suitable 
under the rules of civil procedure, also to 
reject service. Business & Prof. Adj. Co. 
v. Baker, 62 Or.App. 237, 659 P.2d 1025, 
1027 (1983). Because the service on Erma 
was valid there is no need to examine 
whether the motion was timely or if she 
possessed a meritorious defense, the other 
requirements under Musselman. 
The denial of the motion to set aside 
default judgment is affirmed. Costs 
against the defendants. 
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ., 
concur. 
(o i KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
. HANSEN Utah 1055 
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A. Lamar HANSEN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Cynthia Ann HANSEN, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 860198-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 12, 1987. 
Husband appealed from order of the 
7th District Court, Duchesne County, Rich-
ard C. Davidson, J., which granted divorce, 
awarded custody of minor child to mother, 
and made award of child support and divid-
ed property. The Court of Appeals, Jack-
son, J., held that: (1) award of $140 per 
month in child support was not an abuse of 
discretion; (2) court did not improperly ap-
ply tender years doctrine in awarding cus-
tody to mother; and (3) record supported 
award of custody to mother. 
Affirmed. 
1. Divorce <&=>184(4) 
Trial court is permitted considerable 
discretion in adjusting financial interests of 
parties to divorce and its actions are enti-
tled to presumption of validity. 
2. Divorce e=>308 
Award of $140 per month in child sup-
port was not an abuse of discretion in view 
of parties' myriad debts and meager assets, 
despite father's claim that support schedule 
allegedly used in the judicial district 
showed that the proper support amount 
was $78. 
3. Divorce <s»252.4 
Court did not abuse its discretion in 
ordering husband to pay $3,000 debt to his 
father, even though husband alleged that 
1. Erma admitted at the hearing that she had 1979, both lived with her in the Salt Lake City 
only two daughters and that during August, residence. 
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the debt had been used to pay wife's bail 
and that wife had been ordered to pay all 
debts arising out of fines owed for previous 
criminal convictions. 
4. Divorce «=»298(1) 
Trial court's comment that "I don't 
find any reason to deprive her of custody" 
was not an improper use of the tender 
years doctrine in awarding custody to 
mother but, rather, a recognition of the 
fact that mother had had custody since the 
parties separated. 
5. Divorce «=>298(1) 
Although it is not determinative, court 
may consider which parent the child has 
lived with during the pendency of the di-
vorce in determining custody. 
6. Divorce $=>301 
Award of custody of minor son to 
mother was supported by evidence of fa-
ther's history of assaultive behavior, moth-
er's role as primary caretaker of child dur-
ing marriage, parties' parenting abilities, 
stability of child's environment, and fact 
that mother had had custody during pend-
ency of divorce. 
Randall J. Holmgren, Shields, Shields & 
Holmgren, Salt Lake City, for A. Lamar 
Hansen. 
John E. Schindler, Price, for Cynthia 
Hansen. 
Before JACKSON, GARPF and 
BILLINGS, JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
In his appeal of an April, 1986, judgment 
and decree of divorce, appellant A. Lamar 
Hansen asserts that the trial court erred in: 
(1) ordering him to pay $140 per month in 
child support; (2) ordering him to pay a 
$3,000 debt to his father; and (3) using an 
unconstitutional presumption in awarding 
custody of the parties' young son to re-
spondent, Cynthia Ann Hansen. He also 
challenges the sufficiency of the court's 
findings of fact to support the custody 
award. We affirm the judgment below. 
[1] The trial court is permitted consid-
erable discretion in adjusting the financial 
interests of the parties to a divorce, and its 
actions are entitled to a presumption of 
validity. Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 
470 (Utah 1984); Savage v. Savage, 658 
P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1983). We wffl not 
upset the trial court's apportionment of 
financial responsibilities in the absence of 
manifest injustice or inequity that indicates 
a clear abuse of that discretion. Cf. Turn-
er v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982). 
Appellant first contends that he should 
have been ordered to pay only $78.00 per 
month in child support rather than $140.00. 
This argument is based on his monthly 
income of $1,700 and an obligation to pay 
child support for four children from a pre-
vious marriage. He also argues that 
$78.00 is the proper support amount be-
cause it is shown on a schedule allegedly 
used in the Seventh Judicial District 
[2] The schedule was not offered as 
evidence at trial. If offered, its admissibili-
ty would be questionable. The record re-
veals that the trial judge had properly be-
fore him lists of the parties' myriad debts 
and meager assets, their tax forms, finan-
cial declarations, paycheck stubs, and 
monthly household expenses. The judge 
was informed of their respective earning 
capacities and the fact that respondent had 
been receiving public assistance. He evalu-
ated the support needs of the minor child 
and the parties' relative abilities to meet 
them. Appellant had been paying court-or-
dered temporary child support of $140 
since May, 1985, and his payments were 
current at the time of trial. He made no 
attempt to demonstrate an inability to con-
tinue making those payments. We hold it 
was not an abuse of discretion for the court 
to set child support at $140 per month. 
[3] Neither are we persuaded that the 
trial judge abused his discretion in dividing 
the parties' substantial debts. Appellant 
complains that the part of the decree order-
ing him to pay one particular $3,000 debt to 
his father is inconsistent with a previous 
HANSEN v. HANSEN 
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order of the court directing Cynthia Ann 
Hansen to pay all debts arising out of fines 
owed for her previous criminal convictions. 
There was, however, conflicting evidence 
about whether the loan of $3,000 was used 
to pay her bail or to pay household ex-
penses. The trial judge considered the na-
ture of all the debts, the parties' relative 
abilities to repay them, and their conflict-
ing claims about the use made of the $3,000 
loan. We see no manifest injustice or ineq-
uity in the judge's allocation of debts be-
tween the parties. 
Appellant next contends that the trial 
court used an unconstitutional preference 
for the respondent in awarding her custody 
of their 30-month-old son. Such a gender-
based custodial preference for mothers of 
small children, called the "tender years" 
presumption, was explicitly disapproved by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Pusey v. Pusey, 
728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1986), three 
months after the Hansens' divorce trial. 
At the trial, each party presented evi-
dence of the other's lack of fitness as a 
proper custodian. This included evidence 
of appellant's physical abuse of the respon-
dent, as well as his former wife, and evi-
dence of respondent's convictions for mon-
ey order theft, check alteration, and mak-
ing a false statement on a loan application. 
Appellant claims that a gender-based pref-
erence was used to tip the scales in respon-
dent's favor, based on one highlighted sen-
tence in the judge's ruling from the bench: 
Custody of the child will be awarded to 
the defendant The reason for that is as 
follows: 
The court finds that the defendant is 
the primary care-giving parent. The 
only thing anybody can really say bad 
about this party is that she has been in 
trouble. 
On the other hand, by the plaintiffs 
own admission he has committed, I think, 
six different assaults, which has got to 
count for something. So if they are go-
ing to start painting each other black, I 
think the brush will fit both. / don't 
find any reason to deprive her of custo-
dy. It seems to have worked. I don't 
see anything wrong with her as a custo-
dial parent. From the testimony that's 
been given here, particularly by the pre-
school lady, she has been working very 
diligently in taking care of this child, and 
the court finds that she is a fit and 
proper person and does award custody to 
her. 
[4,5] We do not believe the emphasized 
remark shows any use of an improper pref-
erence in awarding custody to respondent 
The trial judge was referring to the fact 
that, at the time of trial in April, 1986, the 
child had been in the sole custody and care 
of his mother since the parties separated in 
February, 1985. His reference to not de-
priving her of custody reflects this fact and 
shows that he considered which parent the 
child had lived with during the pendency of 
the divorce. Although not determinative, 
this is one of many relevant factors in a 
custody determination. Pusey, 728 P.2d at 
120. 
The judge's oral findings quoted above, 
recorded in court in the presence of the 
parties, are also germane to the final issue 
raised by appellant. He asserts that the 
written findings of fact pertaining to custo-
dy are insufficient to show that the award 
was based on a determination of the child's 
best interests. He relies on Smith v. 
Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986) and 
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 
1982). 
In Smith, the Utah Supreme Court deter-
mined that the trial court's written findings 
of fact in a custody dispute were inade-
quate to afford the noncustodial parent a 
meaningful appellate review of the custody 
award. Smith, 726 P.2d at 426. The 
Court described adequate factual findings 
as follows: 
To ensure that the trial court's custody 
determination, discretionary as it is, 
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d at 41, 
is rationally based, it is essential that the 
court set forth in its findings of fact not 
only that it finds one parent to be the 
better person to care for the child, but 
also the basic facts which show why the 
ultimate conclusion is justified. 
Smith, 726 P.2d at 426. 
In the case before us, there is only one 
written finding of fact that relates to child 
custody: 
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10. Defendant is a fit and proper person 
to be awarded the care, custody and con-
trol of the minor child of the parties 
subject to the following visitation rights 
provided the plaintiff properly demean 
himself: 
[detailed dates and times of visitation by 
appellant] 
In holding that a custody decision must be 
supported by written findings and conclu-
sions, the Court in Smith cited Hutchison 
and Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). The Court con-
cluded that the trial judge's statements 
while ruling from the bench were "not a 
sufficient substitute for adequate find-
ings." Smith, 726 P.2d at 426. 
Under the standard enunciated in Smith 
and Hutchison, the one conclusory written 
finding quoted above, by itself, is clearly 
inadequate to support the custody determi-
nation. See also Martinez v. Martinez, 
728 P.2d 994 (Utah 1986). Our inquiry, 
however, does not end here. Subsequent 
to Smith, there was a material amendment 
of Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). It now reads: 
(a) Effect 
In all actions tried upon the facts without 
a jury or with an advisory jury, the court 
shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law thereon, 
and judgment shall be entered pursuant 
to Rule 58A Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to 
the extent that the court adopts them, 
shall be considered as the findings of the 
court. It will be sufficient if the find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law are 
stated orally and recorded in open 
court following the close of the evi-
dence— 
1. These rules shall take effect on January 1, 
1950; and thereafter all laws in conflict there-
with shall be of no further force or effect. 
They govern all proceedings in actions 
brought after they take effect and also all 
further proceedings in actions then pending, 
except to the extent that in the opinion of the 
court their application in a particular action 
[6] The emphasized sentences were 
added by order of the Utah Supreme Court 
on October 30, 1986, and became effective 
on January 1, 1987. The new provisions 
govern in all actions pending on the effec-
tive date. Cf Utah R.Civ.P. 1(b).1 Thus, 
Rule 52(a) now explicitly authorizes us to 
look beyond the written findings of fact to 
the trial record and evaluate the sufficien-
cy of the judge's oral findings, quoted 
above, rendered from the bench. It is ap-
parent from those findings that the trial 
judge considered and weighed several 
factors in reaching a custody determination 
that was in the best interests of the Han-
sens' minor son. They include: appellant's 
history of assaultive behavior, respon-
dent's history of criminal behavior; the 
identity of the primary caretaker of the 
child during the marriage; parenting abili-
ties; the stability of the child's environ-
ment; and the identity of the custodian 
during the pending divorce. Each of these 
factors is relevant in a custody determina-
tion. Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d at 426 
(specific attributes of the parents); Pusey 
v. Pusey, 728 P.2d at 120 (identity of pri-
mary caretaker, environmental stability, 
custodian during lengthy pendency of cus-
tody determination); Hutchison v. Hutchi-
son, 649 P.2d at 41 (moral character and 
emotional stability of parents, temporary 
custodian); Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2d 
at 995 (ability of each parent to meet 
child's needs). 
We hold that the oral findings made by 
the trial judge at the close of the evidence 
are sufficient to support the custody award 
and demonstrate that the determination 
was based on factors relevant to the best 
interests of the Hansens' son. They pro-
vide this Court, and the parties themselves, 
with a detailed and logical factual basis for 
the ultimate decision awarding custody to 
respondent, thus satisfying the require-
ments of Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a) and Smith. 
pending when the rules take effect would not 
be feasible or would work injustice 
Utah RXiv.P. 1(b) (emphasis added). 
The first emphasized sentence of amended 
Rule 52(a) was recently applied as the control-
ling standard of appellate court review of a trial 
court's findings of fact. Ashton v. Ashton, 733 
P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987). 
The judgment is affirmed, 
spondent 
GARFF and BILLINGS, JJ., concur. 
STATE •. RAMON Utah 1059 
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Costs to re- Judge concurring specially.) U.C.A.1953, 
77-35-4(d). 
! KEY MUMWl SYSTEM 
*> 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Rodney James RAMON, Defendant 
and Appellant 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Minnette M. RIEDMAN, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Nos. 860005-CA, 860013-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 12, 1987. 
Rehearing Denied July 13,1987. 
Defendants were convicted in the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Jay 
E. Banks, J., of theft by receiving stolen 
property and they appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Bench, J., held that amendment to 
information, charging receiving stolen 
goods, which alleged that defendants re-
ceived or concealed stolen goods was im-
proper as it added an additional offense. 
Reversed. 
Jackson, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
Orme, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
1. Indictment and Information «3=>161(1) 
Court may allow information to be 
amended if no additional or different of-
fense is charged and the substantial rights 
of the defendants are not prejudiced; those 
two conditions are generally met where the 
proposed amendment to an information 
merely recites language of the statute origi-
nally charged. (Per Bench, J., with one 
2. Receiving Stolen Goods e»2 
One distinction between concealing sto-
len goods and receiving stolen goods is that 
subject property need not be stolen in order 
to support conviction for receiving stolen 
goods, as defendant need only believe the 
property to have been stolen. (Per Bench, 
J., with one Judge concurring specially.) 
U.C.A.1953, 76-6-408(1). 
3. Criminal Law e=»29 
Three different ways in which offense 
of receiving stolen goods may be commit-
ted and three different ways in which of-
fense of concealing stolen goods may be 
committed do not give rise to six separate 
offenses. (Per Bench, J., with one Judge 
concurring specially.) U.C.A.1953, 76-6-
408(1). 
4. Indictment and Information <&=>161(5) 
It was error to permit amendment to 
information charging receiving stolen 
goods to add allegation that the defendants 
concealed the stolen goods as the amend-
ment charged an additional or different 
offense than that originally charged. (Per 
Bench, J., with one Judge concurring spe-
cially.) U.C.A.1953, 76-6-408(1). 
Martin Verhoef, Barber, Verhoef & Yo-
com, Salt Lake City, for Ramon and Ried-
man. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Kimberly 
Hornak, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State. 
Before JACKSON, 
BENCH, JJ. 
ORME and 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Defendants Rodney James Ramon and 
Minnette M. Riedman appeal their separate 
convictions of theft by receiving stolen 
property. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
408(1X1986). Because the cases involve the 
same facts and the same dispositive issue, 
we consolidate the cases, sua sponte, and 
reverse both convictions. 
TabF 
Walter James HOWELL, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
Barbara Joyce HOWELL, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 890596-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Feb. 28, 1991. 
Divorce was sought. The Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Frank G. 
Noel, J., granted divorce, awarded alimony, 
and divided property. Former wife appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., 
held that: (1) trial court erroneously looked 
to preseparation standard of living in set-
ting alimony and should have considered 
standard of living during marriage up to 
time of trial approximately two years after 
separation; (2) monthly alimony award was 
inadequate to equalize parties' standard of 
living at time of divorce; and (3) trial court 
could refuse to speculate about hypotheti-
cal future tax consequences of property 
division pursuant to divorce. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
Bench, J., concurred in part, dissented 
in part, and filed opinion. 
1. Divorce <a=>237 
Alimony was erroneously based on pre-
separation standard of living and should 
have been based on standard of living dur-
ing the marriage up to time of divorce trial 
about two years after separation; during 
that two-year period, husband's income 
doubled because another airline purchased 
husband's employer, and husband's ability 
to take advantage of that change in part 
resulted from perseverance during lean 
times. 
2. Divorce <^253(3) 
Value of marital property is deter-
mined as of time of divorce decree or at 
trial, but courts can, in exercise of their 
equitable powers, use different date, such 
HOWELL v. HOWELL Utah 1209 
Cite as 806 F2d 1209 (UtahApp. 1991) 
as date of separation, if one party has 
acted obstructively. 
3. Divorce <£»237 
Determining standard of living in or-
der to set alimony after divorce is fact-sen-
sitive, subjective task and is not determined 
by actual expenses alone. 
4. Divorce <s=>235 
Trial courts have discretion to deter-
mine standard of living which existed dur-
ing marriage after consideration of rele-
vant facts and equitable principles. 
5. Divorce <s=*237 
Trial courts must consider the follow-
ing factors in setting alimony after divorce: 
financial conditions and needs of recipient 
spouse, recipient's ability to produce in-
come, and ability of payor spouse to pro-
vide support. 
6. Divorce <s=>240(2) 
Trial court setting alimony after di-
vorce should first determine financial needs 
and resources of both parties and should 
set alimony as permitted by those parame-
ters to approximate parties' standard of 
living during marriage as closely as possi-
ble. 
7. Divorce e=>240(2) 
If payor spouse's resources are ade-
quate, alimony following divorce need not 
be limited to provide for only basic needs, 
but should also consider recipient spouse's 
station in life. 
8. Divorce <3=>239 
Trial court setting alimony after di-
vorce must make findings on all material 
issues. 
9. Divorce <s=*239, 286(9) 
Trial court's failure to make findings 
on all issues material to setting alimony 
after divorce constitutes reversible error, 
unless pertinent facts in record are clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting 
only finding in favor of judgment. 
10. Divorce <^240(4) 
Monthly alimony award of $1,800 was 
inadequate to equalize abilities of former 
wife and former husband to go forward 
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with their lives; wife was approximately 50 
years old, spent most of the 30 plus years 
of the marriage caring for children and 
home, and had minimal job skills, and hus-
band had gross monthly income of $10,120, 
would have no child support obligation ap-
proximately 15 months after decree, and 
would then have gross monthly income of 
approximately $8,200 in comparison to 
wife's gross monthly income of $2,445. 
11. Divorce <S=>252.2 
Exact mathematical equality of income 
is not required when equalizing parties' 
standard of living as of time of divorce, but 
sufficient parity to allow both parties to be 
on equal footing financially as of time of 
divorce is required. 
12. Divorce <s=*252.2 
Trial court could refuse to speculate 
about hypothetical future tax consequences 
of property division pursuant to divorce. 
Paul H. Liapis, Helen E. Christian (ar-
gued), Kim M. Luhn, Gustin, Green, Stegall 
& Liapis, Salt Lake City, for defendant and 
appellant. 
David S. Dolowitz (argued), Michael S. 
Evans, M. Joy Douglas, Cohne, Rappaport 
& Segal, P.C., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
and appellee. 
Before BENCH, GARFF and 
GREENWOOD, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant, Barbara Joyce Howell, ap-
peals from a divorce decree's award of 
alimony and division of equity in a Califor-
nia home. We affirm the property division 
but reverse and remand as to alimony. 
FACTS 
Defendant and plaintiff, Walter James 
Howell, were married on October 14, 1956. 
Plaintiff began working as a pilot for West-
ern Airlines shortly after the parties mar-
1. Defendant filed an earlier declaration of 
monthly expenses totaling $4464 62, but includ-
ried. He continued to be employed as a 
pilot with Western, later taken over.fci" 
Delta Airlines, throughout the parties' n\arv 
riage. The parties had five children, four 
of whom were emancipated at the time d 
trial. The parties had marital difficulties 
on and off for a number of years and 
separated in November 1986. At that time 
plaintiffs gross income was between $5500 
and $5600 per month, and had been at that 
level for the prior five years. Western 
Airlines experienced financial problems pri-
or to the takeover by Delta Airlines. As g* 
result of negotiations between Western 
and its pilots, plaintiff received virtually no 
pay raises between 1981 and 1986, despite 
increases in the cost of living. Both par-
ties testified that their family finances 
were strained during that time period. ^ 
Plaintiff filed for divorce in November 
1987. At the time of trial, December 19§8„$ 
his gross monthly income had increased^ 
$10,120. Plaintiffs financial declaration in-
dicated monthly expenses of $7960, wWcljf 
included $2400 for alimony and child sup-? 
port, $372 for vacations, and $633 for attor^ 
ney fees. 
During the parties' marriage, defendant 
was a homemaker and had worked only 
part time at unskilled labor jobs. At the 
time of trial defendant earned $649.80 per 
month, though that job was only temporary 
and terminated in December 1988. She 
testified at trial that she had monthly ex:t 
penses totaling $5021.l 
The parties owned homes in Utah and 
California, as well as real property in Tex-
as. Plaintiff testified that the Utah home 
had little, if any, equity, while the Califor-
nia home would yield substantial equity. 
Plaintiff wanted to sell all the properties 
and divide the net proceeds. Defendant 
testified she would prefer to live in the 
California home. 
After trial, the court entered findings of 
fact, conclusions of law. and a decree of 
divorce on May 12. 1959 In its findings, 
the court states its belief that "the income 
level of $5500 reflects the income level and 
living standards of the parties during the 
ed no expenses for rea' property taxes or insur-
ance, indicating that the> uere then unknown. 
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their lives together." court had considered the parties* standard last five years of 
The court found that defendant was capa-
ble of earning $625 per month, and that 
plaintiff had income of $10,000 per month. 
The findings further state that "[t]he court 
has determined in setting alimony that 
while $5,500.00 per month represents the 
living standards of the parties in the last 5 
years of the marriage, when the parties 
resided together, the ability of the plaintiff 
to pay alimony is based upon his present 
income of $10,000.00 per month." Defen-
dant was awarded $1800 per month alimo-
ny and $1363 per month child support for 
the parties' then sixteen year-old child, 
based on the child support guidelines then 
m effect. The court ordered that all of the 
real property, including the California 
home, be sold and the net proceeds divided 
equally between the parties. 
On appeal, defendant asserts (1) the par-
ties' standard of living, for purposes of 
determining alimony, should be based on 
that at the time of trial; (2) the alimony 
awarded is insufficient; and (3) the trial 
court should have taken into consideration 
the tax consequences of selling the Califor-
nia home. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Trial courts have considerable discretion 
in determining alimony and property distri-
bution in divorce cases, and will be upheld 
on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial 
abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Ras-
band v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 
(Utah Ct.App.1988). Findings of fact m 
divorce appeals are subject to the clearly 
erroneous standard of review such that 
"due regard shall be given to the opportu-
nity of the trial court to judge the credibili-
ty of the witnesses." Utah R Civ P 52(a); 
Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989). Conclusions of law, how-
ever, are reviewed for correctness and giv-
en no special deference on appeal Bounti-
ful v. Riley, 784 P2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 
1989); Smith v. Smith, 793 P 2d 407, 409 
(Utah Ct.App.1990). 
ALIMONY 
[1] Defendant claims that the alimony 
award would have been higher if the trial 
of living at the time of trial rather than 
when the parties separated, approximately 
two years earlier. Additionally, defendant 
claims alimony should have been higher 
because of the disparity in the parties' in-
come, length of the marriage, and the par-
ties' respective earning abilities and ex-
penses. We consider first the applicable 
standard of living question. 
[2] The value of marital property is de-
termined as of the time of the divorce 
decree or trial. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 
P 2d 1218, 1222-23 (Utah 1980). See also 
Berger v Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 
1985). The reason for the rule is that "[b]y 
the very nature of a property division, the 
marital estate is evaluated according to 
what property exists at the time the mar-
riage is terminated." Jesperson v. Jesper-
son, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). Courts 
can, however, in the exercise of their eq-
uitable powers, use a different date, such 
as the date of separation, if one party has 
"acted obstructively, . . . " Peck v. Peek, 
738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah Ct.App.1987). 
No cases in Utah or elsewhere, that we 
or counsel have discovered, have specifical-
ly addressed the question of when a cou-
ple's "standard of living" should be deter-
mined for the purpose of calculating alimo-
ny, be it separation or trial or some other 
time. Most speak only of the standard of 
living during marriage. See Savage v. 
Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983). 
"Standard of living" is defined as "a mini-
mum of necessities, comforts, or luxuries 
that is essential to maintaining a person in 
customary or proper status or circum-
stances " Webster's Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary 2223 (1986). "An alimo-
ny award should, to the extent possible, 
equalize the parties' respective post-divorce 
hvmg standards " Rasband v. Ras-
band, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct.App. 
1980). 
In this case, the parties were separated 
for approximately one year before plaintiff 
filed for divorce. About one year later, 
trial was held We note that a separation 
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of two years before trial in a divorce action 
is certainly not unusual. During that two-
year period, plaintiffs income doubled be-
cause of the successful takeover of West-
ern Airlines by Delta Airlines. Plaintiffs 
ability to take advantage of that change 
was at least in part a result of having 
persevered during the lean times, as did his 
wife and children. The impact of the sala-
ry increase on the parties' standard of liv-
ing, however, was certainly affected by the 
fact that it was used to maintain separate 
living arrangements. 
13,4] We believe it is consistent with 
the goal of equalizing the parties' post 
divorce status to look to the standard of 
living existing at or near the time of trial in 
determining alimony. This is consonant 
with the treatment of both marital property 
and child support and is better designed to 
equip both parties to go forward with their 
separate lives with relatively equal odds. 
It is further justified because any future 
changes in alimony are limited to instances 
where a material change of circumstances 
has occurred. Bridenbaugh v. Briden-
baugh, 786 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah CtApp. 
1990). In so holding, we agree with the 
dissenting opinion that determining stan-
dard of living is a "fact-sensitive, subjec-
tive task." We disagree, however, that 
standard of living is determined by actual 
expenses alone. Those expenses may be 
necessarily lower than needed to maintain 
an appropriate standard of living for vari-
ous reasons, including, possibly, lack of 
income. As Webster says, standard of liv-
ing includes "customary or proper status" 
considering the parties' circumstances. 
Those circumstances should be evaluated 
at the time of trial and, contrary to the 
dissent, can properly address what situa-
tion would have existed if the parties had 
not separated earlier. In this case, the 
post-separation substantial increase in 
plaintiffs income was akin to deferred in-
come. In light of the facts of this case, we 
conclude that the trial court erred in look-
ing at the pre-separation standard of living 
in setting alimony, but should have instead 
considered the standard of living "during 
the marriage" up to the time of trial. In so 
concluding we do not intend to establish a 
rigid rule which must be followed in tall 
domestic cases, but acknowledge that trial 
courts have discretion to determine' the 
standard of living which existed during the 
marriage after consideration of all relevant 
facts and equitable principles. In this case' 
it was inequitable and an abuse of discre^ 
tion to pinpoint standard of living as of the 
time of the parties' separation. 
[5-7] We now turn to defendant's argu-
ment that the court did not properly consid-
er all relevant factors, resulting in an un-y 
justifiably low alimony award. Trial courts 
must consider the following factors in set-
ting alimony: (1) the financial condition and 
needs of the recipient spouse; (2) the recipi-
ent's ability to produce income; and (3) the 
ability of the payor spouse to provide suj> 
port. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649 
(Utah 1988). Utah cases have stated that 
the purpose of alimony is to prevent the 
receiving spouse "from becoming a public* 
charge" and to maintain the standard of 
living enjoyed during the marriage, to th£ 
extent possible. Fletcher, 615 P.2d at 
1223. Therefore, trial courts should first/ 
determine the financial needs and re-
sources for both parties, by examining the 
three factors enumerated. Second, the 
court should set alimony as permitted by 
those parameters, to approximate the par-
ties' standard of living during the marriage 
as closely as possible. It follows that if the 
payor spouse's resources are adequate, ali-
mony need not be limited to provide for 
only basic needs, but should also consider 
the recipient spouse's "station in life." 
Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, 147 
(Utah 1978). In Gardner v. Gardner, 748 
P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme 
Court reviewed an alimony award after a 
long-term marriage. The court found that 
the alimony award in that situation should, 
"to the extent possible, equalize the par-
ties' respective standards of living and 
maintain them at a level as close as possi-
ble to that standard of living enjoyed dur-
ing the marriage." Id. at 1081. See also 
Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 103 (Utah 
1986); Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 
(Utah 1985). 
HOWELL v. HOWELL Utah 1213 
Cite as 806 ?2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991) 
court must make find- after deducting child support and alimony, [8,9] The trial 
jnes on all material issues. Failure to do 
«o constitutes reversible error, unless perti-
nent facts in the record are "clear, uncon-
uoverted, and capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment." Ander-
stn v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 
Ct.App.W88). 
Utah's appellate courts have considered 
the appropriateness of alimony after a long 
fcerm marriage, where the wife (usually) 
has worked primarily in the home, has lim-
ited job skills, and is in her late forties or 
fifties. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076; Rasband, 
752 P.2d 1331, 1333. In Jones v. Jones, 700 
p 2d 1072 (Utah 1985), the supreme court 
found alimony awarded inadequate to allow 
the wife a standard of living even ap-
proaching that experienced during the mar-
riage, and described the marriage as fol-
lows: 
During most of the marriage, with the 
full consent and support of her husband, 
[the wife] devoted her time to raising 
their four children and donating her ser-
vices to various social service organiza-
tions It is entirely unrealistic to as-
sume that a woman in her mid-50's with 
no substantial work experience or train-
ing will be able to enter the job market 
and support herself in anything even re-
sembling the style in which the couple 
had been living. 
Id. at 1075. 
(10,11] In this case the court made 
findings as to both plaintiffs and defen-
dant's gross incomes It did not, however, 
make the required finding as to defen-
dant's financial needs, although defendant 
testified to monthly expenses of approxi-
mately $5,000. Child support set pursuant 
to child support guidelines at $1363, plus 
alimony of $1800, plus defendant's poten-
tial salary as determined by the court of 
$645, yields total gross monthly income of 
$3808 for defendant and her son. Plaintiff, 
2. "If courts award child support in lieu of per-
manent alimony, they may fail to anticipate the 
financial impact on the remaining family as 
each child reaches age 18 and his or her award 
terminates." March 1990 Utah Task Force on 
Gender and Justice Report to the Utah Judicial 
Council 38. 
has gross monthly income of $6837. When 
his child support obligation ceases, approxi-
mately fifteen months after the decree, he 
will have gross monthly income of $8200 in 
comparison to defendant's $2445.2 Defen-
dant fits the profile described in Jones and 
other cases: she is approximately fifty 
years old, has minimal marketable job 
skills, and has spent most of the thirty plus 
years of the parties' marriage raising and 
caring for their five children and their 
home, presumably with the concurrence of 
plaintiff. Her likelihood of achieving sig-
nificant salary levels in the future is slim. 
The alimony set by the court does not come 
close to equalizing the parties' standard of 
living as of the time of the divorce, but 
allows plaintiff a two to four times advan-
tage.** We, therefore, hold that the alimo-
ny amount set by the court was clearly 
erroneous. 
We reverse and remand to the trial court 
on the issue of alimony, for findings as to 
defendant's financial needs, the parties' 
standard of living at the time of the trial, 
and for adjustment of the amount of alimo-
ny to better equalize the parties' abilities to 
go forward with their respective lives. 
TAX CONSIDERATIONS 
[12] Defendant also urges that the 
court erred by failing to consider the tax 
consequences of selling the California 
home. Defendant produced an expert wit-
ness at trial who testified as to the possible 
tax ramifications of the sale. He discussed 
capital gams tax, but said the amount 
would depend on the sales price, and that it 
might be avoided pursuant to tax regula-
tions. He testified that taxes might be 
deferred, or "rolled over," but could not 
say with any certainty how the IRS would 
rule. There is no abuse of discretion if a 
court refuses to speculate about hypotheti-
cal future tax consequences of a property 
3. Exact mathematical equality of income is not 
required, but sufficient parity to allow both par-
ties to be on equal footing financially as of the 
time of the divorce is required. 
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division made pursuant to a divorce. Alex-
ander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, 224 
(Utah 1987). Tax consequences in this case 
were speculative as to whether they could 
be avoided or delayed, and as to amount. 
The court heard testimony and evidence 
regarding possible tax implications, but did 
not err in refusing to adjust property distri-
bution because of those theoretical conse-
quences. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the trial court's property dis-
tribution order but reverse as to the alimo-
ny award and remand for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. 
GARFF, J., concurs. 
BENCH, Judge (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part): 
I agree with the majority opinion's treat-
ment of the "tax considerations/1 I also 
agree that this case must be remanded for 
entry of appropriate findings as to the 
needs of defendant for alimony and the 
ability of plaintiff to pay alimony. I re-
spectfully disagree with the majority, how-
ever, as to how the parties' standard of 
living during the marriage impacts the ali-
mony computations. The majority rules, as 
a matter of law, that in computing the 
alimony award, the trial court should have 
considered a hypothetical standard of living 
as if the parties were living together at the 
time of trial rather than their actual stan-
dard of living enjoyed prior to separation.1 
There are no cases addressing when the 
parties' standard or living is determined 
because a "standard of living" cannot, as 
the majority implies, be quantified by the 
trial court. It is not like marital property 
which is capable of objective valuation at a 
given time. Nor is it capable of being 
calculated based on set figures of income 
1. Contrary to the majority's assertion, the trial 
court did not "pinpoint" the parties' standard of 
living as of the time of separation The trial 
court took the parties' average income over a 
five-year period prior to separation and as-
sumed that their average income was their 
"standard of living." While it is clear that the 
trial court erred in assuming that income alone 
as are child support payments. Determin-
ing the parties' standard of living during 
marriage is a fact-sensitive, subjective task 
that requires a trial court to look at ihe 
totality of the parties' financial circum-
stances during the marriage. The Utah 
Supreme Court has therefore established 
objective factors that must be considered 
by the trial court when it determines an 
award of alimony. 
"The most important function of alimony 
is to provide support for the wife as 
nearly as possible at the standard of 
living she enjoyed during marriage, and 
to prevent the wife from becoming a 
public charge." English v. English, 565 
P.2d [409] at 411. [(Utah 1977)] With 
this purpose in mind, the Court in Eng-
lish articulated three factors that must 
be considered in fixing a reasonable ali-
mony award: 
[1] the financial condition and needs of 
the wife; 
[2] the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself; and 
[3] the ability of the husband to provide 
support. 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 
1985). Accord Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 
96, 100-01 (Utah 1986) (failure to consider 
these factors is an abuse of discretion); 
Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566-67 (Utah 
1985) (an appellate court will not disturb a 
trial court's ruling if these factors are ade-
quately addressed). 
As is apparent from the foregoing quota-
tion, the receiving spouse's previous stan-
dard of living is not an independent factor 
to be quantified and incorporated into a 
formula for calculating alimony. Rather, it 
is a frame of reference for determining the 
reasonableness of the alimony award. See 
generally, 2 H. Clark, Jr., The Law Of 
Domestic Relations In The United States 
§ 17.5(8) (2d ed. 1987). In the present case, 
establishes a standard of liwng, it may not be 
said that it made the mistake of pinpointing that 
standard of living The majority therefore errs 
in finding that the trial court abused its discre-
tion when the trial court did not even make the 
mistake that the majont) is accusing it of mak-
ing 
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w e are not concerned with the risk of de- failed to determine 
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fendant becoming a public charge given the 
apparent ability of plaintiff to cover defen-
dant's basic needs. The question is how 
much additional support above defendant's 
basic needs should be granted. The par-
ties' standard of living prior to separation 
helps to establish what would be reason-
able by showing the lifestyle to which the 
parties have grown accustomed. 
Defendant seeks to benefit from plain-
tiffs raise by mistakenly, and unnecessar-
ily, claiming that the raise entitled her to 
alimony based upon a hypothetical stan-
dard of living to be calculated from plain-
tiffs new annual salary of $120,000, an 
income to which she has never grown ac-
customed.2 In other words, defendant 
claims that her relevant standard of living 
is the unknown standard of living that she 
might have enjoyed were the parties not 
terminating their marriage. Since any at-
tempt to determine a standard of living for 
two separated parties as if they were not 
separated would be purely speculative, the 
majority's ruling is judicially unworkable. 
There is no rational way of knowing how 
the parties might have utilized the in-
creased income had they remained togeth-
er. Would they have bought a new car, a 
new house, or maybe a vacation timeshare? 
Or would they have simply saved the mon-
ey for retirement? Since a couple's stan-
dard of living is determined in large part 
by how they spend their resources, a trial 
court could do nothing but speculate about 
the possible standard of living if the mari-
tal relationship had continued beyond sepa-
ration. 
Not only is such an approach unwork-
able, it is not needed if the traditional ap-
proach outlined in English is followed. In 
the present case, the trial court clearly 
2. Defendant claims, and the majority seems to 
agree, that defendant is entitled to a larger 
amount of ahmon> because she "persevered 
during the lean times." Such an argument does 
not, however, justify an amount in excess of the 
needs substantiated bj the receiving spouse 
English, 565 P.2d at 412 The majority's sum-
mary conclusion that the income was "akin to 
deferred income," is totally unsupported 
While the parties ma\ have perservered at West-
ern Airlines during the lean times, there is no 
evidence that there was an> commitment from 
defendant's financial 
condition and needs based on the expenses 
she claimed to be necessary to maintain the 
standard of living she enjoyed during the 
marriage. See, e.g., Olson, 704 R2d at 567 
("to maintain the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage, the living expenses of 
the wife and minor children would be 
$4,200 per month"). 
Defendant presented to the trial court 
evidence of the expenses which she claimed 
would be necessary to maintain her stan-
dard of living, but the trial court made no 
findings thereon.3 The trial court should 
have reviewed the expenses claimed and 
determined which expenses could be 
deemed reasonable in light of the stan-
dard of living she had enjoyed prior to 
the separation. See, e.g., Jones, 700 P.2d 
at 1075 (the couple had enjoyed a "very 
comfortable lifestyle," alimony award of 
$1,000 per month was insufficient for wife 
to "maintain anything even approaching 
the standard of living she enjoyed during 
the marriage"). Her reasonable expenses 
should have then been offset by her own 
resources, i.e., any investment income and 
her own wage-earning capacity. Only then 
could the trial court have made a finding as 
to defendant's needs. 
The trial court should have then gone 
through the same analysis as to the plain-
tiffs needs and resources in order to deter-
mine his ability to pay. Again, the reason-
ableness of his claimed expenses should be 
reviewed with the parties' prior standard of 
living in mind. The trial court should have 
then determined whether plaintiffs re-
sources exceeded his reasonable needs. At 
this point the trial court should have, and 
in fact did, consider the impact of the dra-
matic increase in plaintiffs income. If 
Western that plaintiffs income would increase 
if and because he stayed with the airline 
3. Defendant's actual expenses at the time of trial 
were hkel> greatlv diminished due to her limit-
ed income at the time She therefore correctly 
sought to present not only her actual expenses 
during the separation, but also the expenses she 
claimed would be necessary to maintain or, in 
many cases return to, the standard of living she 
enjoyed prior to separation 
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plaintiff had not received the raise, then his 
ability to pay would be approximately 
$4,500 less per month, in which case nei-
ther party would likely be able to enjoy a 
standard of living anywhere near their pre-
vious standard. Inasmuch as plaintiffs 
raise has increased his ability to pay, defen-
dant will be directly benefitted without re-
sort to a hypothetical standard of living to 
which she had not grown accustomed. 
After determining what resources were 
available to the parties to meet their own 
reasonable expenses, the trial court should 
have considered any imbalance in the pro-
spective standards of living if the parties 
were left to support themselves with their 
own resources. If it were apparent that 
defendant could not maintain her previous 
standard of living with her own resources, 
and that the plaintiff with his dramatically 
increased income could maintain a higher 
standard of living, then the trial court 
could have awarded alimony to raise the 
standard of living of the defendant. Davis 
v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988) 
("the ultimate test of the propriety of an 
alimony award is whether, given all of 
these factors, the party receiving alimony 
will be unable to support him- or herself 'as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living 
. . . enjoyed during the marriage,' " quoting 
English, 565 P.2d at 411).4 
Inasmuch as the trial court failed to fol-
low the foregoing approach, the court 
abused its discretion in making the alimony 
award. I therefore concur with the majori-
ty that this case must be remanded to 
allow the trial court to properly consider 
the established factors and make appropri-
ate findings. However, since plaintiffs 
raise will be fully considered when his abili-
ty to pay alimony is determined, I believe 
there is no need to depart from the estab-
lished criteria for determining alimony 
The parties' standard of living need not, 
and should not, be extrapolated so as to 
4. The alimony award, however, need not be 
large enough to maintain the receiving spouse 
at the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage if that amount of alimony would low 
er the standard of living of the paying spouse 
below that of the receiving spouse Alimony 
may only raise the standard of living of the 
include speculations about what their stan-
dard of Irving might have been at the time 
of trial if they had not separated. I there-
fore respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion's legal ruling on that point 
STATE of Utah in the Interest of M.S., 
a person under the age of 
eighteen years, 
v. 
Michael SALATA, Appellant 
No. 900193-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Feb. 28, 1991. 
Father appealed from order of the 
Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake 
County, Arthur G. Chnstean, J., which teis 
mmated parental rights. The Court of Ap-
peals, Bench, J., held that evidence sus-
tained trial court's factual findings and d& 
termination that father was unfit 
Affirmed 
1. Infants <3=»248 
Claim that court had improperly con-
sidered inadmissible hearsay in reaching its 
findings in parental rights termination case 
would not be considered on appeal where 
parent dxi not refer to the rule of evidence 
against admitting hearsay to the definition 
of hearsay, to any cases resolving hearsay 
issues, or to am asserted hearsay admitted 
by the court Rules App.Proc , Rule 24(a). 
receiving spouse until it i* roughlv equal to that 
of the paving spouse It is in this sense that 
ahmon\ should seek "to the extent possible, [to] 
equalize the parties' respective post-divorce liv-
ing standards," Rasband t Rasband, 752 P.2d 
1331, 1333 (Utah CuApp 19S8) 
TabG 
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Because Erickson made no effort at any 
time to procure a buyer for either piece of 
equipment and had approved the sale of the 
shear on the day set forth in the notice for 
less than was eventually obtained, we can-
not find that he was prejudiced by either 
the technical defects in the notice or the 
slight delay in the sale. In fact, since he 
acquiesced to the lower bid, the delay actu-
ally worked to his advantage by lessening 
the deficiency by $2,000. Under these cir-
cumstances, we conclude that the notice 
was reasonable. 
The deficiency judgment entered by the 
lower court against Erickson is therefore 
affirmed. In light of the facts that the 
leases involved in this matter provided for 
an award of attorney fees to Scharf in any 
action necessary to enforce the leases and 
the trial court awarded them to her in 
connection with the proceedings below, we 
remand the case for determination of rea-
sonable fees in connection with this appeal 
as well. Management Services Corp. v. 
Development Associates, Utah, 617 P.2d 
406, 409 (1980). 
HALL, C.J., and HOWE and DURHAM, 
JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J, concurs in the result. 
(o | «Y KUMBER SYSTEM > 
DeMar D. JONES, Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
v. 
Harriet H. JONES, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 18733. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 17, 1985. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Raymond S. Uno, J., entered de-
cree of divorce, divided marital assets, and 
determined alimony. Wife appealed the 
property division and alimony award. The 
Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that: 
(1) Supreme Court could not determine 
whether trial court distributed marital as-
sets equitably; (2) trial court abused its 
discretion in fixing monthly alimony award 
to wife at $1,000 for five years, $750 for 
five additional years, and $500 thereafter; 
and (3) how husband chose to allocate prof-
its between himself and his business was 
not binding on court in determining hus-
band's ability to pay alimony. 
Remanded. 
1. Divorce <S=>253(4) 
Supreme Court could not determine 
from the record whether trial court equita-
bly distributed property in divorce proceed-
ing and trial court's statement that proper-
ty distribution was "fair and equitable" 
was insufficient finding where trial court 
provided no findings of fact that fixed val-
ues of marital assets. 
2. Divorce <s=>253(4) 
In divorce proceeding, when one of the 
parties to a property distribution raises a 
serious question as to value of one or more 
of the marital assets, trial court's distribu-
tion of those assets should be based upon 
written findings of fact that will permit 
appellate review. 
3. Divorce <&=>286(1) 
Wife waived claim that distribution of 
marital assets was inequitable where wife's 
attorney prepared the inadequate findings 
of fact regarding marital asset values and 
where wife's attorney made no motion to 
have trial court amend the findings to in-
clude values. 
4. Divorce <s=*237 
In fixing a reasonable alimony award, 
court should consider the financial condi-
tions and needs of the wife, the ability of 
the wife to produce a sufficient income for 
herself, and the ability of the husband to 
provide support. 
5. Divorce <3»240(4) 
Alimony award to wife allowing her 
monthly alimony of $1,000 for five years, 
$750 for five additional years, and $500 
thereafter was insufficient where, other 
than assets awarded to her in property 
distribution, wife had no assets and no 
outside income, where husband and wife 
had formerly enjoyed a very comfortable 
life style, where wife was awarded no in-
come-producing assets, where wife was ob-
ligated to make mortgage payments of 
nearly $700 per month on residence, where 
wife would be unable to maintain anything 
like the standard of living she enjoyed during 
marriage, where wife was 52 years old and 
had no professional training and few market-
able skills, and where husband was in an 
excellent position to provide adequate con-
tinuing support to wife. 
6. Divorce <fc*237 
How husband chose to allocate profit 
from his business between himself and the 
business was not binding on court in de-
termining husband's ability to pay a\i-
raony, full profit produced by the business, 
adjusted for legitimate and reasonable 
needs of the business for additional capital, 
should have been used by trial court as 
basis for assessing husband's ability to pro-
vide alimony; trial court should not permit 
claims of need for capital on the part of the 
business to take precedence over support 
needs of wife. 
JONES v. JONES Utah 1073 
Cite as 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) 
The parties were married on December 
13, 1952. They separated during May of 
1980, and their divorce decree was entered 
on June 14, 1982. During the course of the 
marriage, the couple raised four children, 
buflt a 4$00-square-ioot home ion Sandy, 
Utah, and established a retail pharmacy 
business, Riverton Drug, which was the 
primary income-producing asset of the mar-
riage. The husband is a licensed pharma-
cist During the early years of the mar-
riage, the wife worked in minor clerical 
jobs. However, after the family began to 
grow, she worked only intermittently, 
usually at the pharmacy or the associated 
gift shop. Her primary occupation during 
the marriage was raising the children, al-
though she also volunteered considerable 
time to a variety of social service organiza-
tions. 
B.L. Dart, John D. Parken, Salt Lake 
City, for defendant and appellant 
Glenn Richman, Salt Lake City, plaintiff 
and respondent. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Defendant appeals from the property dis-
tribution and alimony provisions of a de-
cree of divorce, contending that she was 
not given an appropriate share of the mari-
tal assets and that the aVimony award is 
insufficient. We affirm the property divi-
sion, but reverse the alimony award and 
remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
After a day-long trial, the trial court 
issued a memorandum opinion awarding 
the parties a divorce and describing the 
property to be awarded to each. Shortly 
thereafter, the wife's counsel submitted 
fmdi&gs of ffcct, wV\kh were approved by 
the trial court. The findings consisted of 
nothing more than statements taken from 
the court's memorandum opinion setting 
out the property division and reciting that 
it was "fair and equitable." Neither the 
memorandum decision nor the findings as-
signed individual values to each of the as-
sets or a total value to the cumulative 
share being awarded to each party. Under 
the terms of the decree, the husband re-
ceived Riverton Drug, including the land, 
building, and balance sheet assets, a condo-
minium he had purchased subsequent to 
the parties' separation, together with its 
furnishings, a country club membership, 
and all interest in a time-share condomin-
ium in Mazatlan. The wife received the 
family home with its furnishings, a country 
club membership, a 1980 automobile, and 
several securities. In addition to the spe-
cific items oi property, the wiie -was award-
ed $10,000 in cash, $3,500 in attorney fees, 
and monthly alimony of $1,000 for five 
years, $750 for five additional years, and 
$500 thereafter. The wife challenges both 
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the property distribution and alimony provi-
sions of the decree. 
In a divorce proceeding, the trial court 
may make such orders concerning property 
distribution and alimony as are equitable. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 30-3-5 (1984 ed.). The trial 
court has broad latitude in such matters, 
and orders distributing property and set-
ting alimony will not be lightly disturbed. 
See e.g., Higley v. Higley, Utah, 676 P.2d 
379, 382 (1983); Dority v. Dority, Utah, 
645 P.2d 56, 59 (1982); English v. English, 
Utah, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (1977). However, 
the trial court must exercise its discretion 
in accordance with the standards that have 
been set by this Court. In the present 
case, we find that the trial court did not 
comply with those standards. We there-
fore reverse and remand, but only as to the 
alimony issue. 
We address first the property distribu-
tion. The wife argues that the trial court 
awarded her such a small portion of the 
marital assets as to make the entire distri-
bution inequitable. Ordinarily, we would 
assess the merit of such an assertion by 
reviewing the trial court's findings of fact 
and the values it assigned to the various 
items of property included in the distribu-
tion. However, in the present case there 
are no findings of fact that fix these val-
ues. In an attempt to compensate for the 
trial court's failure to make such findings, 
we have reviewed the record to determine 
whether the values were apparent from the 
evidence. However, that examination re-
veals that the valuation of the most impor-
tant assets was hotly disputed by the par-
ties. If the trial court accepted one set of 
values, the wife was clearly awarded too 
little; if another set was adopted, it is 
possible that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion. 
[1,2] On the present record, we cannot 
determine whether the trial court distribut-
ed the property equitably. In re Marriage 
of Martin, 22 Wash App. 295, 588 P.2d 
1235, 1236 (1979). To avoid problems of 
this nature, we require that when one of 
the parties to a property distribution raises 
a serious question as to the value of one or 
more of the assets, the trial court's distri-
bution of those assets should be based 
upon written findings of fact that wOl per-
mit appellate review. Cf Chandler v. 
West, Utah, 610 P.2d 1299,1301 (1980). 
Counsel for the wife contends that the 
matter should be remanded to the trial 
court for entry of the required findings. 
The husband contends that such a remand 
is unnecessary. He relies on Pearson v. 
Pearson, Utah, 561 P.2d 1080 (1977), for 
the proposition that the trial court need 
only make generalized findings of fact to 
support its judgment and that the trial 
court's statement that the distribution was 
"fair and equitable" is a sufficient finding 
to sustain the judgment. 
The husband misreads Pearson. There 
the court entered a decree dividing the 
marital property pursuant to a general for-
mula stipulated to by the parties. Appel-
lant asserted that the court failed to make 
detailed findings of fact showing that the 
distribution was in accord with the stipula-
tion. We held that the discretion conferred 
on the trial court by section 30-3-5 of the 
Code could not be controlled by a stipula-
tion of the parties and that the trial court's 
general and rather conclusory findings of 
fact were sufficient to support the property 
distribution. Id. at 1082. However, we 
specifically observed that the Pearson ap-
pellant did not claim that the ultimate dis-
tribution was inequitable. That fact was 
critical to the affirmance. In contrast, the 
gravamen of the wife's claim here is that 
the distribution was inequitable. To deter-
mine whether equity was done, we must 
have before us specific findings on the 
facts pertinent to that issue. 
[3] Normally, we would grant the reme-
dy sought by the wife and remand for 
findings on the specific value of the assets. 
In this case, however, the wife's attorney 
prepared the inadequate findings of fact 
she challenges on appeal and the conclu-
sions of law and decree of divorce, all of 
which the court entered without alteration. 
Counsel for the wife made no motion to 
have the trial court amend the findings to 
include values. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(b). 
JONES v. JONES^ 
Cite as 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) 
Utah 1075 
The wife cannot come now, albeit through 
new counsel, and complain of her own fail-
ure to include specific property values in 
the findings of fact She has waived the 
claim. 
The wife's second claim is that the trial 
court abused its discretion in making the 
alimony award, considering both the length 
of the marriage and the present financial 
resources of the parties. We agree. 
[4,5] This Court has described the pur-
pose of alimony: "[T]he most important 
function of alimony is to provide support 
for the wife as nearly as possible at the 
standard of living she enjoyed during mar-
riage, and to prevent the wife from becom-
ing a public charge." English v. English, 
565 P.2d at 411. With this purpose in 
mind, the Court in English articulated 
three factors that must be considered in 
fixing a reasonable alimony award: 
[1] the financial conditions and needs of 
the wife; 
[2] the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself; and 
[3] the ability of the husband to provide 
support 
Id at 411-12 (citations omitted). See also 
Gramme v. Gramme, Utah, 587 P.2d 144, 
147 (1978); Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 
P.2d 1218, 1223 (1980). Nowhere in the 
trial court's memorandum decision, its find-
ings of fact, or its statements made on the 
record at the conclusion of the hearing is 
there any indication that the court analyzed 
the circumstances of the parties in light of 
these three factors. And our attempt to 
perform this analysis through a review of 
the record evidence compels us to conclude 
that the trial court abused its discretion in 
fixing the alimony award. 
As noted, the first factor to be con-
sidered is the financial condition and needs 
of the wife. Other than the assets award-
ed her in the property distribution, the wife 
has no assets and no outside income. As a 
result of the success of Riverton Drug, the 
couple had enjoyed a very comfortable life-
style. In the property settlement, the wife 
was awarded no income-producing assets. 
She was awarded $10,000 in cash and sev-
eral securities of relatively small value and 
limited liquidity. She now must make 
mortgage payments of nearly $700 per 
month on the residence, wholly apart from 
ordinary and necessary expenses of food, 
clothing, and transportation. Assuming 
that she sells the house and uses the equity 
to purchase more modest accommodations, 
it is almost certain that she will be unable 
to maintain anything even approaching the 
standard of living she enjoyed during the 
marriage, given the $1,000 per month ali-
mony awarded by the trial court for the 
first five years and the decreased amounts 
awarded for the following years. 
The second factor to be considered is the 
wife's ability to produce a sufficient income 
for herself. She was married at the age of 
23 and was 52 years old at the time of trial. 
The paid work she did in the early years of 
the marriage and the miscellaneous func-
tions she performed at the pharmacy and 
gift shop were all relatively unskilled in 
nature. During most of the marriage, with 
the full consent and support of her hus-
band, she devoted her time to raising their 
four children and donating her services to 
various social service organizations. She 
has no professional training and few mar-
ketable skills. The husband managed the 
finances of both the family and the busi-
ness and provided his wife with an allow-
ance to cover her expenses. When River-
ton Drug was finally incorporated, the 
stock was issued entirely in the husband's 
name. The wife has no independent in-
come. It is entirely unrealistic to assume 
that a woman in her mid-50's with no sub-
stantial work experience or training will be 
able to enter the job market and support 
herself in anything even resembling the 
style in which the couple had been living. 
See Higley v. Higley, Utah, 676 P.2d 379, 
381 (1983). 
The final factor to be considered is the 
ability of the husband to provide support to 
the wife. The record shows that although 
the husband paid himself an annual $45,000 
from the proceeds of Riverton Drug, the 
total profits from the business actually 
amounted to almost $90,000 per year. 
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While the trial court apparently viewed 
$45,000 as the husband's total annual in-
come for purposes of determining alimony, 
in fact he had control over the entire profit, 
but chose to take only half of it as personal 
income and to set the rest aside for rein-
vestment in the business. 
[6] The apportionment of income be-
tween personal and business uses is quite 
properly a matter left to the discretion of 
the husband as owner of the pharmacy and 
gift shop. However, how he chooses to 
allocate that profit is not binding on the 
court in determining his ability to pay ali-
mony to his ex-spouse. The full profit pro-
duced by the business,- adjusted by the 
court to take into account legitimate and 
reasonable needs of the business for addi-
tional capital, should have been used as the 
basis for assessing the husband's ability to 
provide for his spouse. In making this 
analysis, the trial court should not permit 
all claims of need for capital on the part of 
the business to take precedence over the 
support needs of the wife. If these capital 
needs are a result of discretionary deci-
sions of the husband to expand and im-
prove the business, rather than to maintain 
it in its present condition, then to permit 
him to divert income into the!' business at 
the expense of his ex-spouse's support 
needs would be to permit him to enrich 
himself at her expense. Cf. Christiansen 
v. Christiansen, Utah, 667 P.2d 592, 594 
(1983). 
On the record, there is no reason to 
surmise that the income generated by the 
business will decrease in the future. The 
husband, therefore, as sole owner, is in an 
excellent position to provide adequate con-
tinuing support to his ex-spouse. 
The foregoing analysis leads inexorably 
to the conclusion that the trial court's ali-
mony award was inequitable, both in terms 
of the initial amount and the graduated 
diminution over time The wife is in her 
mid-50's, possesses few marketable job 
skills, and has little hope of retraining. 
This is simply not the sort of situation in 
which a decreasing rehabilitative alimony 
award is appropriate. The husband oper-
ates a financially successful business, built 
up over the course of the marriage through 
the joint efforts of both the husband and 
the wife. These facts clearly call for some 
form of continuing spousal maintenance. 
The original award must be more substan-
tial, considering the husband's real discre-
tionary income, and should continue at that 
level for the foreseeable future. 
We remand for further findings consists 
ent with this opinion. The trial court,4 of 
course, will retain continuing jurisdiction 
over the matter and may modify the decree 
on petition of a complaining ex-spouse if 
the circumstances should change in the fu-
ture. U.C.A., 1953, § 30-3-5 <Supp.l983). 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE, and 
DURHAM, JJ. concur. 
STATE of Utah, IN the INTEREST OF 
CLATTERBUCK, Nick Alan. 
No. 19937. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 18, 1985. 
Juvenile charged with criminal homi-
cide and first-degree murder was certified 
by the Third Juvenile District Court, Utah 
County, Leslie D. Brown, J., for trial as an 
adult. The 15-year-old juvenile appealed 
certification order. The Supreme Court, 
Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) statute em-
powering juvenile court to certify juvenile 
for trial as an adult provides a substantive 
standard for certification; (2) even though 
statute empowering juvenile court to certi-
fy juvenile for trial as adult does not speci-
fy burden of proof that State must meet to 
justify certification, statute does not violate 
due process; (3) juvenile court's failure to 
expressly state standard of proof that 
TabH 
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Helen NARANJO, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Jose L. NARANJO, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 860126-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 22, 1988. 
In a divorce proceeding, the District 
Court, J. Dennis Frederick, J., awarded 
wife use and possession of home subject to 
lien in favor of husband, $800 a month 
alimony, proceeds from sales contract of 
home, share in husband's injury award, and 
other marital property for total of $111,-
846, and awarded to husband additional 
property of $118,009, and husband appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held 
that (1) awards made to wife were proper, 
and (2) husband's motion to modify divorce 
decree was properly denied. 
Affirmed. 
1. Divorce «»252.2 
There is no fixed formula upon which 
to determine division of property in divorce 
action. 
2. Divorce «=>286(2) 
Trial court has considerable latitude in 
adjusting financial and property interests 
when dividing property in divorce action, 
and court's actions are entitled to presump-
tion of validity. 
3. Divorce *»286(5, 8, 9) 
Changes will be made in trial court's 
property division determination in divorce 
action only if there was misunderstanding 
or misapplication of law resulting in sub-
stantial and prejudicial error, evidence 
clearly preponderated against findings, or 
such serious inequity resulted as to mank 
fest clear abuse of discretion. 
4. Divorce «=»237 
When fixing reasonable alimony 
award, court must consider financial condi-
tion and needs of party seeking alimony, 
party's ability to produce sufficient income 
for himself, and ability of other party to 
provide support 
5. Divorce <*»235 
Court's failure to analyze parties' cir-
cumstances when fixing reasonable alimo-
ny award constitutes abuse of discretion. 
6. Divorce <$=>24(K2) 
Alimony award of $800 to wife was 
proper where wife was 59 years old and 
had spent last 16 years of her life as full 
time homemaker while husband developed 
trucking business, it was highly unlikely 
that wife would be able to provide suffi-
cient income to support herself, and award 
was only slightly more than one third of 
husband's monthly income. 
7. Divorce «»252.3(3) 
As general rule, premarital property, 
gifts, and inheritances may be viewed as 
separate property when making distribu-
tion of property in divorce proceeding; 
however, in appropriate circumstances one 
spouse may be awarded property which 
other spouse brought into marriage. 
8. Divorce *»252.2 
In fashioning equitable property divi-
sion in divorce proceeding, court must con-
sider all of pertinent circumstances includ-
ing amount and kind of property to be 
divided, source of property, parties' health, 
parties' standard of living and respective 
financial conditions, parties' needs and 
earning capacities, duration of marriage, 
what parties gave up by marriage, and 
relationship property division has with 
amount of alimony awarded. 
9. Divorce «=»252.3(1) 
In dividing parties' property in divorce 
proceeding, award to wife of all proceeds 
from sales contract of parties' home was 
proper where court took into consideration 
amount and kind of property to be divided, 
circumstances of the parties, and fact that 
wife would enjoy minimal standard of liv-
ing under alimony award. 
10. Divorce <*=»252.5U) 
In dividing parties' property in divorce 
proceeding, award to wife of occupancy of 
NARANJO v. NARANJO 
Cttett751 T2d 1144 (UtahApp 1988) 
Utah H45 
parties' home was proper where husband 
retained one-half ownership interest in 
property, and wife was required to pay off 
husband's $31,000 lien against home upon 
occurrence of one of several contingencies. 
11. Divorce *»252.3(3) 
Because of personal nature of special 
damages, amounts received as compensa-
tion for pain, suffering, disfigurement, dis-
ability, or other personal debilitation are 
generally personal property of injured 
spouse in divorce actions. 
12. Divorce *=>252.3(1) 
Money realized as compensation for 
lost wages and medical expenses, which 
diminish marital estate, are considered to 
be marital property in divorce actions. 
13. Divorce *»252.3(3) 
Title to marital property prior to di-
vorce decree is not necessarily binding on 
trial court in its distribution of marital 
property. 
14. Divorce ^252.3(5) 
In-kind distribution of closely held cor 
porate stock is appropriate in distribution 
of marital property in divorce proceeding 
where evidence fails to establish stock's 
value. 
15. Divorce *=>252.3(5) 
In distribution of marital property in 
divorce proceeding, award to wife of one 
half of closely held corporate stock and 
award to husband of other half of stock 
and all remaining cash proceeds was prop-
er, where value of stock was speculative in 
nature, and husband had already been 
awarded major income-producing assets. 
16. juivorce «=»164 
Husband's motion to modify divorce 
decree was properly denied where husband 
neither alleged nor proved changed circum-
stances. U.C.A.1953, 30-S-5. 
Samuel King (argued), Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and appellant 
Phil L Hansen, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and respondent 
Before BENCH, GARFF and 
GREENWOOD, JJ. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Defendant appeals the trial court's judg-
ment in this divorce action, seeking amend-
ment of the judgment 
Plaintiff/respondent, Helen Naranjo, and 
defendant/appellant, Jose Naranjo, were 
married on December 4, 1968 and were 
divorced on February 25, 1985. They had 
no children during the nearly seventeen 
year marriage, although defendant helped 
to raise plaintiffs five children from a pre-
vious marriage. 
At the time of trial, plaintiff was fifty-
nine years old, had ulcers, but was other-
wise in good health. During the marriage, 
she worked intermittently at low-paying 
jobs. At the time of trial, she was having 
difficulty finding a job because of her age 
and lack of skills. Defendant, fifty-one 
years old at the time of trial, was self-em-
ployed as a long-line truck driver and owns 
his own diesel truck and flat-bed trailer. 
In the twelve months prior to the divorce, 
his net income was $27,905. Because of 
the length of the marriage and the dispari-
ty in the parties' earning capacity, the trial 
court ruled that defendant pay plaintiff 
$800 per month alimony. 
The parties owned a home and property 
in Magna, Utah, on which the parties had 
built an oversized garage used by defend-
ant as a truck maintenance and storage 
facility. The trial court found that this 
real property had a fair market value of 
$75,000 at the time of trial, and that the 
parties' equity in it was $62,242. The trial 
court awarded plaintiff use and possession 
of the home, subject to the outstanding 
mortgage obligation and a lien in favor of 
defendant for $31,121. 
When the parties were first married, de-
fendant owned a house in Kearns. The 
parties lived in the home for a period of 
time, jointly made improvements on it and 
then sold it on contract, with a balance due 
to them of $37,900. At the time of trial, 
this contract was in default. The trial 
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court found that the parties had merged 
their assets, making the full equity in this 
house a marital asset, and awarded the 
contract proceeds to plaintiff. 
During the marriage, in 1980, defend-
ant's left knee was seriously injured in an 
industrial accident As a consequence, he 
underwent several surgeries and was un-
able to work for nine months. Defendant's 
doctor conjectured that defendant could 
continue working for only five to ten more 
years because his knee was steadily becom-
ing more painful and could require future 
surgery. Subsequently, defendant was 
awarded a $110,000 judgment in connection 
with the knee injury, $61,459 of which he 
ultimately received. Defendant converted 
$50,000 of these proceeds into joint thrift 
certificates in his and plaintiffs names and 
used the remainder for family expenses. 
The trial court found that defendant did 
not meet his burden of showing the amount 
of the award attributable to pain and suf-
fering, and that the injury award was for 
lost income and, therefore, joint property. 
Thus, plaintiff was entitled to share in the 
injury award. In making these determina-
tions, the trial court explicitly took into 
account the possibility that defendant 
would require future surgery by awarding 
him the majority of the income-producing 
assets of the marriage, but also found that 
his possible need for future surgery was 
"speculative." 
Defendant testified that he planned to 
use the award proceeds to meet his future 
medical expenses and to offset his potential 
reduced earning capacity. Plaintiff, with-
out defendant's knowledge or authoriza-
tion, cashed $30,000 of the certificates and, 
in her own name, invested them in stock in 
National Military Underwriters Co., a close-
ly-held corporation for which she worked. 
In distributing the award proceeds, the tri-
al court split the stock equally between the 
parties and awarded the remaining thrift 
certificates to defendant 
The trial court also awarded to plaintiff 
other marital property so that the value of 
her award totalled $111,846. Defendant 
was also awarded additional property, 
bringing the total value of his award to 
$118,009. 
On appeal, defendant alleges that the 
trial court erred in: (1) awarding plaintiff 
$800 alimony per month; (2) awarding 
plaintiff all the proceeds from the sales 
contract of the Kearns home that defend-
ant owned before marriage to plaintiff; (3) 
awarding plaintiff occupancy rather than 
just equal ownership of the Magna home; 
(4) giving plaintiff an equal share of de-
fendant's personal injury proceeds; (5) 
splitting the National Military Underwrit-
ers stock equally between defendant and 
plaintiff rather than awarding it all to 
plaintiff and awarding defendant other, 
offsetting assets; and (6) not looking to the 
effect of the decree with respect to defen-
dant's future medical needs. 
[1-3] There is no fixed formula upon 
which to determine a division of properties 
in a divorce action, Turner v. Turner, 649 
P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982), the trial court has 
considerable latitude in adjusting financial 
and property interests, and its actions are 
entitled to a presumption of validity. Sav-
age v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 
1983). Changes will be made only if there 
was a misunderstanding or misapplication 
of the law resulting in substantial and prej-
udicial error, the evidence clearly prepon-
derated against the findings, or such a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest 
a clear abuse of discretion. English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977); 
Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 
CtApp.1987). 
I 
Alimony 
The purpose of alimony is to "enable the 
receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as 
possible the standard of living enjoyed dur-
ing the marriage and to prevent the spouse 
from becoming a public charge." Paffel v. 
Paffel, 732 P.2d 96,100 (Utah 1986); Jones 
v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). 
It should, so far as possible, equalize the 
parties' "respective standards of living and 
maintain them at a level as close as possi-
ble to the standard of living enjoyed during 
NARANJO 
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the marriage." Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 
564, 566 (Utah 1985); Hxgley v. Higley, 676 
P.2d 379, 381 (Utah 1983). "[T]he ultimate 
test of the propriety of an alimony award is 
whether, given all of these factors, the 
party receiving alimony will be able to sup-
port him- or herself 'as nearly as possible 
at the standard of living . . . enjoyed during 
marriage/ " Dams v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 
649 (Utah 1988) (quoting English, 565 P.2d 
at 411). 
[4,5] The Utah Supreme Court has con-
sistently articulated three factors which 
must be considered in fixing a reasonable 
alimony award: (1) the financial condition 
and needs of the party seeking alimony; (2) 
that party's ability to produce a sufficient 
income for him- or herself; and (3) the 
ability of the other party to provide sup-
port English, 565 P.2d at 411-12; Davis, 
749 P.2d at 649; Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 
1382 (Utah CtApp.1987). Failure to ana-
lyze the parties' circumstances in the light 
of these three factors constitutes an abuse 
of discretion. Paffel, 732 P.2d at 101; 
Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075; Boyle v. Boyle, 
735 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah CtApp.1987). As 
long as the "trial court exercises its discre-
tion within the bounds and under the stan-
dards we have set and has supported its 
decision with adequate findings and conclu-
sions, we wfll not disturb its rulings." 
Davis, 749 P.2d at 649. 
The trial court found plaintiff, at the 
time of trial, was unemployed and had no 
income, and defendant was self-employed, 
making a net yearly income of approxi-
mately $28,000. The Utah Supreme Court 
has noted that "[i]t is unrealistic to assume 
that a woman in her mid-50's with no sub-
stantial work experience or training will be 
able to enter the job market and support 
herself in anything even resembling the 
style in which the couple had been living." 
Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075. 
[6] Plaintiff, who is fifty-nine years old, 
has spent the last sixteen years of her life 
as a full-time homemaker while defendant 
developed his trucking business. It is high-
ly unlikely that she will be able to provide 
1. The trial court found that the parties had 
merged their marital assets. Appellant attempts 
v. NARANJO Utah 1147 
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sufficient income to support herself. See 
Higley, 676 P.2d at 381. Considering the 
needs of plaintiff and the parties' ability to 
produce income, 
[w]here a marriage is of long duration 
and the earning capacity of one spouse 
greatly exceeds that of the other . . . it is 
appropriate to order alimony . . . at a 
level which will insure that the supported 
spouse . . . may maintain a standard of 
living not unduly disproportionate to that 
which [she] would have enjoyed had the 
marriage continued. 
Savage, 658 P.2d at 1205 (Utah 1983). De-
fendant's approximate monthly income is 
$2,300. The alimony award of $800 is 
slightly more than one-third of defendant's 
monthly income, not an unreasonable distri-
bution. As such, we find that there has 
been no abuse of discretion and affirm the 
trial court's award of alimony. 
II 
Equity in Kearns Home 
Defendant asserts that the trial court 
erred in awarding plaintiff all the proceeds 
from the sales contract of the parties' 
Kearns home because his pre-marital equi-
ty in the home was traceable and because 
there was no trial court finding that the 
parties had merged their pre-marital as-
sets.1 
[7,8] As a general rule, pre-marital 
property, gifts, and inheritances may be 
viewed as the separate property of the 
parties. Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133,135 
(Utah 1987). However, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, a party may be awarded prop-
erty which the other spouse brought into 
the marriage. Id. In fashioning an eq-
uitable property division, trial courts must 
consider all of the pertinent circumstances, 
including the amount and kind of property 
to be divided, the source of the property, 
the parties' health, the parties' standard of 
living and respective financial conditions, 
their needs and earning capacities, the du-
ration of the marriage, what the parties 
gave up by the marriage, and the relation-
to argue that this finding does not include pre-
marital assets. 
1148 Utah 751 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
ship the property division has with the 
amount of alimony awarded. Id. Trial 
courts "need be guided by the general pur-
pose to be achieved by a property division, 
which is to allocate the property in a man-
ner which best serves the needs of the 
parties and best permits them to pursue 
their separate lives." Id. 
[9] In this case, we have already noted 
that the trial court took these factors into 
account in determining alimony. Given de-
fendant's obligation for spousal support 
and the minimal standard of living which 
plaintiff will enjoy under the alimony 
award, we find no abuse of discretion. 
HI 
Occupancy of Magna Home 
Defendant argues that the trial court's 
award to plaintiff of occupancy of the par-
ties' Magna home is unfair, in that defend-
ant entered the marriage with a home and 
leaves without one while plaintiff entered 
the marriage without a home and leaves 
with one. He also argues that the award is 
arbitrary, in that the garage on the proper-
ty will stand empty while defendant is com-
pelled to rent comparable truck storage 
and maintenance facilities. Defendant pro-
poses that he receive the entire equity in 
the Magna home while plaintiff receives 
the entire investment in National Military 
Underwriters stock and the $37,900 con-
tract on the Kearns home. 
[10] Although defendant entered the 
parties' marriage with a home and now 
leaves without occupancy of one, he retains 
a one-half ownership interest in the Magna 
property. Under the terms of the divorce 
decree, plaintiff is required to pay off de-
fendant's $31,121 lien upon the occurrence 
of the first of several contingencies, includ-
ing the expiration of five years from the 
date of entry of the divorce decree. The 
trial court found that the parties had 
merged their assets over the course of the 
marriage and that the full equity is an 
asset of the marriage. This finding is sub-
stantiated by the record. 
Even though we appreciate the need 
which defendant has for the garage on the 
property, it is "inappropriate for this Court 
to reverse on an isolated item of property 
or debt distribution. Rather, this Court 
must examine the entire distribution to de-
termine if the trial court abused its discre-
tion." Boyle, 735 P.2d at 670-71. We find 
no abuse of discretion with respect to this 
issue. 
IV 
Personal Injury Proceeds and National 
Military Underwriters Stock 
[11,12] Because of the personal nature 
of special damages, amounts received as 
compensation for pain, suffering, disfigure-
ment, disability, or other personal debilita-
tion are generally found to be the personal 
property of the injured spouse in divorce 
actions. See Izatt v. Izatt, 627 P.2d 49, 51 
(Utah 1981). Likewise, money realized as 
compensation for lost wages and medical 
expenses, which diminish the marital es-
tate, are considered to be marital property. 
See Bugh v. Bugh, 125 Ariz. 190, 608 P.2d 
329, 331 (1980). 
The trial court found that defendant's 
personal injury award was joint property, 
and awarded plaintiff a portion of it It 
reasoned that defendant did not meet his 
burden of showing the amount of the inju-
ry award attributable to compensation for 
pain and suffering. Defendant argues that 
he was unable to meet this burden because 
the judgment was awarded in Colorado, 
and, according to Colorado procedure, the 
jury verdict was not broken into general 
and special damages. 
[13] In this case, it is irrelevant wheth-
er or not defendant carried this burden of 
proof because the trial court has power "to 
make such distributions as are just and 
equitable, and may compel such conveyanc-
es as are necessary to that end." Jackson 
v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah 
1980). See also Burnham v. Burnham, 
716 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah 1986). In so doing, 
the court may take into consideration all of 
the pertinent circumstances in distributing 
the parties' property. Wilkins v. Stout, 
588 P.2d 145, 146 (Utah 1978). Title to 
marital property prior to a divorce decree is 
SMITH v. SMITH 
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not necessarily binding on the trial court in 
its distribution of marital property. Jack-
son, 617 P.2d at 340. 
[14,15] At the time of trial, plaintiff 
had already invested $30,000 of the award 
proceeds in the National Military Under-
writers stock. When plaintiff purchased 
the stock, it was valued at its purchase 
price, but its current value is unknown. 
An in-kind distribution of closely-held cor-
porate stock is appropriate where the evi-
dence fails to establish the stock's value. 
Savage, 658 P.2d at 1204-05. The trial 
court awarded plaintiff one-half of the 
stock and defendant the other half and all 
the remaining cash proceeds. It would be 
inappropriate, given the speculative nature 
of the investment and the fact that defend-
ant has already been awarded the major 
income-producing assets, for plaintiff to re-
ceive all of the stock and defendant to 
receive offsetting property. We further 
note that plaintiff was not given an equal 
share in the award proceeds from the out-
set, but only an equal share in the National 
Military Underwriters stock, so defendant's 
objection to an equal division of the award 
proceeds is not well taken. While we do 
not condone plaintiffs behavior in award-
ing herself a pre-trial "distribution" of joint 
assets, in view of the entire allocation of 
marital assets, we do not find that the trial 
court abused its discretion. See Boyle, 785 
P.2d at 670-71. 
ified when there has been a change in the 
circumstances or condition of a party since 
the entry of the original decree. Thomp-
son v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 
1985); Chandler u West, 610 P.2d 1299, 
1300 (Utah 1980). 
[16] However, defendant has neither al-
leged nor proven such changed circum-
stances, so the trial court did not err in 
refusing to modify the decree.2 
Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm 
the trial court's order and award costs to 
plaintiff. 
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
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• . 
Daniel Harold SMITH, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 860252-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 23, 1988. 
Future Effect of Decree With Respect 
to Defendant's Medical Needs 
Defendant argues that the trial court did 
not look ahead to his future medical needs 
in fashioning the decree. Immediately af-
ter the decree was entered, defendant filed 
a motion to modify, which the court denied. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1984) has been 
consistently interpreted to mean that the 
trial court has continuing jurisdiction over 
the divorce decree with respect to property 
distributions, and the decree may be mod-
2. Since the tiling of this appeal, the trial court, 
under its continuing jurisdiction, entered a sup-
plemental recommendation and order reducing 
Parties' marriage was dissolved by the 
Sixth District Court, Garfield County, Don 
V. Tibbs, J., and husband appealed from 
court's property distribution and alimony 
awards. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., 
held that (1) divorce court order awarding 
wife the marital home and all furnishings 
and appliances therein and ordering hus-
band to repay mother's purchase-money 
loan was not abuse of discretion, and (2) 
award of $425 per month in temporary 
alimony was not abuse of discretion. 
Affirmed. 
the alimony award to $350 per month due to a 
reduction in defendant's income. 
Tab! 
RASBAND v. RASBAND 
a t e M 752 F2d 1331 (UtahApp. 1988) 
A typical example is the case of the 
couple who are divorced in state A, their 
matrimonial home state, and whose chil-
dren are awarded to the wife, subject to 
visitation rights of the husband. Wife 
and children move to state B, with or 
without permission of the court to re-
move the children- State A has continu-
ing jurisdiction and the courts in state B 
may not hear the wife's petition to make 
her the sole custodian, eliminate visita-
tion rights, or make any other modifica-
tion of the decree, even though state B 
has in the meantime become the "home 
state" under section 3. The jurisdiction 
of state A continues and is exclusive as 
long as the husband lives in state A 
unless he loses contact with the children, 
for example, by not using his visitation 
privileges for three years. 
Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act A Legislative Remedy 
for Children Caught in the Conflict of 
Laws, 22 Vand.L.Rev. 1207, 1237 (1969) 
(quoted in State ex reL Cooper v. Hamil-
ton, 688 S.W.2d 821, 826 (Tenn.1985)). 
Under the facts of this case, Utah's juris-
diction over custody issues was primary 
and Washington's jurisdiction was second-
ary. The parties were divorced in Utah. 
Rawlings subsequently moved to Washing-
ton, taking the children with her. Weiner 
remained in Utah, and continually sought 
enforcement of his visitation rights under 
the Utah decree. At Rawlings' request, 
Washington took emergency jurisdiction 
under UCCJA. On discovering that Utah 
had continuing jurisdiction over custody, 
Washington declined any further jurisdic-
tion under section 14(1). That was precise-
ly what should have happened under 
UCCJA. Because Utah had primary juris-
diction over custody of the children, I con-
cur in affirming the judgment of the trial 
court 
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Russell Bourne RASBAND, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Carol T. RASBAND, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 870081-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 18, 1988. 
In divorce proceeding in the District 
Court, Rodney Page, J., wife was awarded 
automatically decreasing monthly alimony, 
property was divided equally between hus-
band and wife, and reasonable attorney 
fees for wife were fixed at $3,500, and wife 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, 
J., held that: (1) decreasing alimony award 
was improper; (2) court properly distribut-
ed parties' assets and debts by dividing 
them equally between parties; and (3) 
court properly determined wife's attorney 
fees at $3,500. 
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded. 
1. Divorce <s=*286(3) 
Court's award of spousal support will 
not be disturbed absent showing of clear 
and prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
2. Divorce <3=>240(2) 
Alimony award should, to extent possi-
ble, equalize parties' respective postdivorce 
living standards and maintain them at lev-
els as close as possible to that standard of 
living enjoyed during marriage. 
(O ilfYKl*B{l5YSTlM> 
3. Divorce <&=>235 
When determining reasonable alimony 
award, failure to consider financial condi-
tions and needs of requesting spouse, abili-
ty of requesting spouse to produce suffi-
cient income for himself, and ability of 
other spouse to provide support constitutes 
abuse of court's discretion. 
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4. Divorce «=>240<1) 
Decreasing alimony, based on specula-
tion of alimony recipient's future ability to 
earn, is generally inappropriate in view of 
court's continuing jurisdiction to modify 
original decree. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
5. Divorce <*=>247 
Award of alimony of $800 per month 
for one year, decreasing to $700 per month 
for two years, and then to $350 per month 
for five years was improper, where court 
failed to consider husband's clear ability to 
provide support, wife's severely limited 
ability to meet her own established finan-
cial needs, and fact that husband would 
have discretionary income of $10,000 annu-
ally and wife would have none. 
6. Divorce «=*286(2, 8) 
Court's distribution of property in di-
vorce proceeding is endowed with presump-
tion of validity and will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless it is clearly unjust or clear 
abuse of discretion. 
7. Divorce <&*252.4, 252.5(1) 
Court properly distributed parties' as-
sets and obligations in divorce proceeding 
by dividing assets equally, and by dividing 
net equity in home equally after reimburs-
ing husband for payment of family debts, 
despite wife's contention that husband had 
gained intangible assets which should be 
offset by awarding wife all parties' tangi-
ble assets, where court ordered husband to 
pay tangible business debts, wife withdrew 
$8,500 from bank account and did not ac-
count for all money she used, and husband 
used inheritance to pay family expenses or 
to set up savings accounts. 
8. Divorce <&=>223 
Court has power to award attorney 
fees in divorce proceedings, and decision to 
make such award and amount thereof rests 
primarily in sound discretion of court; how-
ever, award must be based on evidence of 
both financial need and reasonableness. 
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3. 
9. Divorce *»227(1) 
Court's determination that wife in-
curred reasonable attorney fees of $3,500 
in divorce proceeding was proper although 
attorney fees amounted to more than 
$7,000; case was not difficult from legal, 
factual, or discovery standpoint 
David S. Dolowitz (argued), Cohne, Rap-
paport & Segal, Salt Lake City, for defend-
ant and appellant 
Pete N. Vlahos (argued), Vlahos & 
Sharp, Ogden, for plaintiff and respondent 
Before DAVIDSON, GREENWOOD 
and JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Carol Rasband's appeal challenges the 
alimony award, the property division, and 
the legal fee award in the parties' February, 
1987 judgment and decree of divorce. We 
affirm in part and vacate and remand in 
part 
The parties were married in 1957, a few 
months after graduating from high school. 
Four children were born as issue of the 
marriage. The youngest child was eman-
cipated two months after entry of the de-
cree; another is an adult incapable of self-
support Mrs. Rasband worked occasional-
ly at low-skilled, minimum wage jobs and 
did some typing to help Mr. Rasband in his 
work. He was a manager of insurance 
agents from 1977 untfl 1984 when he elect-
ed to work as an independent agent 
Their assets and debts were divided 
about evenly by the trial court Equality 
was to be ultimately achieved by sale of 
the family home within three years (to be 
used by appellant in the interim), with the 
net equity divided equally at that time af-
ter reimbursement of respondent for pay-
ing $9,992 in family debts and payment to 
him of an additional $5,400. Mr. Rasband 
was ordered to pay $250 in monthly sup-
port for the handicapped adult child, pend-
RASBAND v. RASBAND 
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ing further review of her condition.1 Mrs. 
Rasband was awarded automatically-de-
creasing monthly alimony of $800 for one 
year, decreasing to $700 for two years, 
then to $350 for five years, and ending at 
$1 per year. She requested payment by 
respondent of $7,970 in legal expenses and 
was awarded $1,000 of that request 
ALIMONY 
[1] This court will not disturb the trial 
court's award of spousal support absent a 
showing of a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion. Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 
100 (Utah 1986). In this appeal, Mrs. Ras-
band asserts that the trial court committed 
such an abuse in determining the amount 
of alimony and in providing for its automat-
ic decline. We agree on both of these 
related points. 
[2,3] An alimony award should, to the 
extent possible, equalize the parties' re-
spective post-divorce living standards and 
maintain them at a level as close as possi-
ble to that standard of living enjoyed dur-
ing the marriage. Gardner v. Gardner, 
748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). 
See also Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649 
(Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme Court has 
articulated three factors that must be con-
sidered by the trial court in determining a 
reasonable alimony award: (1) the financial 
conditions and needs of the requesting 
spouse; (2) the ability of the requesting 
spouse to produce a sufficient income for 
himself or herself; and (3) the ability of the 
other spouse to provide support Gardner, 
748 P.2d at 1081; Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 
564, 566 (Utah 1985);' Jones, 700 P.2d at 
1075. Failure to consider these factors 
constitutes an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion. Paffel, 732 P.2d at 101. 
Based on our review of the record, we 
must conclude that the trial court, in set-
1. Although the court's order with respect to the 
adult child was only "temporary" until the court 
received an evaluation of her condition by Davis 
County Mental Health, the record contains no 
ting the first year of support at only $800 
per month and in decreasing it to $1 over 
eight years, failed to consider Mr. Ras-
band's clear ability to provide support and 
Mrs. Rasband's severely limited ability to 
meet her own established financial needs. 
The parties' thirty-year marriage began as 
they graduated from high school. Mr. Ras-
band produces about $7,000 gross income 
per month; Mrs. Rasband has no income. 
Their assets consisted of the insurance 
business, a large home, vehicles and per-
sonal property, all acquired through joint 
efforts. He contributed his income and 
labor; although Mrs. Rasband has average 
typing skills, she primarily contributed her 
unpaid labor. Her homemaking and child-
rearing efforts advanced his career pur-
suits. Both parties are functioning adults 
with health problems not untypical of per-
sons nearing fifty years of age. The trial 
court found that Mr. Rasband's net month-
ly earnings (after business expenses but 
before taxes) were $3,800 and that his 
needs were $1,500 per month, "including 
payment of the family debts." Mrs. Ras-
band's needs were specifically found to be 
between $1,250 and $1,400 per month. 
These findings have not been challenged on 
appeal. 
The disparity between Mr. Rasband's an-
nual net income of $45,600 and her zero 
income is striking. During the one year of 
$800 monthly alimony awarded by the trial 
court, his income would be $36,000 and 
hers only $9,600. His standard of living 
will be much nearer that enjoyed during 
the marriage than will hers. This disparity 
is augmented by his ability to expense 
some personal use items through his busi-
ness and by her additional expense in car-
ing for their adult daughter. 
[4] The trial court made only one 
vague, conclusory finding regarding Mrs. 
Rasband's present and future ability to 
produce a sufficient income to meet her 
such report or any ruling or further order of the 
court modifying or terminating this provision of 
the decree, which neither party has objected to 
on appeal. 
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needs, i.e., that she is "capable of meaning-
ful employment in the future." It is this 
finding that apparently formed the basis 
for the court's determination of the amount 
and the nonpermanence of the alimony 
awarded. However, as the Utah Supreme 
Court has recently pointed out, 
[t]he findings of fact must show that the 
court's judgment or decree "follows logi-
cally from, and is supported by, the evi-
dence." Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 
426 (Utah 1986). The findings "should 
be sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on 
each factual issue was reached." 
Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 
1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 
1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)). See also Parks v. 
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 601 
(Utah 1983) (findings of fact must clearly 
indicate the mind of the court).2 
Mr. Rasband is clearly capable of paying 
support sufficient to meet Mrs. Rasband's 
entire determined living expense need, now 
and in the future, if she is unable to do so 
on her own. Detailed findings regarding 
her earning capacity are critically impor-
tant to this reviewing court since the 
record evidence indicates that appellant's 
present and future earning capacity is mini-
mal. She had no earnings in the year 
before trial; she has only a high school 
education and average job skills to market 
2. The decree attributes present and future work 
and income to Mrs. Rasband with which she is 
expected to provide ongoing support for herself 
and her adult daughter. The court, however, 
made no specific earning capacity finding, i.e., a 
dollar amount the trial court believes she is 
capable of earning monthly. She needs such a 
"baseline" in order to seek a modification of 
alimony in the future by showing a substantial 
change in circumstances if, in fact, she does not 
or cannot obtain work providing that level of 
income. See Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 382 
n. 1 (Utah 1983). On the other hand, without 
such a specific finding, any income she does 
earn from employment will show improved cir-
cumstances on her part, supporting a request by 
respondent to lower his alimony obligation. 
She should not be thus penalized, at least until 
her earnings exceed the baseline amount the' 
trial court contemplated she could and would 
make when the decree was entered. See Can-
Her ability to work is impaired by the 
disability of their adult daughter. She will 
have difficulty finding and retaining a full-
time job. If employed, her earnings would 
undoubtedly be meager for a long period, 
given her lack of education, training or 
work experience.3 
The facts and the trial court disposition 
in this case are very similar to those in 
Jones, where the alimony award decreased 
from $1,000 to $500 over ten years. The 
parties were married for thirty years, 
raised four children, built a retail pharmacy 
business, and enjoyed a comfortable life-
style. The tangible assets were divided, 
but Mr. Jones received the income-produc-
ing business. Mrs. Jones had no outside 
income and no income-producing assets. 
She was awarded a home, but had to pay 
the home mortgage, probably necessitating 
its sale. She was 52, had no professional 
training and limited marketable skills. The 
court said it was unrealistic to assume that 
she would be able to enter the job market 
and support herself in the style they had 
enjoyed. The incorporated business gener-
ated profits of about $90,000 annually but 
the husband drew only $45,000 salary, 
thereby providing the husband with addi-
tional discretionary income in the business. 
As the Utah Supreme Court concluded: 
This is simply not the sort of situation in 
which a decreasing rehabilitative alimony 
award is appropriate. The husband oper-
ning v. Canning, 744 P.2d 325, 327 (Utah App. 
1987). 
It is obvious that many circumstances of the 
parties could change materially in eight years or 
less. Accordingly, we think decreasing alimony 
—based on speculation about a future ability to 
earn—is generally inappropriate in view of the 
court's continuing jurisdiction to modify an 
original decree under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 
(1987). 
3. Even if she secured full-time employment at 
the federal minimum wage, Mrs. Rasband 
would only earn a gross income of $134 per 
week, approximately $536 per month. After 
taxes are taken out, these earnings plus the 
alimony awarded by the trial court do not even 
meet her basic monthly needs of $1,250-$ 1,400. 
RASBAND v. RASBAND Utah 1335 
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ates a financially successful business, of the decreasing alimony award and re-
built up over the course of the marriage mand for adequate findings4 by the trial 
through the joint efforts of both the hus- court and entry of new judgment and de-
band and the wife. These facts clearly cree provisions awarding permanent alimo-
call for some form of continuing spousal ny. 
maintenance. 
Jones, 700 P.2d at 1076. PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION 
Although Mr. Rasband does not have the 
amount of discretionary income Mr. Jones 
did, the award herein leaves Mr. Rasband 
with some discretionary income and Mrs. 
Rasband with none. The lower court found 
$45,000 of disposable income. He needs 
$18,000 annually and she needs $16,800, for 
a total of $34,800. This leaves him with 
$10,000 annual discretionary income, in ad-
dition to the advantage he enjoys by being 
able to expense some personal living ex-
penses through the business. These facts 
appear to warrant permanent alimony in a 
monthly amount greater than $800. 
[5] Under these circumstances, the 
amount of nonpermanent, declining alimo-
ny awarded to Carol Rasband creates a 
situation comparable to the meager award 
in Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 
1983), and the non-award in Canning v. 
Canning, 744 P.2d 325 (Utah App.1987). 
When this is coupled with the lack of ade-
quate findings regarding her current and 
future ability to produce an income that-
together with alimony—will meet her 
monthly need of $1,250-$1,400, the trial 
court's award is a clear and prejudicial 
abuse of discretion. 
Although this court has the power to 
modify the amount of alimony awarded in 
the decree, the lack of proper findings pre-
vents us from doing so. See Higley, 676 
P.2d at 382; Canning, 744 P.2d at 327. 
We thus vacate the portion of the judgment 
below that sets the amounts and duration 
4. See Higley, 676 P.2d at 382 
On remand, the trial court must consider 
whether the appellant has the ability to earn 
enough to supplement the permanent alimony 
award to a level consistent with the guidelines 
set forth by this Court for determining a rea-
sonable alimony award If the tnal court 
finds that the appellant does not have this 
[6] The trial court in a divorce action 
has considerable discretion in equitably ad-
justing the financial and property interests 
of the parties. Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 
468, 470 (Utah 1984); Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 
1378, 1380 (Utah App.1987). Because the 
court's distribution of property is endowed 
with a presumption of validity, Pusey v. 
Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 1986), we 
will not disturb it on appeal unless it is 
clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discre-
tion. Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1078; Smith v. 
Smith, 78 Utah Adv.Rep. 39 (CtApp.1988). 
Mrs. Rasband avers that, although the 
trial court divided the property equally, 
equal is not equitable in this case. She 
claims an equitable award would give her, 
as a "basic minimum/' the home in toto, as 
well as the fixtures, furnishings and appli-
ances. 
The underlying premise of her argument 
is that Mr. Rasband has acquired during 
marriage specific, intangible personal prop-
erty assets not valued by the court, i.e., 
business acumen, contacts and knowledge. 
She asserts his intangible knowledge and 
experience have considerably more value 
than $10,000. She, on the other hand, has 
not acquired any comparable income-pro-
ducing assets. She claims an award of all 
of the parties' tangible assets, instead of 
only half, would equitably offset the intan-
gible assets that he has acquired. 
The parties, however, had also acquired 
$37,866 of tangible business debts, which 
ability, then it should modify its award of 
permanent alimony accordingly. If the trial 
court believes that the appellant does have 
this ability, then it should make such a find-
ing of fact Absent a finding regarding the 
appellant's ability to work, the appellant 
would be precluded in the future from asking 
the court to modify her alimony award based 
on changed circumstances if she can show in 
the future that she is unable to work 
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the court ordered Mr. Rasband to pay, af-
ter finding that the value of the income 
potential of the business was offset by 
those debts. Appellant also overlooks the 
court's finding that she withdrew $8,500 
from family bank accounts in mid-1985, 
only some of which was used for family 
expenses; she did not account for the rest 
In addition, Mr. Rasband contributed an 
inheritance (amount unknown) from his 
parents that was comingled with family 
funds and used to pay family expenses or 
to set up savings accounts. 
[71 On these facts, we cannot say the 
trial court clearly abused its discretion in 
distributing the parties' assets and obli-
gations. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Counsel for Mrs. Rasband made a prof-
fer at trial concerning her $7,970 bill for 
his legal services, identifying himself as a 
family law specialist and a fellow of the 
American Academy of Matrimonial Law-
yers. Counsel's documented time was 
billed at $125 per hour, his legal assist-
ant's documented time was billed at $40 per 
hour.8 He stated that he had attended two 
pretrial hearings and that the hours spent 
on this case were reasonable in light of two 
extraordinary factors: (1) the adult child's 
disability and its effect on respondent's 
support obligation; and (2) investigation of 
the possible hiding of respondent's actual 
income by charging off personal expenses 
as business expenses. 
Counsel for Mr. Rasband objected to the 
amount of hours proffered as being unrea-
sonable and unnecessary. The court 
agreed, concluding that the case was not 
difficult from a legal, factual, or discovery 
standpoint and fixing a reasonable fee at 
$3,500. Mrs. Rasband had already paid 
5. Appellant's counsel advised the trial court that 
his assistant was present at trial to help him 
with witness and exhibit management. The 
court advised counsel that it did not intend to 
allow him to receive credit for that work, since 
that was precisely the bailiffs job There is 
nothing in the record to suggest that the court 
$2,500 from monies acquired during the 
marriage. Mr. Rasband was ordered to 
pay the $1,000 balance. Although the ba-
sis for appellant's challenge to this award 
has not been clearly articulated, she appar-
ently claims that the trial court abused its 
discretion in determining that $3,500 repre-
sented a reasonable attorney fee in light of 
the complexity of this case. 
[8] A trial court has the power to 
award attorney fees in divorce proceedings, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 
(1984). Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 
(Utah 1980). The decision to make such an 
award and the amount thereof rest pri-
marily in the sound discretion of the trial 
court Id However, the award must be 
based on evidence of both financial need 
and reasonableness. Beats v. Beats, 682 
P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984). 
Reasonable attorneys fees are not 
measured by what an attorney actually 
bills, nor is the number of hours spent on 
the case determinative in computing fees. 
In determining the reasonableness of at-
torneys fees, . . . [a] court may consider, 
among other factors, the difficulty of the 
litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys 
in presenting the case, the reasonable-
ness of the number of hours spent on the 
case, the fee customarily charged in the 
locality for similar services, the amount 
involved in the case and the result at-
tained, and the expertise and experience 
of the attorneys involved. 
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624-25 
(Utah 1985). See also Beals, 682 P.2d at 
864. 
[91 In light of the relevant factors and 
the circumstances of this case, we find no 
abuse of discretion in the court's determi-
nation and award of the attorney fee. 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed, except for the provisions related to 
categorically refused to consider the pre-trial 
work performed by the legal assistant in deter-
mining the reasonable attorney fee in this case. 
Because of this, we need not reach the issue of 
whether a trial court must take into account the 
time expended by counsel's legal assistant in 
determining a reasonable attorney fee. 
RASBAND v. RSBAND 
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the decreasing alimony award. Those por-
tions of the judgment are vacated and the 
case remanded for requisite findings of 
fact pertaining to appellant's earning ca-
pacity, based on the evidence presented at 
trial, that adequately support new judg-
ment and decree provisions covering only 
the amount of permanent alimony to be 
awarded her. Costs to appellant. On re-
mand, the trial court should also determine 
appellant's need for respondent's payment 
of her attorney fees incurred in this appeal. 
If that financial need is adequately shown, 
the trial court may take evidence regarding 
a reasonable fee and make such an order 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 
(1984). See Heltman v. Heltman, 29 Utah 
2d 444, 511 P.2d 720 (1973). 
DAVIDSON and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
( o | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
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best be promoted by maintaining the prior, 
stable and healthy arrangement. That is, 
where the evidence was otherwise inconclu-
sive—if anything, favoring Vladimir some-
what—the paramount consideration of sta-
bility conclusively tips the scale in Vladi-
mir's favor and warrants awarding custody 
to him, as a matter of law. We, therefore, 
reverse and award custody to Vladimir, with 
Anna to have liberal visitation rights. We 
remand for a determination of child sup-
port to be paid by Anna and an appropriate 
visitation schedule. 
The issue of child support raised by Vla-
dimir is moot in light of our order regard-
ing custody. 
PROPERTY AWARD 
[8] Lastly, Vladimir assails the court's 
division of property and debts. In part, he 
contends the court improperly found that 
the parties had about $780 in their check-
ing account and divided that amount be-
tween Anna and Vladimir. Anna testified 
that on the day she left Vladimir, she went 
to the bank and checked the balance in the 
account and the balance was about $780. 
A bank statement was admitted into evi-
dence which indicates end of day balances 
on April 8 of $781.78, April 9 of $677.09, 
and $32.00 on April 10. Anna's testimony 
is somewhat unclear as to exactly which 
day she left, but nevertheless, we find it 
within the court's discretion to determine 
that each party was entitled to half of the 
amount in the account on the approximate 
date of their separation. We also find no 
error in the remainder of the court's order 
regarding the parties' assets and debts. 
Affirmed in part and reversed and re-
manded in part. The parties shall bear 
their own costs of this appeal. 
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur. 
DcLynne N. SCHINDLER, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
John E. SCHINDLER, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 880355-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 6, 1989. 
In divorce action, the Seventh District 
Court, Carbon County, Dennis L. Draney, 
J., awarded wife alimony and custody of 
parties' two children, and husband appeal-
ed- The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held 
that (1) custody award to wife was not 
abuse of discretion, despite wife's emotion-
al instability; (2) psychologist's proffered 
testimony as to which party should have 
custody of children was inadmissible due to 
lack of foundation; (3) husband was not 
entitled to new trial on basis of surprise at 
trial court's refusal to admit psychologist's 
proffered testimony as to better custodial 
parent, and psychologist's promise to wife 
not to give comparison; and (4) award of 
alimony to former wife was not abuse of 
discretion, although it did not leave former 
husband with much money to live on. 
Affirmed. 
1. Infants <S=>19.3(2, 3) 
Trial court's broad discretion in mak-
ing child custody awards is limited in that 
it must be exercised within confines of 
legal standard set by appellate courts, and 
facts and reasons for court's decision must 
be set forth in appropriate findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. 
2. Divorce <S=>298(1, 4) 
Trial court's primary focus in making 
child custody decision must be on best in-
terest of child, rather than conduct of par-
ties during marriage. 
3. Infants ^19.3(1), 19.3(2) 
There is no required set of conditions 
which trial court must consider when mak-
SCHINDLER v. 
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ing custody determination; applicability 
and relative weight of vanous factors in 
particular case lies within trial court's dis-
cretion. 
4. Divorce S=>298(1, 4) 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when awarding custody to mother by con-
sidering only three factors, the identity of 
primary caretaker, bonding of children 
with prospective custodian, and prospective 
custodian's emotional stability, where 
factors considered were the most pertinent 
to case. 
5. Divorce «=>302 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in awarding custody of children to mother 
without requiring her to obtain counseling 
for her emotional problems, despite court's 
finding that mother had exhibited some 
emotional instability during marrige. 
6. Appeal and Error <s=>757(3), 931(1), 
1008.1(5), 1010.1(1) 
To mount successful attack on trial 
court's factual findings, appellant must 
marshal all evidence in support of trial 
court's findings and then demonstrate that, 
even viewing evidence in light most favor-
able to findings, evidence is insufficient to 
support findings, or that findings are other-
wise clearly erroneous. 
7. Evidence <&=>571(1, 9) 
Trial court's finding that mother's 
emotional problems were result of mar-
riage relationship, and its conclusion that 
mother was fit and proper person to have 
custody of children in spite of her emotion-
al disability, were not abuse of discretion, 
despite expert testimony proffered by hus-
band to contrary. 
8. Evidence <£=*555.2 
Psychologist's proffered testimony as 
to which party should have custody of chil-
dren was inadmissible due to lack of foun-
dation, where psychologist had never coun-
seled with children or with mother together 
with children. Rules of Evid, Rule 702. 
9. Divorce ^ l S l 
Father was not entitled to new trial on 
custody determination on basis of father's 
surprise at psychologist's promise to moth-
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er not to give comparison as to which party 
would make better custodial parent, where 
trial judge's exclusion of psychologist's tes-
timony was based on lack of foundation, 
rather than psychologist's promise to moth-
er, and thus surprise at discovering exist-
ence of promise was irrelevant. 
10. Divorce <3=>151 
Father was not entitled to new trial on 
custody determination due to his alleged 
surprise at trial court's refusal to admit 
psychologist's proffered testimony as to 
which party was better custodial parent, on 
grounds of lack of foundation because psy-
chologist had never counseled with children 
or with mother together with children, as 
father should have known basis for psy-
chologist's testimony. 
11. Divorce <&=>286(3) 
If factors of financial conditions and 
needs of receiving spouse, ability of receiv-
ing spouse to produce sufficient income for 
herself, and ability of responding spouse to 
provide support, have been considered, 
Court of Appeals will not disturb trial 
court's alimony award unless such serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest clear 
abuse of discretion. 
12. Divorce <&=>240(2) 
Trial court's award of alimony to for-
mer wife, which did not leave former hus-
band with much money to live on, was not 
inherently unfair or abuse of discretion; 
record indicated that parties were heavily 
in debt and unable to meet their current 
financial obligations, trial court found that 
former wife was capable of employment 
but currently unemployed, and trial court 
had examined both parties' budgetary 
needs and former husband's income. 
Don R. Peterson, Leslie W. Slaugh, Pro-
vo, for defendant and appellant 
B L Dart, John D. Schaeffer, Jr., Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
Before BENCH, GARFF and ORME, 
JJ. 
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OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Defendant/appellant, John E. Schindler, 
appeals the trial court's judgment award-
ing plaintiff/respondent, DeLynne N. 
Schindler, alimony and custody of the par-
ties' two children. We affirm. 
Appellant and respondent married on Au-
gust 17, 1973, divorced in January 1980, 
and subsequently remarried on July 20, 
1981. Two male children were born during 
the second marriage: John Christian 
(Chris) and Cory Lynn. These boys were, 
respectively, ages 4 and 3 at the time of 
trial. 
Appellant's gross monthly income at the 
time of trial included a salary of $2,360 for 
his work as a deputy county attorney, pri-
vate law practice income of $500, and con-
tract income of $206. Respondent had 
been an elementary school teacher prior to 
and during the marriage, until Chris's 
birth. She did not work outside the home 
afterwards, and was unemployed at the 
time of trial. At the time of trial, respon-
dent's monthly income consisted of $400 
temporary maintenance paid by appellant 
and $500 per month from her parents, in 
contrast to her claimed monthly needs of 
about $2,500 per month. Appellant claimed 
living expenses totaling $3,360 per month, 
$1,492 of which was attributable to debts 
established in the temporary custody hear-
ing. The parties acquired a home and oth-
er real property during the marriage, none 
of which had any appreciable equity. 
The parties separated on February 14, 
1987. A hearing on the issues of tempo-
rary custody and support was held on 
March 4, 1987, and resulted in an order 
awarding temporary custody of the chil-
dren, exclusive use and occupancy of the 
marital residence, and $400 per month tem-
porary maintenance to respondent. 
At trial, appellant relied on expert testi-
mony presented by Dr. Lynn Ravsten and 
Dr. Ralph Vanderlinden, both licensed psy-
chologists with whom the parties had par-
ticipated in marriage counseling during 
1986 and 1987, to support his position that 
he should be awarded custody of the chil-
dren because respondent's behavior was 
emotionally damaging to them. 
Ravsten testified that Chris had a "very 
severe oppositional behavior problem" re-
sulting in resistive and aggressive behav-
ior, was much more aggressive than most 
boys his age, had a mood problem of anger 
and sadness, and was alienated. He found 
that Cory did not have these problems be-
cause he was too young. Invoking ethical 
restrictions because he had not observed 
respondent and the boys together, Ravsten 
testified only concerning the theoretical 
background of aggressive behavior, rather 
than finding respondent's behavior to be 
the cause of Chris's problems. He stated 
that he did not have any reservations about 
appellant as a custodial parent, but cau-
tioned that he did not intend this as a 
comparative statement with respect to re-
spondent's capability as a custodial parent. 
Appellant sought to elicit testimony from 
Vanderlinden as to which parent would be 
the best permanent custodial parent. Re-
spondent's counsel objected on the grounds 
that Vanderlinden had not evaluated the 
children nor seen them interact with re-
spondent. Upon voir dire examination, 
Vanderlinden stated that, prior to the initial 
hearing, he had promised respondent he 
would not testify as to which party was the 
better parent. He also admitted that he 
had not counseled with the children, tested 
them, nor observed them interact with re-
spondent. Therefore, the judge sustained 
respondent's objection and did not allow 
Vanderlinden to give an opinion as to which 
party would be the better permanent custo-
dian. However, he did allow Vanderlinden 
to compare the parties' general personality 
characteristics. 
The trial court awarded custody of the 
children to respondent and ordered appel-
lant to pay $400 per month child support. 
Further, it ordered appellant to pay the 
$875 per month mortgage payment until 
the house was sold and, then, permanent 
alimony of $500 per month. Appellant was 
also to assume debts with payments in 
excess of $700 per month, while respondent 
was ordered to pay other debts in the 
amount of $539 per month. The court en-
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tered its written factual findings and de-
cree of divorce on March 4, 1988. 
Appellant filed a motion for a new trial 
on March 14, 1988, alleging that the trial 
court abused its discretion in excluding 
part of Vanderlinden's testimony, that he 
was surprised by Vanderlinden's previous 
promise to respondent not to testify, and 
that the evidence was insufficient to sup-
port the trial court's custody and alimony 
awards. Appellant's affidavit accompany-
ing the motion indicated that he had met 
with Vanderlinden several times to discuss 
the upcoming trial, that Vanderlinden had 
given no indication that he had made such a 
promise, and that appellant could not have 
anticipated Vanderlinden's restricted testi-
mony. Vanderlinden also submitted an af-
fidavit in which he indicated that the chil-
dren's long term interests would best be 
served by awarding their custody to appel-
lant because respondent's psychological 
problems detracted from her parenting 
ability. 
The trial court denied appellant's motion 
for a new trial. Appellant brought this 
appeal in which he raises the following 
issues: (1) Was the trial court's award of 
custody to respondent an abuse of discre-
tion in that it was against the weight of the 
evidence? (2) Did the trial court err in 
excluding Vanderlinden's testimony? (3) 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
denying appellant's motion for a new trial? 
(4) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
awarding respondent alimony? 
CUSTODY 
[1] In making child custody awards, the 
trial court is given broad discretion, Davis 
v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988), and 
its decisions will not be overturned absent 
an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice. 
Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 159 
(Utah Ct.App 1989) This discretion is lim-
ited in that: (1) it must be exercised within 
the confines of the legal standards set by 
the appellate courts, and (2) the facts and 
reasons for the court's decision must be set 
forth in appropriate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law Id.; see also Daws, 
749 P.2d at 648 
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[2] The trial court's primary focus must 
be on the best interests of the child, rather 
than on the conduct of the parties during 
the marriage. Deeben v. Deeben, 772 P.2d 
972, 974 n. 4 (Ct.App.1989). To determine 
the best interests of the child, the trial 
court must consider "function-related" 
factors, which include: 
the preference of the child; keeping sib-
lings together; the relative strength of 
the child's bond with one or both of the 
prospective custodians; and, in appropri-
ate cases, the general interest in continu-
ing previously determined custody ar-
rangements where the child is happy and 
well adjusted. Other factors relate pri-
marily to the primary custodians' charac-
ter or status or to their capacity or will-
ingness to function as parents: moral 
character and emotional stability; dura-
tion and depth of desire for custody; 
ability to provide personal rather than 
surrogate care; significant impairment 
of ability to function as a parent through 
drug abuse, excessive drinking, or other 
cause; reasons for having relinquished 
custody in the past; religious compatibili-
ty with the child; kinship, including, in 
extraordinary circumstances, stepparent 
status; and financial condition. 
Id. at 973 (quoting Hutchison v. Hutchi-
son, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982)). This 
court has recognized that some of the more 
significant factors, although not disposi-
tive, include the identity of the primary 
caretaker dunng the marriage, the parent 
who has the greatest flexibility to provide 
personal care for the child, and the relative 
stability of the environment each parent is 
capable of providing Id at 56. 
[3,4] Appellant argues that the trial 
court abused its discretion by considering 
only three factors, the identity of the pri-
mary caretaker, the bonding of the children 
with the prospective custodian, and the pro-
spective custodian's emotional stability, 
and then disregarding evidence that 
weighed in appellant's favor on the emo-
tional stability factor. The trial court, m 
its findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
stated that: 
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5. During the marriage, the plaintiff 
has been the primary caretaker of the 
parties' minor children, and has contin-
ued in that role since the parties' separa-
tion. 
6. The parties' children are more closely 
bonded to the plaintiff than to the defen-
dant 
7. Both parties are fit and proper par-
ents. 
8. Plaintiff has exhibited some emotion-
al instability during the marriage which 
is principally attributable to marital con-
flict between the parties and does not 
impair plaintiffs functioning as a fit and 
proper parent to the children. 
9. The oldest child of the parties is ex-
hibiting some emotional problems. 
4. It is in the best interest of the par-
ties' two minor children that their care, 
custody and control be awarded to plain-
tiff subject to the condition that plaintiff 
arrange for such counseling as may be 
necessary for Chris to overcome his emo-
tional difficulties and if qualified counsel-
ors determine that such difficulties exist 
aside from the emotional trauma caused 
by the divorce, plaintiff shall follow 
through with such counseling [sic] for 
Chris as may be necessary. This conclu-
sion takes into account the emotional in-
stability of the plaintiff which the Court 
believes can be addressed by counseling. 
Because custody determinations are so 
fact-sensitive, there is no required set of 
conditions which the court must consider, 
but the applicability and relative weight of 
the various factors in a particular case lies 
within its discretion. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 
at 41; see Bake v. Bake, 772 P.2d 461, 
462-65 (Ct.App.1989). Although the 
judge's written findings do not take into 
account all possible factors, he considered 
the factors most pertinent to this case, 
which was well within his discretion. 
[5] Appellant argues that the judge 
abused his discretion in awarding custody 
to respondent without requiring her to ob-
tain counseling for her emotional problems. 
The judge clearly considered respondent's 
emotional state and potential need for 
counseling in his findings, and his failure to 
require respondent to obtain counseling lies 
within his discretion. 
Appellant further argues that the trial 
court's finding that respondent's emotional 
problems were a result of the marriage 
relationship and its conclusion that respon-
dent was a fit and proper person to have 
custody of the children in spite of her emo-
tional disability were against the clear 
weight of the evidence. In so arguing, he 
relies heavily on the expert testimonies of 
Ravsten and Vanderlinden. 
[6,7] To mount a successful attack on 
the trial court's factual findings, an appel-
lant must marshal all the evidence in sup-
port of the trial court's findings and then 
demonstrate that, even viewing the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the 
findings, the evidence is insufficient to sup-
port the findings, Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985), or that its 
findings are otherwise clearly erroneous. 
A finding is clearly erroneous when, even 
though there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court is "left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
191, 193 (Utah 1987). This court does not 
consider evidence de novo, so the mere fact 
that we might reach a different result than 
the trial court on the same evidence does 
not justify setting aside the trial court's 
findings. Id. 
Evidence as to respondent's emotional 
state, its effect on the children, and her 
ability as a parent is extremely controvert-
ed. Respondent admitted she "ranted and 
raved" at times, but that this was due to 
the interpersonal conflict with appellant. 
Appellant admitted that respondent was 
able to take physical care of the boys and 
behaved appropriately in public, but felt 
that she disciplined them inappropriately, 
was emotionally detached from them, and 
had an angry and explosive temperament 
which was upsetting to them. Although 
appellant's expert witnesses testified, in 
substance, that respondent's parenting 
skills were substantially impaired by her 
emotional state, there was much other evi-
dence presented as to her positive parent-
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ing skills, her involvement with the chil-
dren, and their bonding to her. Further, 
respondent's witnesses had observed her 
interact with the children while appellant's 
experts had no such opportunity. Thus, 
even though much of the expert testimony 
supports appellant's position, he has not 
taken all of the evidence in respondent's 
favor, viewed it in the light most favorable 
to the trial court's findings, and demon-
strated that it is insufficient to support the 
court's findings or otherwise shown that 
the trial court's findings were clearly erro-
neous. 
Therefore, we find that the court did not 
abuse its discretion in considering three 
factors and in not weighing the emotional 
stability factor in appellant's favor. 
EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
[8] Appellant argues that the trial court 
erred in excluding Vanderlinden's prof-
fered testimony as to which party should 
have custody of the children, asserting that 
Vanderlinden's promise to not make a com-
parative statement at the initial hearing did 
not preclude him from giving more com-
plete testimony at the final hearing. He 
states that Vanderlinden's failure to meet 
with the children or respondent after the 
initial hearing goes only to the weight and 
not to the admissibility of the proffered 
testimony, and, therefore, the testimony 
should have been permitted. 
Under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, the trial court has discretion to 
determine the qualification of an expert 
witness to give an opinion on a particular 
matter, Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping 
Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 14 (Utah Ct.App.1989), 
and the admissibility of the expert's testi-
mony. Craig Food Indus, v. Weihing, 746 
P.2d 279, 283 (Utah Ct.App.1987). The ex-
pert's opinion may be based upon facts or 
data he or she perceived or were made 
known to him or her at or before the hear-
ing. Wight, 765 P.2d at 15. The critical 
factor is whether the expert has knowledge 
that can assist the trier of fact in resolving 
the issues before it. Utah R.Evid. 702. 
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At no time did the trial judge indicate 
that he had excluded Vanderlinden's testi-
mony on the basis of Vanderlinden's prom-
ise to respondent Instead, he explicitly 
excluded the testimony for lack of suffi-
cient foundation, stating: 
[t]he basis for my sustaining the objec-
tion, . . . is no counseling with the chil-
dren, no tests on the children, no counsel-
ing with the plaintiff for that purpose, 
and without that basis, I think thaf s all 
we're doing—if his only purpose in being 
here has to do with custody, then I'm not 
sure that he has the basis at this time to 
discuss with the Court the attributes that 
can only go to that issue. 
The trial court is free to accept or reject 
an expert's opinion, State v. Shickles, 760 
P.2d 291, 302 (Utah 1988); Sorensen v. 
Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820, 830 (Utah CtApp. 
1989) cert filed 106 Utah Adv.Rep. 63, and 
may accord to the witnesses' opinion what-
ever weight it deems proper. Shickles, 760 
P.2d at 302. Apparently, the judge was 
not persuaded by the testimony of the two 
experts, so did not rule in appellant's favor, 
which is within his discretion and does not 
constitute error. 
DENIAL OF MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL 
[9,10] Appellant asserts that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion for a new trial, alleging that he was 
surprised at the court's refusal to admit 
Vanderlinden's proffered testimony as to 
the better custodial parent and at Vander-
linden's promise to respondent not to give a 
comparison, which he could not have rea-
sonably discovered before the trial. 
The decision to grant a new trial lies 
largely within the trial court's discretion. 
State v. Brown, 771 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Ct 
App.1989). However, the trial court has no 
discretion to grant a new trial unless the 
moving party shows at least one of the 
circumstances specified in Rule 59(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Moon 
Lake Elec. Ass'n v. Ultrasystems W. Con-
structors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125, 128 (Utah 
Ct.App 1988). These circumstances in-
clude, among others, "[ajccident or sur-
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prise, which ordinary prudence could not 
have guarded against"; "[n]ewly discover-
ed evidence, material for the party making 
the application, which he could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at the trial"; and "insufficiency 
of the evidence to justify the verdict or 
other decision." Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a)(3), (4), 
and (6). So long as such a showing is not 
made, we will not reverse the trial court's 
decision on a motion for a new trial absent 
a clear abuse of discretion. Brown, 771 
P.2d at 1095; Moon Lake Electrical Ass'n, 
767 P.2d at 128. 
Appellant has shown none of the above 
circumstances. Because the trial judge ex-
cluded Vanderlinden's testimony on the ba-
sis of lack of foundation rather than on 
Vanderlinden's promise to respondent, ap-
pellant's surprise at discovering the exist-
ence of the promise is irrelevant. Appel-
lant states that he met with Vanderlinden 
several times prior to trial to prepare for 
the trial in addition to his counseling visits, 
and was presumably aware of the basis for 
Vanderlinden's opinion, including the fact 
that Vanderlinden had never counseled 
with the children or with appellant together 
with the children. That Vanderlinden's tes-
timony was excluded because of lack of 
foundation should not have surprised appel-
lant because, he, in all prudence, should 
have known the basis for his testimony. 
Also, Vanderlinden's affidavit did not pro-
vide newly discovered evidence but only 
stated testimony already known at the time 
of trial but excluded on the basis of lack of 
foundation. Because appellant has shown 
none of the circumstances required in Rule 
59(a), the trial court had no discretion to 
grant him a new trial. 
ALIMONY 
Appellant insists that the trial court 
erred in awarding alimony to respondent 
because it failed to adequately consider (1) 
respondent's ability to earn income because 
her employment status might change m the 
near future, and (2) his inability to provide 
support. He claims his financial obli-
gations nearly equal his income, which 
leaves him insufficient funds with which to 
support himself. 
[11] Trial courts have essentially the 
same discretion in awarding alimony and 
dividing property as they have in making 
child custody awards. Davis, 749 P.2d at 
649. In awarding alimony, appellate courts 
require the trial court to consider each of 
the following three factors: (1) the finan-
cial conditions and needs of the receiving 
spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving 
spouse to produce a sufficient income for 
him or herself; and (3) the ability of the 
responding spouse to provide support. 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 
121, 124 (Utah Ct.App.1988); Fullmer v. 
Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 951 (Utah CtApp. 
1988). If these three factors have been 
considered, we will not disturb the trial 
court's alimony award unless such a seri-
ous inequity has resulted as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion. Fullmer, 761 
P.2d at 950; Andersen v. Andersen, 757 
P.2d 476, 478 (Utah CtApp.1988). The ulti-
mate test of an alimony award is whether 
the party receiving alimony will be able to 
support him or herself "as nearly as possi-
ble at the standard of living . . . enjoyed 
during the marriage." English v. English, 
565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). 
[12] The court's written findings indi-
cate that "both parties are able-bodied and 
capable of employment Plaintiff is seek-
ing employment but is presently unem-
ployed and caring for the parties' minor 
children on a daily basis. She is trained as 
a school teacher, and is preparing to return 
to teaching in the Fall of 1988." It then 
detailed the parties' economic needs and 
sources of income. The court concluded, 
among other things, that "[t]here are insuf-
ficient assets and income to meet the needs 
of the parties." 
It is reversible error if the trial court 
fails to make specific findings on all materi-
al issues unless the facts in the record are 
"clear, uncontroverted, and capable of sup-
porting only a finding m favor of the judge-
ment," Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 124 
(quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 
999 (Utah 1987)), or if the court fails to 
consider the three factors. See Maxwell v. 
Maxwell, 754 P.2d 84, 86-87 (Utah CtApp. 
STATE v. 
Cite as 776 ?2d 91 
1988). It is clear from these findings that 
the court did consider the three factors 
when it found that respondent was capable 
of employment but currently unemployed, 
and when it examined both parties' budget-
ary needs and appellant's income. The 
record indicates that the parties are heavily 
in debt and unable to meet their current 
financial obligations. Therefore, even 
though the trial court's award of alimony 
did not leave appellant with much money to 
live on, it is not inherently unfair or an 
abuse of discretion. Once respondent be-
comes gainfully employed and her income 
rises, there is nothing to preclude appellant 
from moving for a modification of the ali-
mony award at that time. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987). 
Although the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in making an award of alimony 
here, it is curious that it awarded perma-
nent rather than temporary alimony when 
respondent's employment circumstances 
were likely to change significantly in the 
near future. Because appellant did not 
raise the issue of temporary alimony, how-
ever, we decline to rule on it. 
Affirmed. 
BENCH and ORME, JJ., concur. 
DENNEY Utah 91 
(UuhApp 1989) 
Eves, J., which revoked probation. The 
Court of Appeals, Davidson, J., held that 
defendant's probation automatically termi-
nated after period of 18 months and could 
not thereafter be revoked, even if trial 
court had intended to impose two consecu-
tive terms of probation. 
Reversed. 
1. Criminal Law «=>632(3) 
Unambiguous order made in criminal 
proceeding cannot be varied by remarks 
made in later hearing to coincide with what 
judge may have intended. 
2. Criminal Law <s=*982.7, 982.9(3) 
Where judge sentenced defendant to 
three years probation but did not state in 
his order that the term of three years was 
actually two consecutive terms of 18 
months each, defendant's probation termi-
nated at the end of the statutory maximum 
of 18 months and probation could not there-
after be revoked. U.C.A.1953, 77-18-
l(lOXa) (1985). 
( O 5 KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
James L. Shumate, Cedar City, for defen-
dant and appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, Charlene Barlow, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Leon Earl DENNEY, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 880371-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 14, 1989. 
Certiorari Denied Sept. 5, 1989 
Defendant appealed from order of the 
Fifth District Court, Iron County, J. Philip 
1. Utah Code Ann § 77-18-1 was amended in 
1985 and 1987. See 1985 Utah Laws ch 229. 
§ 1, 1987 Utah Laws ch 114, § 1 The provi-
776 P 26-4 
Before DAVIDSON, GARFF and 
GREENWOOD, JJ. 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Defendant appeals from the trial court's 
revocation of his probation. He claims that 
his probation term automatically terminat-
ed after eighteen months by operation of 
law pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(10)(a) (Supp 1986).1 We agree 
and reverse 
Defendant pleaded guilty, on September 
18, 1985, to two third degree felony 
charges of uttenng a forged prescription 
sion defendant relies upon in this appeal is 
currently found in Utah Code \nn 
§ 77-18-l(7)(a) (Supp 1988) 
TabK 
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on hn own motion, recused himself due to 
the colorable claim of prejudice 
Pursuant to our holding regarding sec 
tion 77-2<M, the convictions are reversed 
and the charges are dismissed with preju 
dice 
HOWE AC J , and STEWART, 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ , 
concur 
Mary M TIIRONSON, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v 
Charles II TIIRONSON, Defendant 
and Appellee 
No 890517-CA 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
March 25, 1991 
Rehearing Denied May 21, 1991 
In a divorce action, the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, David S Young, 
J , entered a divorce decree and awarded 
joint legal custody of the parties' child, 
child support, alimony and property divi 
sion Wife appealed The Court of Ap 
peals Jackson, J , held that (1) amend 
ments to child custody statute deleting re 
buttable presumption favoring joint legal 
custody was a substantial and substantive 
amendment and thus could not be applied 
retroactively, (2) court abused discretion in 
imposing joint legal custody on parents 
without statutorily required parental 
agreement (3) findings were inadequate to 
support child custody award, (4) child sup 
port award had to be reconsidered includ 
ing income from noneamed sources and 
husband s current earnings in making cal 
dilations and (r>) wife was entitled to ah 
mony of $800 per month on a permanent 
basis, rather than for only one year 
Remanded in part, modified in part and 
otherwise affirmed „ 
1 Parent and Child *»3 3(1) 
Amendments to child custody statuU 
deleting rebuttable presumption favoring 
joint legal custody was a substantial and 
substantive amendment and thus could not 
be applied retroactively U C A 1953, 30-
3-10 2 ! 
2 Divorce «=»299 
Trial court abused its discretion in Im-
posing order of joint legal custody on par* 
en Is and child without statutorily required 
parental agreement and in the face of pa-
rental opposition U C A 1953, 30-3-10 1 to 
30-3-10 4 
3 Divorce *=»301 
Findings were inadequate to support 
child custody award where court utilized 
best interest factors related to joint legal 
custody, not those related to child custody, 
findings were in conflict as to whether 
court or parents should determine visita-
tion rights, findings did not support award 
of any physical custody, and custody WM 
awarded on the basis of court imposed via 
tation time allocation U C A 1953, 304-1 
10, 30-3-10 2(3) ' 
4 Divorce «=»306 
In determining appropriate child siai 
port award, parental income had to includ* 
consideration of income from nonearnelj 
sources, as well as current earnings <K 
husband, rather than average of husbaniflj 
earned income over several years U Cil 
1953, 78-45-7 4, 78-45-7 5, 78-45-7 5(lXi| 
(5)(b), 78-45-7 5 to 78-45-7 7 I 
5 Divorce «=»240(2) 
Award of $800 alimony to wife OB 
permanent basis, rather than for only« 
year, was warranted based on consu 
tion of wife's earning capacity as a 
time pharmacist and her necessary mon! 
living expenses, and husband's cur 
gross capacity and his actual and necesi 
monthly living expenses 
Paul H Liapis (argued), Helen E Chris 
tan, Kim M Luhn, Gustin, Green, Stegall 
A Lupis, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
appellant 
Clark W Sessions (argued), Dean C An 
dreasen, Campbell, Maack & Sessions, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellee 
Before BENCH, GARFF and 
JACKSON, JJ 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge 
Mary Thronson appeals provisions of a 
divorce decree and separate order award 
bg joint legal custody of a child, child 
support, alimony, and property We re 
mind for further proceedings regarding 
child custody and support We modify the 
alimony award and affirm the remainder of 
toe decree 
FACTS 
The parties were married on September 
tO, 1978 Their marriage was the first for 
both She was a full time pharmacist and 
be a full time attorney A son was born to 
them on September 11, 1981 She became 
the child 8 primary caretaker and a part 
time pharmacist He became a shareholder 
fa hu law firm She filed a complaint for 
divorce He filed a counterclaim for di 
rorce They were divorced by a decree 
entered June 23, 1989 A separate order of 
JNnt legal custody was also entered Fur 
L Custody terminology Many legislators judges 
and wyters have been loose with their joint" 
custody language Early articles identified this 
veiing problem as follows 
Both the forms of custody (sole divided split 
joint) following divorce and the terms which 
describe them are vague and overlapping 
The lack of standard definitions and the 
courts tendency to use certain terms inter 
changcably have created confusion 
Foiberg & Graham Joint Custody of Children 
hltonng Divorce 12 U C Davis L Rev 523 525 
Often when referring to one of these custody 
arrangements courts use vague language or 
Inadequately defioed terms 
[•rati Joint Custody 67 Ky LJ 271 283 (1978-
I7f) 
TIIRONSON v TIIRONSON 
Clt# M 110 fJd 42a (Utah App 1991) Utah 429 
ther relevant facts will be set forth below 
in our treatment of the respective issues 
CHILD CUSTODY AWARD 
Ms Thronson challenges the joint legal 
custody decree and order on two grounds 
(1) She did not agree to the order of joint 
legal custody and Utah Code Ann 
§ 30-3-10 2 (1989) required the agreement 
of both parents at the time of this decree 
and order (2) The provision for an auto-
matic award of sole custody to one parent 
when the other moves from the state was 
error 
CIHI D CUSTODY IN UTAH 
Prior to 1988, Utah did not have a statute 
expressly authorizing an award of "joint 
legal custody" • of a child Our divorce 
statutes have contained various child custo-
dy provisions since 1903 For many years 
Utah Code Ann § 30-3-5 (1989) has autho 
nzed district courts to include in divorce 
decrees ' equitable orders relating to the 
children, property and parties " Further, 
Utah Code Ann § 30-3-10 has contained 
various specific provisions regarding 
factors to be considered in awarding sole 
custody of a child See Lembach v Cor, 
639 P2d 197 (Utah 1981), 1 Utah L Rev 
363 (1989) (historical development of child 
custody factors and preferences in Utah) 
"Joint Legal Custody" was specifically 
added to the sole custody statute in 1988, 
and designated as § 30 3-10 1 to -10 4 
We emphasize that this is a joint "legal" 
custody statute and not a joint ' physical' 
One author points out that considerable se 
manlic confusion has resulted possibly because 
the term joint custody predates the concept" 
of joint custody as it is known today He slates 
"I have encountered at least fifteen terms used 
to refer to various alternalnes to sole custody 
joint legal custody joint physical custody divid 
ed custody separate custody alternating custo 
dy split custody managing conservatorship 
possessory conservatorship equal custody 
shared custody partial custody custody given 
to neither parly to the exclusion of the other 
temporary custody shifting custody and con 
current custody Miller Joint Custody 13(3) 
r a m L Q 345 360 n 79 (1979) 
4 3 0 Utah 810 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
custody statute. In the 1988 Utah legisla-
tive session, Senator Hillyard stated: "This 
is not joint physical custody. The child 
obviously can't live in two homes. But it's 
joint legal custody which would give the 
noncustodial parent more involvement in 
the decisions of child raising." Floor De-
bate, (Feb. 3, 1988) Sen. Recording No. 42, 
side 2. In section 10.1 the legislature pro-
vided its definition of joint legal custody: 
In this chapter, "joint legal custody" 
(1) means the sharing of the rights, 
privileges, duties, and powers of a parent 
by both parents, where specified; 
(2) may include an award of exclusive 
authority by the court to one parent to 
make specific decisions; 
(3) does not affect the physical custo-
dy of the child except as specified in the 
order of joint legal custody; 
(4) is not based on awarding equal or 
nearly equal periods of physical custody 
of and access to the child to each of the 
parents, as the best interest of the child 
often requires that a primary physical 
residence for the child be designated; 
and 
(5) does not prohibit the court from 
specifying one parent as the primary 
caretaker and one home as the primary 
residence of the child. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1 (1989). Sub-
sections (1) and (2) define joint legal custo-
dy: both parents share the authority and 
responsibility to make basic decisions re-
garding their child's welfare. Subsections 
(3), (4) and (5) tell us what joint legal custo-
dy is not—it is not joint physical custody. 
We note that this statute does not contain a 
definition of nor a provision for "joint phys-
ical custody." 
Subsection 10.2(1) created a "rebuttable 
presumption" that joint legal custody is in 
the best interest of a child. But, that pre-
sumption was made subject to subsection 
(2) which provided: 
The court may order joint legal custody 
if it determines that: 
(a) both parents agree to an order of 
joint legal custody; 
(b) joint legal custody is in the best inter-
est of the child; and 
(c) both parents appear capable of imple-
menting joint legal custody. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2 (1989). 
The order remains discretionary with the 
court, not mandatory, even when all three 
conditions are satisfied, i.e., (1) parental 
agreement, (2) best interests, and (3) par-
ents capable of implementation. Further 
sections of the statute emphasize its "pa-
rental agreement" posture. We note that 
section 10.3—terms of joint legal custody 
order—contains two further subsections 
dealing with parental agreement: 
(2) The court shall, where possible, in-
clude in the order the terms agreed to 
between the parties; . . . 
(5) The agreement may contain a dispute 
resolution procedure the parties agree to 
use 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.3 (1989). More-
over, the termination provisions, section 
10.4, confer upon one parent the right to 
unilateral'y terminate the order of joint 
legal custody. The order can be terminat-
ed simply by filing and serving a motion. 
Once the motion is filed, the court is re-
quired to replace the order "with an order 
of sole legal custody under Section 30-3-
10." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4 (1989). 
This provision emphasizes the parental 
agreement stance of the statute as initially 
adopted and in force at the time of this 
divorce. 
We return to section 10.2(3) to point out 
that the legislature created a list of factor! 
the court shall consider in determining thi 
best interest of a child in the context of 
joint legal custody (not joint physical cusu> 
dy). Those factors are: 
(a) whether the physical, psychological 
and emotional needs and development of 
the child will benefit from joint lep) 
custody; 
(b) the ability of the parents to give 
priority to the welfare of the child 
reach shared decisions in the child's 
interest; , 
(c) whether each parent is capable of 
couraging and accepting a positive 
tionship between the child and the o 
parent; 
TIIRONSON y. 
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(d) whether both parents participated in 
raising the child before the filing of the 
suit; 
(e) the geographical proximity of the 
homes of the parents; 
(0 if the child is 12 years of age or older, 
any preference of the child for or against 
joint legal custody; and 
(g) any other factors the court finds rele-
vant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2(3) (1989). On 
the other hand, the legislature did not offer 
any guidance to trial courts' to assist in 
determining the "capability" of the par-
ents. The term is not defined. Section 
10 4 contains provisions for (1) modification 
of a joint legal custody order, (2) termi-
nation of the order discussed above, and (3) 
attorney's fees based on frivolous plead-
ings and harassment. Utah Code Ann. 
f 30-3-10.4 (1989). The modification provi-
sions appear to be a codification of the 
Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982) 
bifurcated procedure used in sole custody 
modifications. Prior to adoption of this 
statute in 1988, the only reported Utah 
esse dealing directly with an initial award 
of "joint custody" was Lembach v. Cox, 
tupra. There, the court stated "a custody 
arrangement, joint or otherwise, is within 
the broad equitable powers of the court." 
Further, the court said "[t]he fact that the 
father and the mother could not negotiate a 
joint custody arrangement demonstrates 
1 Other Uiah reported cases involving jo in! cus-
tody are: Moody v. Moody. 715 l».2d 507 (Utah 
1985) (modification hearing of an initial award 
of joint custody); Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608 
(Utah 1984) (on modification hearing, it was 
noted that trial court considered joint custody 
*• but did not order it in initial decree). 
i S. The child custody reform of the eighties 
L gained impetus from ongoing no fault divorce 
P trfulatlve reform. Utah added "irreconcilable 
£ differences" to its list of nine fault-based 
fc'c grounds in 1987. Utah Code Ann. 
f
 : f J0-i- l(3)(a) (1987). "Both reforms look 
r< place with no public commitment or private 
I * lahiative for the systematic assessment of the 
jfc left) changes on patterns of custody or on child 
xL welfare As fashions change and new interest 
f . group* emerge, family law is at risk of becom-
& fc*f a series of experiments that never report 
& v result! in ways that can help inform the legisla-
gk' I h * process." Zimring, Foreword to Sugarman 
THRONSON Utah 4 3 1 
(Ul.hApp. 1991) 
the inappropriateness of ordering joint cus-
tody." 639 P.2d at 200.* 
Prior to 1980, a handful of states includ-
ing California had adopted various forms of 
"joint custody" statutes. During the 
1980's "joint custody" was in vogue and a 
second wave of states adopted "joint custo-
dy" statutes. Utah became the thirty-sec-
ond state (and apparently the last) caught 
up in this wave. 2 Family Law and Prac-
tice, § 32.04 (A. Rutkin ed. 1990 & Supp.) 
(hereinafter "Fam. Law").3 
California, the acknowledged pioneer of 
no-fault divorce and joint custody, re-
trenched in 1988 regarding joint custody. 
California's 1979 statute contained a "pre-
sumption . . . that joint custody is in the 
best interests of a minor child where the 
parents have agreed to an award of joint 
custody." Cal.Civ.Code § 4600.5(a) (West 
1979). In 1983, California amended its 
joint custody statute to include a specific 
definition of both "physical" custody and 
"legal" custody. The California Legisla-
ture recognized the need to he more specif-
ic when in 1983 it defined joint legal custo-
dy to mean "both parents shall share the 
right and responsibility to make decisions 
relating to the health, education and wel-
fare of the child," Cal.Civ.Code § 4600.5Jd), 
and defined joint physical custodif as 
"each of the parents . . . (have) significant 
periods of physical custody." Cal.Civ.Code 
§ 4000.5(d)(5) (West 1988). A team of 
Stanford professionals proposed the need 
it Kay, Divorce Reform at the Crossroads, at viii 
(1990). As no fault made divorce virtually auto-
matic, fathers' groups began to protest a pro-
mother bias in child custody decisions. At the 
same lime, feminist groups began attacking le-
gal standards which were gender specific as in-
herently discriminatory. Then, fathers' groups 
turned the idea of gender neutrality to their 
advantage in the child custody aiena. These 
opposing forces set the stage for "joint custody" 
statutes based on the rationale of "equality" 
rather than "equity" and children end up taking 
a back scat to the drivers, i e., their divorcing 
parents. One writer succinctly summed up the 
result: 'This modern trend illustrates a move 
backward toward the more explicit lieminent of 
childien as property—only this lime the proper-
ly is lo be divided equally." Fineman, Domi-
nant Discourse. Professional language, and Le-
gal Change In Child Custody Decisionmaking, 
101 HarvL.Rev. 727. 739-40 (1988). 
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to consider "joint custody" as having a 
third form—the actual residential arrange-
ment for the child.1 Later, a California 
Task Force recommended that existing 
joint custody provisions be clarified to indi-
cate that no statutory presumption exists 
in favor of joint custody. In response, 
subsection (d) was added: 
This section establishes neither a prefer-
ence nor a presumption for or against 
joint legal custody, joint physical custo-
dy, or sole custody, but allows the courts 
and the family the widest discretion to 
choose a parenting plan which is in the 
best interests of the child or children. best interests 01 mc ^...._ 
Cal.Civ.Code § 4600(d) (West Supp.1989). 
HI Coincidentally, while this appeal 
was pending, the 1990 Utah Legislature 
substantially amended its two year-old joint 
legal custody statute deleting the "rebut-
table presumption" favoring joint legal cus-
tody. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2 
(1989 & Supp.1990). However, the legisla-
ture retained its initial definition of "joint 
legal custody," section 30-3-10 1, and the 
list of seven factors courts are required to 
consider in determining the best interests 
of the child in the context of joint legal 
custody. Section 30-3-10.2(3)(a-g). Also 
retained in the statute is some language 
regarding parental agreement: "The court 
shall, where possible, include in the order 
(joint legal custody order] the terms agreed 
to between the parties \ parents)," 
§ 30-3-10.3(2) (emphasis added), and, "The 
agreement may contain a dispute resolu-
tion procedure the parties agree to 
use " § 30-3-10.3(5) (emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.3 (1989). Our 
legislature's change of position on the "re-
buttable presumption" in favor of joint le-
gal custody and the necessity of parental 
agreement creates confusion concerning 
the public policy basis for the joint legal 
custody statute. Utah and California ap-
pear to be the first and only states to 
retrench from a presumption in favor of 
joint (legal) custody after having adopted 
the presumption. Due to the paucity of 
pre-Statute and absence of post-statute 
joint custody reported decisions in Utah, 
plus the fact that Utah's statute is not like 
that of any other state, we are left to 
decide an issue of first impression with 
little useful precedent. Mr. Thronson ar-
gues that we should apply the 1990 version 
of the joint legal custody statute, i.e., apply 
the amendments retroactively. We decline 
to do so. The 1990 amendments did not 
make a mere procedural change or simply 
clarify how the 1988 statute should have 
been understood originally. The amend-
ments were substantial and substantive, 
thus retroactive application is not appropri-
ate. See In re J.R, 648 P.2d 1364, 1369 n. 
4 (Utah 1982). 
ANALYSIS OF JOINT LEGAL 
CUSTODY AWARD UNDER § 
30-3-10.1 to -10.4 
As noted above, the majority of states 
have adopted statutes expressly authors I 
ing some form of "joint custody" award I 
Those statutes come in four basic formil 
1. joint custody as an option only when 
the parties petition or agree; 
2. joint custody as an option; 
3. joint custody as a presumption * 
preference; 
4. joint custody split into joint legal cut 
tody and joint physical custody. ] 
Fam.Law, § 32.0612]. Initially, Utah 
bined forms 1 and 3. Now, Utah is form 
but only as to joint "legal" custody. Ha 
the trial court faced Utah's initial BUt 
with a favorable presumption on one h 
and the requirement of parents' agreei 
on the other. Ma. Thronson opposed a
 w 
custody order. The trial court failed 
meet the parental agreement requirem 
head-on. Instead, th£ court found "< 
exists substantial difficulty between 
parties" and "it is in the best interesUi 
the child for the parties to be awsH 
joint legal custody." The court failed' 
4. -There .re , « u , . . r * £ £ £ £ t ^ X * 
, « . , : .he leg.. " • " ^ f i ^ S * res.denU.1 
cu5.ody agreementi .nd •" ^ . ^ ^ ,„ 
rately to understand the implications of I 
for the functioning of the post-divorce fin 
Albiston, Maccoby, & Mnookin, Does Jointl 
Custody Matter\ Stan.L. & Poly Rev. I67.J 
(1990). 
THRONSON 
ciKMfio r*4 
find whether the parents agreed or disa-
greed as to an order of joint legal custody. 
At the time the court ruled, the statute 
stated: 
The court may order joint legal custody 
if it determines that: 
(a) both parents agree to an order of 
joint legal custody . . . Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-10.2(2)(a) (1989). 
The form of the statute required a 
threshold finding of parental "agreement." 
The trial court implicitly found "disagree-
ment" but proceeded with the order. 
Moreover, the record reveals opposition to 
the order, i.e., no agreement Several 
states have adopted the "parental agree-
ment" form of joint custody statute, includ-
ing Colorado, Texas and Kansas.* The Col-
orado statute, for example, requires -that 
any motion for joint custody be filed by 
both parties, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 14-10-124(5) 
(1973), and that any plan for joint custody 
must be jointly agreed to by the parties, 
Colo.Rev.Stat. § 14-10-124.5(5) (1973). In 
Colorado, a trial court ordered joint custo-
dy over the objection of the mother. The 
appellate court ruled that the award in the 
absence of agreement of the parties was an 
abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of 
Potinoff, 683 P.2d 377, 378 (Colo.Ct.App. 
1984). See a/50 Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 672 
S.W.2d 887 (Tex.Ct.App. 1984) (court has no 
authority to award joint custody without 
agreement); Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Kan. 
App2d 284, 615 P.2d 806 (1980) (without 
agreement, joint custody award unautho-
rised). 
(2) We hold that the trial court abused 
ka discretion by imposing the order of joint 
, kftl custody on the parents and child. 
' Th* statute required parental agreement. 
> Here, there was parental opposition. See 
} Unbach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197, 200 (Utah 
K lttl) (inappropriate to order joint custody 
|jiktre parents not in agreement). Thus, 
* wt vacate the order of joint legal custody. 
)D«e to our ruling and remand, we need not 
|Mtch M* Thronson's challenge to the pro-
Illinois. Massachusetts, Ohio, and Wisconsin 
t alto adopted simitar statutes. Fam.Law 
v. THRONSON Utah 4 3 3 
42a (UuhApp. m i ) 
vision for automatic change of custody 
when one parent moves from the state. 
ANALYSIS OF CHILD CUSTODY 
UNDER § 30-3-10 
Our vacating of the order of joint legal 
custody is not necessarily dispositive of the 
issues of child custody, including legal cus-
tody, i.e., decision-making, and physical 
custody, i.e., caregiving and visitation 
rights. The trial court's findings might 
support a "best interests" custody award 
under § 30-3-10, although an award of 
joint legal custody was improper. How-
ever, both the court's memorandum deci-
sion and formal findings specify the court's 
reliance on the legislature's list of best 
interest factors in the joint legal custody 
statute § 30-3-10.2(3) enumerated above. 
On the other hand, § 30-3-10 provides: 
In determining custody, the court shall 
consider the best interests of the child 
and the past conduct and demonstrated 
moral standards of each of the parties. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 (1989) (emphasis 
added). 
Our Supreme court has developed the 
best interest factors to be considered under 
this provision. 
We believe that the choice in compet-
ing child custody claims should instead 
be based on function-related factors. 
Prominent among these, though not ex-
clusive, is the identity of the primary 
caretaker during the marriage. Other 
factors should include the identity of the 
parent with greater flexibility to provide 
personal care for the child and the identi-
ty of the parent with whom the child has 
spent most of his or her time pending 
custody determination if that period has 
been lengthy. Another important factor 
should be the stability of the environ-
ment provided by each parent. 
Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 
1986) (emphasis added). See also Hutchi-
son v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 
1982); Rule 4-903(3) Utah Code of Jud Ad-
§ 32 06(21 at n. 45. 
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mm (1980) (requiring custody evaluators to 
consider and respond to a list of factors) 
131 Our comparison of the two lists of 
factors re\eals that they are not identical, 
although some similarities appear More 
over, the context of the respective factors 
point the thrust of the trial court s inquiry 
in tv»o different directions As a result, 
the findings herein will not support an ulti 
mate finding under § JO-3-10 that child 
custody should be placed with one parent 
or the other Further, the findings contain 
internal disagreement The memorandum 
decision states ' the court desires the par 
ties to arrange between themselves for rea 
sonable and liberal visitation which they 
determine To the same effect is formal 
finding number 61 ' [i]t is in the best 
interests of the parties and their minor 
child to attempt to arrange between them 
selves reasonable and liberal visitation 
If the parties are unable to do so, the court 
will set a specific schedule" But, the 
court in formal finding number 65 took 
that promised privilege away from the par 
ties stating— (i)n light of an appropriate 
reasonable and liberal visitation schedule, it 
is reasonable that the parties' minor child 
will spend 577 of his time with plaintiff, 
who has primary physical custody, and 41% 
of his time with the defendant" The 
* 57^ visitation award to the mother pro 
vides the basis for the "primary physical 
custody statement This was the only 
time the trial court mentioned physical cus 
tody This specification of visitation time 
surreptitiously imposed an award of joint 
physical custody upon the parties without 
proper consideration of the best interest 
factors under § 30-3-10 We hold the find 
ings to be inadequate to support any award 
of child custody because 
(1) The trial court utilized best interest 
factors related to joint legal custody 
§ 30-3-10 2(3) and not the factors related 
to child custody § 3 0 - M 0 
(2) The findings are in conflict as to the 
determination of visitation rights, i e , by 
the court or the parents, 
(3) The findings do not support any 
award of physical custody, and 
(4) Custody was awarded on the basis of 
a court imposed visitation time allocation 
Our task Is to act in the best Interest* el 
the child We must vacate and remand the 
custody and visitation award We do Ml 
remand simply for revision of the finding 
or with directions to modify the decrt« 
regarding these matters During the inter* 
im, the facts regarding the parents aad 
their child and their relationships mijcbt 
have been dramatically changed Further, 
the joint legal custody statute has bet* 
substantially amended The current fttta-
al and legal circumstances should be exam-
ined before this matter is finalized That, 
we remand for further fact finding and t 
new legal determination, utilizing whaler* 
procedures and hearings the trial court 
deems necessary—consistent with tfcji 
opinion 
CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
(41 Child support will have to be recg*> 
sidered in connection with the above f* 
mand Utah Code Ann § 78-45-7 4 (Su?fv 
W 0 ) reveals that the support obligate* k 
intended to be a shared obligation of boU 
parents This obligation must be allocalW 
in proportion to the parties' adjusted great 
income pursuant to Utah Code An*. 
§ 78-45-7 5 to -7 7 Subsection 7 5 ua* 
the items of income to be included in gnat 
income It also lists two items to be s*Ja» 
traded from gross income to calculate *4> 
justed gross income alimony previous^ 
ordered and paid and child support prtvl 
ously ordered Neither of those item* k 
applicable here Ihus, gross income m U» 
same as adjusted gross income in thu cat* 
But, the trial court failed to include in c o t 
from nonearned sources as required If 
§ 78-45-7 5(1 )(a) Moreover, the trial eoelt 
averaged Mr Thronson s earned income fir 
several years rather than using "currt* 
earnings ' Section 78-45-7 5(5Hb) fesV 
cates that current earnings are to be u**l 
On remand child support calculation* 
should properly account for these fttai 
pursuant to the statutory requirement*. 
ALIMONY AWARD 
The trial court awarded Ms Throats! 
alimony of $800 per month for one j«a\ 
THRONSON v 
CtfcasSIO rid 42* 
iVte factor* must be considered by the 
tm) court in making an alimony award 
I the financial condition and needs of 
the party seeking alimony, 
t that party's ability to produce suffi 
arnt income for him or herself, and 
t the ability of the other party to pro 
tide support 
.Wmiyo v Naranjo, 751 P2d 1144, 1147 
(luh CtApp 1988) (citing Engltsh v Eng 
M . 5*5 P2d 409 410 (Utah 1977)) 
"Failure to analyze the parties' circum 
•fences in light of these three factors con 
•ttute* an abuse of discretion " Id (citing 
fkfftt v Paffel 732 P 2d 96, 100 (Utah 
IJ&SD As long as the trial court exercises 
fei discretion within the bounds and under 
&W standards we have set and has sup 
farted it* decision with adequate findings 
**4 conclusions, we will not disturb its 
ttftAfs Dams v Darns, 749 P 2d 647, 649 
(Vuh 1988) 
( l | Here the trial court considered each 
W the alimony factors and entered find 
•4-v Ms Thronson R actual and necessary 
•oftthly living expenses were found to be 
11*00 She presented a higher figure, but 
•Vc court heard evidence challenging cer 
tut items and found them to be overstated 
X*. Thronson's current earning capacity, 
a* a full lime pharmacist, was found to be 
C&000 a year gross This finding was 
tftitd on competent evidence and repre 
Matt the midpoint of an annual gross sala 
rj noge of $31 000 to ${9,000 The final 
fetor, Mr Thronson's ability to provide 
atfport, i e, his earning capacity, was con 
ttsfcrtd by the trial court He submitted a 
tt*rt<<n-year summary of his income The 
toal court used an average of the last eight 
jttn, after excluding some contingent fee 
fee*** in three of those years Thus, the 
•Mft found Mr Thronson's average gross 
acta* to be $71 376 annually This calcu 
ItfM and finding was in error Mr Thron 
SMS schedule showed his current gross 
•rung capacity to be $94 47G annually 
Xeiertheless, we cannot say that an award 
•11800 per month in alimony is an abuse of 
sWmjon given the above factors and oth 
•r financial circumstances of the parties 
Wt, we do hold that the trial court abused 
THRONSON Utah 4 3 5 
(UuSApp 1991) 
it* discretion In making the alimony non 
permanent, 1 e , for one year 
The trial court found that "an annual 
income of $35,000 should be imputed" to 
Ms Thronson 1 e , she could earn that 
amount, assuming she was employed on a 
full time basis But, the court found her 
needs to be $3,700 per month, 1 e , $44,400 
annually Accordingly, she is not capable 
of meeting her needs, she requires $9 400 
annually to meet her needs, even when 
employed on a full time basis Thus, she 
will require the $800 per month ($9 600 
annually) alimony for the forseeable fu 
ture Otherwise, she will face a substan 
tial income shortfall compared to her 
needs Further, the trial court found Mr 
Thronson s actual and necessary monthly 
living expenses to be $4,300 per month, 1 e , 
$51,600 annually This leaves him with 
some discretionary income These findings 
warrant an award of permanent alimony 
The trial court abused its discretion in lim 
iting the alimony award to one year Ras 
band v Hatband 752 P 2d 1.U1 1JJ5 
(Utah Ct App 1988) We remand for modi 
fication of the alimony award to be penna 
nent alimony of $800 per month 
OTHER FINANCIAL AND 
PROPKRrY AWARDS 
There is no fixed formula upon which to 
determine a division of property in a di 
vorce action The trial court has considera 
ble latitude in adjusting financial and prop-
erty interests, and its actions are entitled 
to a presumption of validity See Naranjo, 
751 P 2d at 1146 Ms Thronson claims the 
trial court erred by failing to restore to her 
inheritance monies expended by her while 
Hie parties were separated prior to divorce, 
by failing to replace certain furniture re 
moved by Mr Thronson, and by failing to 
restore certain funds spent by Mr Thron 
son after they separated We have exam 
med these items and find no abuse of trial 
court discretion This court will not dis 
turb a determination of financial and prop 
erty interests unless it is clearly unjust or a 
clear abuse of discretion Rasband, 752 
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on these matters. 
BENCH and GARFF. JJ.. concur 
P2d at 1335. Thus. » e affirm the rulings applied retroactively. U.C.A.1953. 2G-1S-
7tlKa). 
2. Social Security and Public We If art 
*»24l 
State *as entitled to recover from rt* 
cipients medical assistance payments ad-
vanced in his hehalf, as recipient settled tut 
claim with insurer without state's consent 
U.C.A.1953, 26-19-7(l)(a). 
3. Soclul Security and Public Welfsrt 
Because recipient of state medical it* 
sistance payments settled claim with imuf 
er without state's consent, state was enti-
tled to recover those medical assistant* 
payments, even though insurer's writta* 
offer to settle for policy limits predaUd 
hoth recipient's application for State aaiial* 
ance and state's acceptance; recipient's 
claim was not fully and legally settled until 
several months after state became obligatr 
ed. U.C.A.1953, 26-19-7(l)(a). 
4. Social Security and Public Wclfaft 
^241 
Where recipient of state medical auisV 
ance payments had claim for recovery 
against insurer of owners and driver of 
automobile which caused recipient's inju-
ries, and recipient pursued that claim with-
out state's consent, state's claim again** 
recipient under Medical Benefits Recovery 
Act included "any proceeds" payable by 
third party to extent of State medical as-
sistance provided to him. U.C.A.1953, 2S-
19-5, 2<M9-7(l)(a). 
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF 
Aundrae I1I(>LEY, a minor. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL 
SERVICES. Appellee, 
v. 
Dennis J. IUC.LEY, 
conservator. Appellant. 
No. 900236-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 10, 1991. 
After recipient of state medical assist-
ance payments settled his claim against the 
insurer of the owner of the automobile 
which caused his accident, State brought 
action against recipient under the Medical 
Benefits Recover) Act to recover medical 
assistance paxmenis provided for recipient. 
The Third District Court, Salt I^ke County. 
David S. Young, J., entered summary judg-
ment for State, and recipient appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held 
that- (1) 1989 amendments to the Act ap-
plied retroactively, and (2) because recipi-
ent settled the claim without state's con-
sent, state was entitled to recover the medi-
cal assistance payments. 
Affirmed. 
I. Social Security and Public Welfare 
«=»24T 
1989 amendment to Medical Benefits 
Recovery Act, which previously prohibited 
filing of claim without State consent and, 
as amended, included settlement, compro-
mise, release, or waiver of claim as well, 
was not substantive, and thus, could be 
Victor Lawrence (argued), Salt Laki 
City, for appellant. 
R. Paul Van Dam, State Atty. Gen., and 
Douglas W. Springmeyer, Asst. Atty. Cea. 
(argued), Salt Lake City, for appellee. 
Before BENCH, JACKSON and 
RUSSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Appellant ("the conservator") appeak 
from a summary judgment based on the 
Medical Benefits Recovery Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 26-19-1 to -18 (1989).' The trial 
court granted Utah Department of Social 
Services' ("the State") motion to recover 
state medical assistance payments provided 
for Aundrae Higley ("Higley"), minor son 
•f the conservator.2 The recovery consist-
ed of proceeds obtained by Higley's coiiHer-
tatwr through a settlement with an auto-
Mobde insurance carrier. We affirm. 
ISSUES 
Appellant raises four issues concerning 
ifpUcation of the provisions of the Medical 
Benefit* Recovery Act: (1) the 1989 amend-
ment! to § 26-19-7 should not be applied; 
CO he did not file any claim or commence 
any action which would trigger the State's 
nfht to recover; (3) he agreed to settle the 
Ihirdparty claim before the State paid or 
fctcaroe obligated to pay any medical assist-
•act, thus the State's right to recover was 
ft* triggered; and (4) the State is not 
tattled to recover insurance proceeds 
wkkh were paid to him other than "medical 
casta." 
FACTS 
Both parties filed motions for summary 
Judgment. The material facts are undis-
aated. On April 30, 1985, Higley sustained 
•cnoui personal injuries. He was sitting 
M a car. The driver suddenly drove the 
car away causing Higley to fall and strike 
an head on the pavement. Farmers Insur-
ance Exchange ("Farmers") had issued a 
aobcy of motor vehicle insurance covering 
tfct car's owners and driver. The policy 
coverage limits were $5,000 first-party no-
fauh medical benefits and $20,000 for lia-
L For discussion relating lo whether the 1984 or 
1*#9 version of ihe statute applies, see infra at 
pp. 437-438. 
t The Medical Benefits Recovery Act operates in 
tudem wnh the Medical Assistance Act 
I 26-1M to - I I (1989). Section 26-18-10, 
tub Medical Assistance Program, provides in 
a** 
(I) The division shall develop a medical as-
ustance program, which shall be known as 
ihe Ulah Medical Assistance Program, for low 
Income persons who are not eligible under 
MATTER OF ESTATE OF IIIGLEY 
ClleuSIO PJd 4M (UtahApp. 1991) 
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bility to third parties for persona) injuries. 
Higley'B medical bills amounted to more 
than $55,000. I Farmers verbally offered to 
pay the $5,000 medical benefits, and $20,-
000 personal injury liability policy limits 
immediately after the accident. Farmers' 
offer was confirmed by a letter addressed 
to Higley's parents dated May 31, 1985. 
Thereafter, Farmers paid $5,000 to Hig-
ley's medical care providers. No one filed 
an action against the car's owners or the 
driver, and no formal claim was filed with 
Farmers. 
Higley and his parents applied to the 
State for medical assistance, i.e., payment 
of his medical expenses. The application 
form is entitled "application and affidavit 
for financial, medical assistance arid food 
stamps." The application portion of the 
form is a basic income and asset financial 
statement of the family. The affidavit por-
tion of the form contains a sworn oath 
stating that the information supplied is 
truthful, an assignment to the State of "all 
rights to benefits otherwise payable to me 
for medical services" and the following ac-
knowledgment: 
If 1 have a right of recovery under an 
insurance policy or against a person who 
may be liable for the medical expenses, I 
have an obligation to the State of Utah 
for medical expenses paid on my or my 
dependents behalf by the Utah Depart-
ment of Health. 
The Higleys in their application did not 
mention Farmers' written offer to pay both 
the $5,000 medical payments and the $20,-
000 personal injury coverage. The applica-
tion was filed on June 10, 1985 and the 
State certified them as eligible for benefits 
on June 20, 1985. On October 30, 1985, 
the ptalr plan for Medicaid under Title XIX of 
the Social Scciuify Act or Medicate under 
Title XVIII of that act .. 
(3) The department shall develop standards 
and administer policies relating to eligibility 
requnements for participation in the pro-
gram, and for payment of medical claims for 
eligible persons 
(4) The progiam shall be a payor of last re-
sort Before assistance is rendered the divi-
sion shall investigate the availability of the 
resources of the spouse, father, mother, and 
adult children of the person making applica-
tion. 
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78-2a-2 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing 
fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term of appointment 
to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is until the first general election 
held more than three years after the effective date of the appointment. There-
after, the term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the date of elec-
tion. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon request of the Judicial 
Council, until a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per 
annum or fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three 
judges. Assignment to panels shall be by random rotation of all judges of the 
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection 
of a chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from 
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of 
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A 
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than 
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting 
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge 
by majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties 
of a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme 
Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L. ficeof a judge of the Court of Appeals is 6 years 
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7. and until a successor is appointed and ap-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- proved under Section 20-1-7.1," into the 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection present third and fourth sentences and made 
(1), divided and rewrote the former third sen- minor stylistic changes, 
tence, which read "Thereafter, the term of of-
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
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(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involv-
ing a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 
1991, ch. 268, § 22. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment by ch 73, effective April 25, 1988, in-
serted subsection designations (a) and (b) in 
Subsection (1), inserted "resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings" in Subsection (2)(a), 
substituted "state agencies" for "state and local 
agencies" in Subsection (2)(a), substituted "in-
formal adjudicative proceedings of the agen-
cies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a), deleted 
"notwithstanding any other provision of law" 
at the end of Subsection (2)(a), inserted Subsec-
tion (b), redesignated former Subsections (2Kb) 
to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i), added 
"except those from the small claims depart-
ment of a circuit court" at the end of Subsec-
tion (2)(d), and made minor stylistic changes 
The 1988 amendment by ch 210, effective 
April 25, 1988, added Subsection (2)(h) and re-
designated former Subsection (2)(h) as Subsec-
tion (2)(i) 
The 1988 amendment by ch 248, effective 
Apnl 25, 1988, m Subsection (2)(a), rewrote 
the phrase before "except" which had read "the 
final orders and decrees of state and local agen-
cies or appeals from the district court review of 
them", deleted "notwithstanding any other 
provision of law" at the end of Subsection 
(2)(a); inserted present Subsection (2)(b), desig-
nated former Subsections (2)(b) to (2)(h) as 
Subsections (2)(c) to (2)0), and substituted 
"first degree or capital felony" for "first or capi-
tal degree felony" m present Subsection (2)(f) 
The 1990 amendment by ch 80, effective 
April 23, 1990, rewrote Subsection (2)(g), 
which read "appeals from orders on petitions 
for extraordinary writs involving a criminal 
conviction, except those involving a first de-
gree or capital felony" and made punctuation 
changes in Subsections (2)(h) and (3) 
The 1990 amendment by ch 224, effective 
Apnl 23, 1990, inserted the subdivision desig-
nation d) in Subsection (2Kb) and added Sub-
section (2)(b)(n), and made related styLstic 
changes 
The 1991 amendment, effective January 1, 
1992, substituted "a court of record" for "dis-
trict court" in Subsection (2)(f) 
Cross-References. — Composition and ju-
risdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 
39-6-16 
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UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 78-45-7.5 
78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used. 
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share of 
the child support award. Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of the 
child may be used to determine the award under these guidelines. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L. came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
1989, ch. 214, § 6. Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 214 be-
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
"nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
full-time job. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Train-
ing Partnership Act, S.S.L, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assis-
tance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ-
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly in-
come. 
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earn-
ings, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements. Each par-
ent shall supplement documentation of current earnings with copies of 
tax returns from at least the most recent year to provide verification of 
earnings over time and shall document income from nonearned sources 
according to the source. Verification of income from records maintained 
by the Office of Employment Security may be substituted for employer 
statements and income tax returns. 
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(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whethefi 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 3 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7). , & 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. **+\£ 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent , t h e income shall be based upon 
employment potent ial and probable ea rn ings as derived from work his-' 
tory, occupation qualif ications, and prevai l ing ea rn ings for persons af 
s imi lar backgrounds in t h e community . Hg 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed afr 
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer 
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. *; 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:, 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children, 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent c®$ 
earn; '% 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he1 
cannot earn minimum wage; i% 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to estate 
lish basic job skills; or ^ 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the. 
custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject of a child support award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right, such as Supplemental Security Income. «^ 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a 
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obliga-
tion of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered 
as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L. parent, the income shall be based" for "Income, 
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5. shall be imputed to a parent based," and made 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- a stylistic change in Subsection (7)(c) 
ment, effective April 23, 1990, added the last Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214 
sentence in Subsection (5)(b), in Subsection became effective on Apnl 24,1989, pursuant to 
(7)(b) substituted "If income is imputed to a Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Modification of award 
Cited 
ANALYSIS support amount without finding that a mate-
rial change of circumstances had occurred 
since the previous order had been entered. 
Bailey v Adams, 798 P 2d 1142 (Utah Ct App. 
Modification of award. 1990) (applying § 78-45-7 2(1 Kb) prior to 1990 
When the parties had agreed to the amount amendment regarding impact of guidelines on 
of child support before the effective date of the existing support orders) 
child support guidelines, the trial court erred 
in modifying child support when no petition to Cited in Thronson v Thronson, 810 P 2d 428 
modify had been filed and in modifying the (Utah Ct App 1991) 
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